Major Thomas L. “Tom” Cubbage II

Military Intelligence Branch, U.S. Army (Ret.)

Active Duty Period: May 1965–May 1971

Vietnam Veteran 1967–68

 

Books, Papers, and Reviews

BOOKS:

"German Misapprehensions Regarding OVERLORD: Understanding Failure in the Estimative Process." Intelligence and National Security, 2 (July 1987): pp. 114–74, also in Michael I. Handel (ed.), Strategic and Operational Deception in the Second World War (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd, 1987). Adapted from paper presented at the Conference on Intelligence and Military Operations, U.S. Army War College (April 1986).

“The Success of Operations Fortitude: Hesketh’s History of Strategic Deception.” Intelligence and National Security, 2 (July 1987): pp. 327–46, also in Michael I. Handel (ed.), Strategic and Operational Deception in the Second World War (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd, 1987).

“Westmoreland v. C.B.S.: Was Intelligence Corrupted by Policy Demands?” Intelligence and National Security, 3 (August 1988): pp. 172–235, also in Michael I. Handel (ed.), Leaders and Intelligence (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd, 1988). Adapted from a paper presented at the Second Conference on Intelligence and Military Operations, U.S. Army War College (May 1987).

“Intelligence and the Têt Offensive: The South Vietnamese View of the Threat,” in The Vietnam War as History, Elizabeth Jane Errington and B. J. C. McKercher (eds.) (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990), pp. 91-116. Adapted from a paper presented at the 15th Military History Symposium, at the Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, Ontario (16-17 March 1989).

THESIS:

"ANTICIPATING OVERLORD — Intelligence and Deception: German Estimates of Allied Intentions to Land Invasion Forces in Northwest Europe," a Thesis presented to the Faculty of the General Intelligence Department, Defense Intelligence School, Washington, D.C. (6 June 1969).
See: http://www.tomcubbage.com/history/Anticipating-Overlord.pdf

PAPERS:

"German Misapprehensions Regarding OVERLORD: Understanding Failure in the Estimative Process," a paper presented at the Conference on Intelligence and Military Operations, U.S. Army War College (April 1986).
See: http://www.tomcubbage.com/history/German-Normandy.pdf

"Westmoreland v. C.B.S.: Was Intelligence Corrupted by Policy Demands?" a paper presented at the Second Conference on Intelligence and Military Operations, U.S. Army War College (May 1987).
See: http://www.tomcubbage.com/history/Westmoreland.pdf

"Westmoreland v. C.B.S.: Was Intelligence Corrupted by Policy Demands? An Special Abridged version of a paper presented at the Second Conference on Intelligence and Military Operations, U.S. Army War College (May 1987).
See: http://www.tomcubbage.com/history/Westmoreland-vs-CBS-Abridged.pdf

"Deception and Operation Market: Surprise Does Not Mean Victory." A paper presented at the Second Conference on Intelligence and Military Operations, U.S. Army War College (May 1987).
See: http://www.tomcubbage.com/history/Operation-Market.pdf

“From Falaise to Nijmegen with British Second Army - Chasing the Chimera: Preconception and Self-deception in War.” A paper presented at the Third Conference on Intelligence and Military Operations, U.S. Army War College (May 1988).
See: http://www.tomcubbage.com/history/Chasing-The-Chimera.pdf

“The Success of Operations Fortitude: Hesketh’s History of Strategic Deception.” An essay written at the request of Michael I. Handel (Army War College Staff). See: http://www.tomcubbage.com/history/Hesketh-Fortitude-Report.pdf

"Intelligence and the Têt Offensive: The South Vietnamese View of the Threat" A paper presented at the 15th Military History Symposium, at the Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, Ontario (16-17 March 1989).
See: http://www.tomcubbage.com/history/Tet-Saigon-Threat-Analysis.pdf

“Planning for Victory: The North Vietnamese War-Planning Up to the Têt Offensive.” As presented at The Theory and Practice of Strategy Conference, at the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA (8–10 February 1990).
See: http://www.tomcubbage.com/history/Strategies-In-Collision-Pre-Tet.pdf

“Strategy and Rationality in the Vietnam War: Hanoi’s Decisionmaking and the Têt Offensive.” Same text as “Planning For Victory.” As presented at The Second International Conference on Strategy, at the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA (7–9 February 1991).
See: http://www.tomcubbage.com/history/Strategy-And-Rationality.pdf

ARTICLE EDITED FOR PUBLICATION:

"Dudley W. Clarke, the Birth of "A" Force, and Allied Deception in World War II: The Remembrances of David Mure." Edited by T. L. Cubbage II (1988). Originally a paper presented at the Conference on Intelligence and Military Operations, U.S. Army War College (April 1986) by David Mure, who died that same year before the paper was finalized.
See: http://www.tomcubbage.com/history/David-Mure-Deception.pdf

REVIEW ESSAYS:

“The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War,” A review essay. Conflict Quarterly, Vol. XIII, No. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 73–84.

“Tet 1968 in a Nutshell,) A speech outline. (1990) Unpublished.
see: http://www.tomcubbage.com/history/Tet-1968-Nutshell.pdf

BOOK REVIEWS:

“Corporate Intelligence and Espionage: A Blueprint for Executive Decision Making.” A book review. Intelligence and National Security, 2 (May 1986), pp. 286–90.

“The Logic of Surprise in International Conflict.” A book review. Intelligence and National Security, 3 (January 1988), pp. 214–18.

“Deception Operations: Studies in the East-West Context,” A book review. Conflict Quarterly, Vol. XI, No. 1 (Winter 1991), pp. 87–88.
See: http://www.tomcubbage.com/history/Deception-Ops-Review.pdf

 

Rev: 02-06-2016