

# DECEPTION AND OPERATION MARKET: SURPRISE DOES NOT MEAN VICTORY

by T. L. CUBBAGE II, Major, MI, USAR (Ret.)

---

## INTRODUCTION

On Sunday afternoon, 17 September 1944, at half past one, twenty thousand airborne soldiers of the First Allied Airborne Army landed behind the German lines in the Netherlands. Their task—in Operation MARKET—was to capture intact the bridges over the Maas (Meuse), Waal, and Neder Rijn on the Eindhoven-Arnhem road. About an hour later—in Operation GARDEN—the ground forces of British 30th Corps attacked northeastward from the Meuse-Escout (Scheldt) Canal toward Arnhem. The combined objective of Operation MARKET-GARDEN was to outflank the Siegfried Line—the German *Westwall*—and cross the Rhine River. Once that was accomplished, the Ruhr basin would be encircled as the prelude to a war-winning British led, Allied Forces, thrust to Berlin.<sup>1</sup>

Field-Marshal Montgomery considered the battle at Arnhem to have been ninety percent successful.<sup>2</sup> Several others, following Montgomery's lead, and with some

---

<sup>1</sup> What the Allies called the Siegfried Line the Germans called the *Westwall*. "The name Siegfried Line, or *Siegfriedstellung*, had its origin in World War I when it was the codeword for the German defensive positions in the rear of the main line between Arras and Soissons." Charles B. MacDonald, *United States Army in World War - The Siegfried Line Campaign* (Washington: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1984), 30 fn. 23.

<sup>2</sup> Bernard L. Montgomery, *Normandy to the Baltic* (London: Hutchinson & Co. (Publishers) Limited, 1947), 149. "This claim is difficult to support, unless the success of

degree of persuasive effect, have succeeded in convincing first themselves and then others, that Operation GARDEN can be said to have been a success, albeit only partially so.<sup>3</sup> Certainly the U.S. 82nd and 101st airborne divisions accomplished their tasks, but the divisions could barely keep the Eindhoven-Nijmegen highway open, and the British 30th Corps was able to secure a bridgehead over the Waal at Nijmegen which later proved to be of some military value.<sup>4</sup> And, the fact that the bridge at Arnhem was kept closed to the German *SS Panzerdivisionen* north of the Neder Rijn for three days certainly contributed to the success—but more likely, to the survival—of the other forces. In honor of the memory of the Allied soldiers who died in action in Operation MARKET, this author notes that it has been described as a "glorious failure," and as an action in which the "troops carrier crews and airborne troops did all that men could do."<sup>5</sup> The tank and infantry troops of 30th Corps fought with no less gallantry.

However, in view of the key objective of Operation MARKET-GARDEN—the opening of the way to and *over* the Lower Rhine and into the Ruhr—the airborne and ground assault phases both were total failures. The defeat—no, the destruction—of the British 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem-Oosterbeek was

---

the operations is judged merely in terms of the numbers of bridges captured. Eight crossings were seized but the failure to secure the ninth, the bridge at Arnhem, mean the frustration of Montgomery's strategic purpose." Chester A Wilmot, *The Struggle for Europe* (1977, reprint, New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, Inc., 1986), 523.

<sup>3</sup> Montgomery, *Normandy to the Baltic*, 149. Some other Allied commanders also reported it to be a success; e.g., Hap Arnold ("Success, and I mean success."), and Lewis Brereton ("Operation MARKET was a brilliant success ...; the airborne operation was an outstanding success."), to note only two. Lewis H. Brereton, *The Brereton Diaries: The War in the Air in the Pacific, Middle East and Europe, 3 October 1941–8 May 1945* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1946), 360, 364-65.

<sup>4</sup> The bridgehead figured in the Battle for the *Reichswald* by 30th Corps from 8 February to 10 March 1945. Brian Horrocks, *A Full Life* (London: Leo Cooper Ltd., 1974), 248-54. For a contrary view of the practical value of the Arnhem adventure, see Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, *A General's Life: An Autobiography by General of the Army Omar N. Bradley* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 335-37.

<sup>5</sup> Francis de Guingand, *Generals at War* (Hodder and Stoughton Limited, 1964), 105 ("glorious failure"); John C. Warren, *Airborne Operations in World War II, European Theater* (Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Historical Division, Air University, 1956), 155.

perhaps the most conspicuous part of that failure. Survivor Lewis Golden said of it:

*A failure it was, a hundred per cent failure, for at 1825 hours on 20th September 1944 1st Parachute Brigade at the main bridge at Arnhem radioed back to [the] divisional headquarters that four enemy Tiger tanks had crossed the bridge from the north to south at 1815 hours. . . . [Thereafter the Arnhem Bridge] . . . remained in German hands until 14th April 1945. By then it had ceased to hold any importance for the Allied cause because some weeks earlier the river to the southeast had been crossed in substantial force."<sup>6</sup>*

A failure surely cannot be described more plainly than that.

Thus, considering the ultimate objective of Operation MARKET; considering the cost in men, equipment and the battle-worthiness of the airborne divisions; and considering the boost to the morale of the Germans that the battle for Arnhem produced, then rightly it must be judged to have been a total failure, and no amount of gloss will change that verdict.

This paper examines how Operation MARKET-GARDEN, and in particularly its airborne phase—called "one of the most daring and imaginative operations of the war"—became the biggest failure of the Allied campaign in northwest Europe.<sup>7</sup> Cloaked by a masterfully mounted deception operation, the strategic and initial tactical surprise was complete. But, over the course of a nine-day battle, the Allied forces failed in their objective. To understand why this was so, Operation

---

<sup>6</sup> Lewis Golden, *Echoes from Arnhem* (London: William Kimber and Co. Limited, 1984), 92.

<sup>7</sup> Bradley and Blair, *A General's Life*, 327 ("The Market Garden plan was a dazzler, . . . It seemed wholly improbable that it had sprung from Monty's ultra-conservative mind."); R. E. Urquhart, *Arnhem* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1958), 1 ("It was nothing if not daring.").

MARKET—the focus—will be examined from both the Allied and the German sides of the hill. And so the tale begins.<sup>8</sup>

From the Allied perspective, Operation MARKET can be fully understood only if it is examined in terms of each of the following: (1) the strategic context; (2) the pre-MARKET airborne plans, (3) the final operational planning; (4) the intelligence collection; (5) the strategic deception efforts; (6) the British-controlled deception agents; and (6) the uncontrolled German agents. To do the German side of the story full justice, Operation MARKET also should be closely examined in relation to the following: (a) the strategic concerns of the Germans; (b) their intelligence collection and analysis up to the point of the attack; (c) their reactions to the attack; and (d) the German intelligence estimates and command appreciations that followed the battle.<sup>9</sup>

The considerations of space require that this study of the Battle of Arnhem be narrowed. Thus, the main focus of this paper will be on the Allied deception effort, the pre-battle estimates of the Germans, the surprise of the attack, and the aftermath of the deception effort.

### Allied Strategy and the First Allied Airborne Army.

To understand Operation MARKET one must fit it within the strategic context of the war in northwestern Europe. The airborne and ground assault in Holland came in the days after the breakout from the Normandy lodgement; Operation MARKET came after the Allied pursuit of the Germans across France and Belgium following the collapse of the *Armeekorps 7* (defender of the Normandy invasion front). The two great Allied forces on the Continent—the 21st and 12th Army Groups—seemingly were ready to begin the march into Germany

---

<sup>8</sup> On 16 September, as he began his briefing of the officers of his British 30th Corps, Lieutenant-General Brian Horrocks, said that "this is a tale you will tell your grand-children," and with a pause continued, "and mightily bored they'll be." Cornelius Ryan, *A Bridge Too Far* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974), 165-66. This writer has always loved that line.

<sup>9</sup> This paper is part of a much longer work in progress that studies all of these factors.

and on to Berlin. In England another mighty force—the elite troops of the two airborne corps—were poised and looking for the opportunity to play a decisive role in the conclusion of the war on the continent.<sup>10</sup>

On 2 August General Dwight D. Eisenhower issued orders to activate the First Allied Airborne Army (FAAA) and its existence was acknowledged publicly over the B.B.C. on 10 August.<sup>11</sup> By 14 August the details of the FAAA organization had been worked out.<sup>12</sup> In command of the FAAA was Lieutenant General Lewis H. Brereton, formerly commander of the Ninth Air Force. Lieutenant-General Frederick A. M. "Boy" Browning (UK Army) was the deputy commander: he also commanded the British 1st Airborne Corps, one of the two corps under FAAA. The American component of FAAA, the XVIII Airborne Corps was commanded by Major General Matthew B. Ridgway. The major units under the command of FAAA included the U.S. 17th, 82d and 101st airborne divisions, the British 1st and 6th airborne divisions, the 52d (Lowland) Division (Airportable), and the Polish 1st Independent Parachute Brigade.<sup>13</sup> General Eisenhower told Brereton

---

<sup>10</sup> Brereton, *The Brereton Diaries*, 308-309, 332-33. "George Marshall and Hap Arnold had never abandoned the idea of massive and decisive airborne operations deep in enemy territory. Even before D day they resumed prodding Eisenhower, suggesting (as Boy Browning had earlier) that, to better mount such operations, the American and British airborne troops, and the troop carriers units, should be merged into a single command headed by a mini-Allied supreme commander. On 20 May Eisenhower assured Marshall that he was thinking along the same lines." Clay Blair, *Ridgway's Paratroopers: The American Airborne in World War II* (Garden City, NY: The Dial Press, 1985), 298. See also Russell Weigley, *Eisenhower's Lieutenants: The Campaign in France and Germany 1944-1945* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1981), 288-89.

<sup>11</sup> Martin Blumenson, *U.S. Army in World War II - Breakout and Pursuit* (Washington: Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1961), 658.

<sup>12</sup> Ltr, 21 AGp (de Guingand) to SHAEF, 14 Aug 44, in File: "Organization Combined US/British Air Tps. Hq.," WO 205/512, Public Records Office, Kew, England. The concept and the organization of the FAAA had been approved on 20 June 1944 to become effective when the SHAEF headquarters went to the Continent to assume operational control of the Allied forces. Ltr, Bedell Smith to G-3 SHAEF, 20 June 1944, WO 205/512, PRO.

<sup>13</sup> Brereton, *The Brereton Diaries*, 308-309, 332-33; Blair, *Ridgway's Paratroopers*, 298-305. Since the numbers of the American and British airborne divisions are not likely to cause any real confusion, one can dispense with speaking of the 17th, 82nd and 101st as the American divisions and the 1st and 6th as the British divisions. In like manner, the system for numbering corps—Roman versus Arabic numerals—will distinguish the nationality of the

that he wanted "a plan prepared which would have as its purpose a maximum contribution to the destruction of the German armies in Western Europe," and that he wanted "imagination and daring."<sup>14</sup>

No sooner was the FAAA command activated than there came upon the Allies the belief that the war might end in 1944. Beginning in mid-August 1944, after the two months of hard fighting following the Normandy D-Day landings, a great feeling of euphoria swept over the Allied commanders. Though he expressed caution, Prime Minister Winston Churchill initially was no less infected with the feeling that the end of the war in Europe might be very close. Thus, even the Allied Control Commission was alerted to be ready to set up an operational headquarters in the German capital of Berlin by 1 November 1944.<sup>15</sup>

Reflecting the general feeling of the Allied commanders, the SHAEF G-2 summary for 23 August said this: "*The August battles have done it and the enemy in the West has had it. Two and a half months of bitter fighting have brought the end of the war in Europe within sight, almost within reach.*"<sup>16</sup> In London, the Combined Intelligence Committee was convinced that the German strategic situation had deteriorated to the point where "no recovery is now possible."<sup>17</sup> The problem for the most senior Allied commanders—especially generals Eisenhower and Montgomery—was how to turn that belief into a reality.

---

commands. Finally, the numbered regiments all are part of the American forces, while the various brigades are either British or Polish troops.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid*, 308. "In October of 1918 ... [U.S.] General Billy Mitchell dumped plans in [Brereton's] ... lap to work out details for what then was something unheard of—a parachute drop behind the enemy's lines ... [as part of a plan] to take Metz from the rear by dropping an entire division by parachute from big bombers." *Ibid*, 309.

<sup>15</sup> Nigel Hamilton, *MONTY: Final Years of the Field-Marshal, 1944-1976* (London: Hamish Hamilton Ltd., 1986; New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1986), 3.

<sup>16</sup> Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower, Vol. 1, Soldier, General of the Army, President-Elect, 1890-1952* (New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1983; reprint, New York: A Touchstone Book, 1985), 336.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid*, 336-37.

On 7 September, 30th Corps of the British Second Army began a two-pronged attack from its positions along the Albert Canal: The plan called for the Guards Armoured Division to assault along the Eindhoven-St.-Oebenrode-Grave-Nijmegen-Arnhem road toward the city of Apeldoorn (a distance of about 150 km); the 11th Armored Division—on the left flank—was to advance on the Turnhour-Tilburg-'s Hertogenbosch-Zaltbommel-Tiel-Renkum road toward Ede (a distance of about 120 km). Unexpectedly strong German defenses in depth prevented the crossing of the Albert Canal by the 11th Armoured Division, and the 50th Division was committed in the area between the 11th and the Guards armored divisions. The Guards Armoured Division also encountered strong resistance but made some progress.<sup>18</sup>

On 8 September the Guards Armoured Division crossed the Albert Canal at Beringen and the 50th Division crossed at Geel. It took the Guards Armoured Division until 10 September to move some 25 km and cross the Meuse-Escaut Canal at Neerpelt (13 km west of Lommel). In the face of fierce German resistance the 15th Division replaced the 50th, but by 13 September the left wing of the 30th Corps attack had moved only 5 km and crossed the Aart Canal. The terrain favored the defenders and generally was unsuited for an armored advance—tank and wheeled units were forced to stay on the roads and cross-county movement was possible only for dismounted infantry units.<sup>19</sup>

On 9 September, in his nightly signal to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Field-Marshal Alan Brooke, Field-Marshal Bernard Montgomery expressed his concerns about the situation facing him:

*The assault on [Le] Havre takes place tomorrow night. In the Pas-de-Calais area the Germans are holding strongly [at] Boulogne, Calais and Dunkirk and these places may require to be methodically reduced. The enemy is also holding strongly [on] the general line Brugge-Gent-*

---

<sup>18</sup> Golden, *Echoes from Arnhem*, 115.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*

*St. Niklaas and he is counterattacking to maintain himself in that area. Second Army [forces] are meeting very determined resistance on the Albert Canal line and rapid progress here cannot now be expected. [Operation COMET,] the airborne drop in the Arnhem area on the Rhine has now been postponed for the present and cannot be undertaken until the leading [Thirty] Corps of Second Army reached Eindhoven. On the right the left two corps of First U.S. Army [—VII and XIX Corps—] have very little opposition but they cannot get on as they are short on petrol.*<sup>20</sup>

Although he did not say it in his message to Field-Marshal Brooke, Montgomery considered in his own mind the idea of abandoning the thrust aimed at Arnhem and concentrating on the capture of all of the German enclaves on the French-Belgian-Dutch coast, including the V-2 rocket launching area at Wassenaar (10 km northeast of The Hague).<sup>21</sup>

On 10 September the strategic situation changed. "To insure the establishment of at least one bridgehead beyond the Rhine, General [Dwight] Eisenhower ... approved employment by—Field-Marshal Montgomery of the Allied strategic reserve, the First Allied Airborne Army, which Montgomery was to use like seven-league boots in an attempt to get across the lower Rhine in the Netherlands."<sup>22</sup>

### Pre-MARKET Airborne Operations

Three airborne divisions had been utilized in the invasion of Normandy. The U.S. 82nd and 101st airborne divisions jumped in the early hours of 6 June 1944 in

---

<sup>20</sup> M.184, EXFOR TAC to CIGS, 092150 Sep 44, PP/MCR/C 30, Reel 10, BLM 110/68, Imperial War Museum, London.

<sup>21</sup> Hamilton, *MONTY: Final Years*, 40. The first V-2 rockets landed in London on 8 September. The next afternoon the Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff signaled Montgomery and asked that he "report by what approximate date you consider you can rope off the coastal area" from whence the rockets were being launched. Msg. 75237, VCIGS to 21AGpTac, 091310 Sep 44, PP/MCR/C 30, Reel 10, BLM 115/43, IWM. See also, David Johnson, *V-1 V-2: Hitler's Vengeance on London* (New York: Stein and Day Publishers, 1982), 95-102.

the Contentin Peninsula behind UTAH Beach. At the same time the British 6th Airborne Division landed on the eastern flank of the British invasion sector.<sup>23</sup> The British 1st Airborne Division, which had returned to England from Italy late in 1943, was kept in its base as part of the Allied reserve during the Battle of the Beachhead.<sup>24</sup>

Contingents of the airborne forces were used in France during the nights of 4 and 5 August when a small force of about two hundred French officers and men, and ten Waco gliders were landed in Brittany. The French Forces of the Interior (F.F.I.) in Brittany then numbered about 20,000. On 4 August, Colonel Albert M. Eon, designated by General Pierre Koenig as Commander of the F.F.I. in Brittany, and his staff parachuted into Brittany to assume command of the uprising that began in that region on 3 August. At the same time one hundred and fifty French paratroopers were dropped near Morlaix to seize and guard the key railroad viaduct in the city. On 5 August, ten American gliders landed between Vannes and Lorient to bring in armored jeeps, weapons and ammunition for the local F.F.I. units which were preparing to capture the airfield north of Vannes.<sup>25</sup>

The next use of troops in a major airborne assault was in Operation YOKUM in Southern France on 15 August in support of the Operation DRAGOON (ANVIL) invasion. The 1st Airborne Task Force was composed of the British 2nd Parachute Brigade (which stayed in the Mediterranean theater when the 1st Airborne Division went to England), the unattached U.S. 517 Parachute Infantry

---

<sup>22</sup> Blumenson, *Breakout and Pursuit*, 697.

<sup>23</sup> The 82nd Airborne Division was pulled out of the line and returned to England for rest and refitting on 8 July. The 101st came out at about the same time. It was mid-August before either was again ready for combat. The British 6th Airborne Division was not returned to England until late August and was not combat ready and available for deployment until 5 October 1944. Msg. SHAEF to FAAA, 051155 Sep 44, in File: "Subsidiary Airborne Operations to Further OVERLORD," AIR 37/775, PRO; Blair, *Ridgway's Paratroopers*, 294, 311-12.

<sup>24</sup> Golden, *Echoes from Arnhem*, 96.

<sup>25</sup> Blumenson, *Breakout and Pursuit*, 354-55, 392 fn. 16.

Regiment, the U.S. 509th and 551st parachute battalions, the U.S. 550th Glider Battalion, and the American 460th and 463d parachute artillery battalions.<sup>26</sup>

Operation YOKUM was a fiasco that ended well. The first part of the drop came by moonlight when the Riviera coast was hidden by a dense fog. Some of the transport pilots homed in on the Eureka navigation beacons placed in the drop zones by the pathfinders, but most planes dropped their sticks of paratroopers blind. About half of the paratroopers missed the three designated drop zones near le Muy (a road and rail hub 16 km behind the DRAGOON invasion beaches). The airborne troops were scattered along the coast from Cannes to Toulon.<sup>27</sup>

Half the YOKUM glider force was recalled; the remaining 35 Waco gliders found the landing zone about 0900 hours; all were badly damaged in landing. At 1800 hours the 551st Parachute Battalion made a text-book drop (the first American daylight jump in Europe). They were followed by 350 Waco gliders with the 550th Glider Battalion and the 35 Horsa gliders that were recalled earlier. All arrived at two glider landing zones at about the same time and chaos occurred. Almost all crashed into each other, or into houses, walls, ditches, trees, and the anti-glider stakes ("Rommel's asparagus")—only about 30 gliders were salvageable after it was over. Eleven glider pilots were killed, and many were injured, as were about one hundred of the glider troops.<sup>28</sup>

Fortunately, enemy opposition was light in the YOKUM landing areas and the disastrous parachute drops and glider landings did not leave the airborne forces too weak to survive—neither were they decisive in the event.<sup>29</sup>

---

<sup>26</sup> Blair, *Ridgway's Paratroopers*, 312-15.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 312-15.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.* Notable by their absence in the potential landing areas in the Operation MARKET area, where the "Rommel asparagus" (*Rommelspargel*)—anti-glider obstacles that had been erected by the tens of thousands in the Normandy and Pas-de-Calais areas and in the south of France.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*

Then, on 17 September 1944, came Operation MARKET in Holland. In the three and a half months between Operations OVERLORD and MARKET, the men in charge of planning for the utilization of the Allied airborne forces in northwestern Europe had not sat idly by. *It was a period when the airborne units were seen as an elite force in search of a mission.*<sup>30</sup>

As a practical matter, no really large-scale Allied airborne operation in northwestern Europe was possible until about 1 September.<sup>31</sup> However, no less than thirty-two different airborne operations were studied.<sup>32</sup> Some of the plans were studied at the request of SHAEF, or 21st and 12th Army Groups while others were conceived originally by the airborne planning staffs. Some ideas never went beyond the initial study phase, but others were planned in detail, and on several occasions the parachute and glider units were put on alert and sealed in their camps. Because the past is prologue, it would be interesting to recount here the many plans that preceded the Operation MARKET assault; but, except for COMET, no attempt will be made in this article.

The thirty-second and last pre-MARKET plan was Operation COMET. It was conceived at the request of 21st Army Group to support the drive north from the Albert Canal by 30th Corps—an operation which began on 7 September. The plan called for the use of 1st Airborne Division and the Polish 1st Independent Parachute Brigade. The plan assumed that the signal to launch the airborne assault would not be given until the tanks of Horrock's 30th Corps were in

---

<sup>30</sup> Eisenhower was under heavy pressure from Generals George Marshall and Hap Arnold to use the airborne forces. These highly trained elite forces were "like a coin burning a hole in SHAEF's pocket." Bradley and Blair, *A General's Life*, 328.

<sup>31</sup> Blumenson, *Breakout and Pursuit*, 185. The delay of the return of the airborne divisions to England after Overlord, "and their dispersed locations there, which made unit training difficult, plus a lack of suitable training areas, hindered preparations for immediate commitment. The demands on troop carrier units for air-supply prevented effective troop carrier exercises. The need at the end of July to divert almost 400 transport aircraft to the Mediterranean for the invasion of southern France" were the reasons why an earlier large-scale airborne operation was impractical. *Ibid.*

<sup>32</sup> Golden, *Echoes from Arnhem*, 96; Blair, *Rigdway's Paratroopers*, 320. Some accounts say there were fifteen or eighteen different plans; however this author counts at least thirty-two.

Eindhoven—having broken through the assumed thin crust of the German defensive line.<sup>33</sup>

In the COMET operation three *coup de main* units—each with one company from the division's 1st Airlanding Brigade, reinforced with Royal Engineers sappers—were to land at first light by gliders in the immediate vicinity of the three road bridges over the Maas at Graves, the Waal in Nijmegen and the Neder Rijn in Arnhem. As the glider assault forces of the 6th Airborne Division had on D-Day, the COMET *coup de main* forces planned to immediately overpower the German troops guarding the bridges, to disarm the demolition charges and to set up a tight defense perimeter at each of the three key bridges. The COMET plan also provided that soon after the glider assaults, the 4th Parachute Brigade would jump at Graves, the 1st Airlanding Brigade and divisional headquarters would land at Nijmegen, and the 1st Parachute Brigade would drop at Arnhem. The Polish Brigade would arrive at Graves later to relieve the 4th Brigade. There were no LZs and DZs near the bridges; accordingly, the airborne planners knew that surprise in the assault on the bridges would depend on whether the *coup de main* forces could be landed successfully. The C-in-C of the Air Staff was of the view that the assault force and air crews would suffer relatively high losses—perhaps as many as thirty percent of the men and aircraft. It was to be a calculated high-risk operation.<sup>34</sup>

---

<sup>33</sup> Msg. Hq AIRTRPS to Hq 2d Army, 052035 Sep 44, in File: 21AGp/00/432/Ops(A), "Opn MARKET," WO 205/192, PRO; Msg. G.041, 2d Army to 21 AGp, 081910 Sep 44, in File: 21AGp/20760/G(Plans), "Operation Linnet," WO 205/692; Msg. G.057, 2d Army to 21 AGp, 092010 Sep 44, WO 205/692; Msg. V.25192, FAAA/Brereton to SHAEF, 101240 Sep 44, WO 205/692; Golden, *Echoes from Arnhem*, 100, 102, 114; Hamilton, *MONTY: Final Years*, 32

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.* Operation DEADSTICK glider forces of the 6th Airborne Division had captured intact the bridges over the Orne River and canal at Bénouville and Ranville in less than ten minutes after a semi-moonlight landing at 0016 hours. This success inspired the FAAA planners; however in contrast to the slap-dash approach to COMET, the *coup de main* element of the 6th Airborne Division had repeatedly rehearsed the glider assault—the six glider pilots in Operation DEADSTICK had made forty-three training flights, and over half of them were at night. Stephen A. Ambrose, *Pegasus Bridge: June 6, 1944* (1985; reprint, New York: Pocket Books, 1986), 64-71, 102-121.

The assault was planned originally to go with the glider assaults on the night of 7/8 September and the landing of the follow-up forces at the beginning of daylight on the morning of 8 September. As H-Hour for COMET approached the British and Polish force was poised to execute the plan during the pre-dawn hours of 8 September; however, the attack was postponed by a combination of bad weather and the strong enemy resistance to the efforts of 30th Corps to cross the Albert Canal. At 1710 hours on 8 September COMET was rescheduled for the night and dawn hours of 9/10 September; at 2010 hours on 9 September it was rescheduled again for the night of 11/12 September. At 1240 hours on 10 September Brereton signaled SHAEF that the air assault was postponed again to the night of 12/13 September. By then the Allied commanders had realized that the German defensive front had solidified and the headlong retreat was over.<sup>35</sup>

At 1500 hours on 10 September, less than three hours after Operation COMET was postponed for the last time, First Allied Airborne Army received new orders from Field-Marshal Montgomery to plan for Operation MARKET using the forces of COMET reinforced by two U.S. airborne divisions and the Dutch Parachute Brigade.<sup>36</sup>

In a rush of planning the details of the attack were worked out. Although the assault force would be larger, the new plan of attack did not provide for the immediate capture of the bridges by *coup de main* glider forces. That fact, and several others, would make a critical difference.<sup>37</sup> Thus the stage was set for Operation

---

<sup>35</sup> Msg. Hq AIRTRPS to Hq 2d Army, 052035 Sep 44, in File: 21AGp/00/432/Ops(A), "Opn MARKET," WO 205/192, PRO; Msg. G.041, 2d Army to 21 AGp, 081910 Sep 44, WO 205/692; Msg. G.057, 2d Army to 21 AGp, 092010 Sep 44, WO 205/692; Msg. V.25192, FAAA/Brereton to SHAEF, 101240 Sep 44, WO 205/692; Golden, *Echoes from Arnhem*, 100, 102, 114; Hamilton, *MONTY: Final Years*, 32.

<sup>36</sup>. Golden, *Echoes from Arnhem*, 100.

<sup>37</sup>. Brereton, *The Brereton Diaries*, 342-43, 345-46, 357-58, 360, 363-64.

MARKET and for the use of the bulk of the Allied Airborne Army in a mass parachute and glider assault.

## ALLIED STRATEGIC DECEPTION OPERATIONS

### The Strategic Deception Effort

Like Operation OVERLORD, with its accompanying deception effort (Operation FORTITUDE), the execution of Operation MARKET was cloaked by SHAEF within the folds of an elaborate on-going strategic deception operation. This effort was part of the extension of the FORTITUDE SOUTH II plan, as amended by the SHAEF deception policy directive of 8 September; the plan did not have a separate code name.<sup>38</sup> There also were some tactical level deceptions in the front line areas. "In order that the enemy might believe that the supply situation [was] such as to make impossible an advance by the Northern Group of Armies, the cavalry patrols were withdrawn as much as 10 miles in some instances. At the same time the U.S. First and Third Armies made attacks into Germany and across the Moselle in order to mislead the enemy as to the Allied intentions."<sup>39</sup>

---

<sup>38</sup>. Roger Fleetwood Hesketh, "FORTITUDE: A History of Strategic Deception in North Western Europe – April, 1943 to May, 1945," (MS prepared for the MOD, London, February 1949, 259 pages), 147. Hereafter referred to as Hesketh, "FORTITUDE." A copy of the typeset unpublished manuscript is in the custody of this author. The Preface to the document can be found in T. L. Cabbage II, "The Success of Operation Fortitude: Hesketh's History of Strategic Deception," *2 Intelligence and National Security* (July 1987), 247-48; the Conclusion can be found at pages 233-42 of Barry D. Hunt, "An Eyewitness Report of the *Fortitude* Deception: Editorial Introduction to R. F. Hesketh's Manuscript," in *Strategic Military Deception*, Donald C. Daniel and Katherine L. Herbig, eds. (Elmsford, NY: Pergamon Press, 1981), 224-42. A copy of the 8 September 1944 SHAEF directive is attached as Appendix I.

<sup>39</sup>. Report, "First Allied Airborne Army: Operations in Holland September-November 1944," n.d., 14, Records of Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II, Record Group 331, File No. *1st AAA, Op Rpts, MARKET Holland*, Military Reference Branch, National Archives, Washington. See also, Brereton, *The Brereton Diaries*, 342. After nightfall on 17 September two flights of ten R.A.F. aircraft dropped several hundred

By the end of June 1944 the SHAEF deception planners—with their experience in implementing Operation FORTITUDE which covered deception in the pre- and post-invasion phase of Operation OVERLORD in Normandy—were convinced that the one best system for passing deception information to the enemy was that of the controlled agent channel. It was the only method which combined the qualities of precision, certainty and speed necessary for the conduct of strategic deceptions at a long range and over an extended time period.<sup>40</sup>

The first phase of the strategic deception plan was to create the proper Order of Battle information. On 21 August, under the guidance of SHAEF G-3 Ops (B), the British-controlled agent BRUTUS confirmed the existence of the First Allied Airborne Army (FAAA), and by 10 September had reported it as being composed of three American and one British airborne divisions (all notional, *i.e.*, fake). BRUTUS also had reported that FAAA was subordinate to FUSAG, and that its divisions could be detached to form one or more task forces for employment with other armies. In addition, BRUTUS had reported that the four divisions of FAAA were to form a task force to operate with the Fourth Army which was located in southeast England.<sup>41</sup>

The next phase of the deception plan was to induce a belief in the existence of a second airborne task force. Once the Germans were told that there were two such task forces, it was assumed that they would draw the conclusion that the second task force consisted of the real airborne divisions in England about which they already knew.<sup>42</sup>

---

dummy parachutists—the so-called *Chinese Soldiers*—15 km east and 15 km west of the actual drop zones. MacDonald, *The Siegfried Line Campaign*, 138.

<sup>40</sup>. Hesketh, "FORTITUDE," 171.

<sup>41</sup>. *Ibid*, 147. The real and the notional FUSAG order of battle is shown in Appendix II.

<sup>42</sup>. *Ibid*. The real airborne divisions that the Germans knew about were: the British 1st and 6th airborne divisions, and the American 82d and 101st airborne divisions. Appendix III is the Allied airborne formations order of battle as appreciated by the Germans. See also the German dispositions map at Appendix IV.

As part of the cover plan for Operation MARKET, the double agents affecting the deception plan were required to say that a large airborne attack was pending somewhere other than at Arnhem (or at any other place in front of the advancing Allied army groups). Thus, the deception plan provided that it would be reported that the Kiel and Bremen areas in northern Germany were to be attacked by the fictional task force. This provided a cover for the real attack that finally came at Arnhem. Then, after the landings in Operation MARKET took place, the agent's story would be that the first landings by the divisions of the real airborne units had taken place before the attack at Kiel and Bremen, and that the deception agents had believed that the airborne attacks would be carried out in the reverse order. It is important to note that the agents also would give the correct date (but not the place) for the actual airborne attack, but they would link that date with the plans to land in the Kiel-Bremen sector of northern Germany.<sup>43</sup>

The deception planners assumed that once the Germans were able to identify the real airborne divisions involved in battle in Operation MARKET, they would note that they corresponded exactly with the deceptions agents' previous information; thus, they would be more likely to have their belief strengthened, both in regard to the existence of the notional task force, and the intention of the Anglo-Americans to use it to carry out a subsequent attack on a more remote north Germany location.<sup>44</sup>

As shall be seen in the section dealing with the collection and evaluation of intelligence by the Germans, the SHAEF deception effort was one hundred percent successful.

Some readers may be wondering why the SHAEF deception plan called for airdrops by two task forces when the Allies did not have sufficient transport and

---

<sup>43</sup>. *Ibid.*

<sup>44</sup>. *Ibid.*

glider tugs to deliver a full three divisions at one time at Arnhem.<sup>45</sup> One conclusion which the deceptions associated with Operation MARKET brings home is the danger of treating a deception operation too literally. *What is or is not possible matters less than what the enemy believes is possible.* As Roger Hesketh has noted:

*One is always inclined to credit the enemy with knowing as much about one's own affairs as one does oneself, but if the conditions precedent to the running of double-cross agents obtain, this will be far from the truth. A reasonable and straightforward story, even if it involves [some] manoeuvres which cannot in reality be performed, is often to be preferred to a more complex one which is capable of execution, but whose objects cannot readily be discerned.*"<sup>46</sup>

Thus the fact that the Allies were barely able to organize, train and equip five airborne divisions and could only deliver about half that force was no practical hindrance to the acceptance by the Germans that a force twice that large was available in England.

The fact is, the number of troop carrying aircraft available to the Allies—and that they were subject to competing demand of air supply of materials and airborne troops transport—did not affect the German estimates concerning the Allied airborne threat. Likewise, the fact that the 28th Infantry Division—the only Allied division trained in amphibious attack which was not used in OVERLORD—had

---

<sup>45</sup>. Weigley, *Eisenhower's Lieutenants*, 296. The Allies were able to land a larger force in a single lift on D-Day at Normandy because the shorter transport flight distances allowed for the use of double-tows by the glider tug aircraft. More aircraft were used in Operation MARKET; however as the flight distances were greater, a larger part of the transport forces had to be used as glider tugs. Mnts. of Mtg., Hq FAAA, 10 Sep 44, in File "1st AAA - Opn Market," RG 331, MRB, NA (Maj. Gen. P. L. Williams: "Due to the distances involved, which precluded the use of double-tow lift ... single tow only could be employed.").

<sup>46</sup>. Hesketh, "FORTITUDE," 173.

been withdrawn from the SHAEF reserve and sent to France in July, also did not hinder the Germans in crediting—as late as January 1945—the Allies with the ability to mount new major amphibious attacks in conjunction with anticipated airborne assaults.<sup>47</sup>

### The British-Controlled Deception Agents.

When, in April 1943, Lieutenant-General Frederick E. General Morgan's COSSAC planning staff was organized in London, a section—Ops (B)—was formed within the COSSAC G-3 staff under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel John V. B. Jervis-Reid. Its function was to deal with deception. At the same time Lieutenant-Colonel Roger F. Hesketh was posted to the Ops (B) staff and given the task of dealing with the part of the section's deception operations which would be implemented by the controlled leakage of information—a process called "*Special Means*."<sup>48</sup>

By mid-January 1944 the COSSAC planning staff had become part of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF).<sup>49</sup>

At the same time Ops (B) was enlarged and divided into two sub-sections: one dealing solely with physical deception; the other—"Special Means"—was concerned with controlled leakage. Colonel Noël Wild, who had come to London from "A" Force, became head of Ops (B). Jervis-Reid, promoted to Colonel, was Wild's deputy. Jervis-Reid also continued to serve as head of the physical deception subsection; Hesketh, also promoted, remained in charge of the Ops (B) Special Means subsection.<sup>50</sup>

---

<sup>47</sup>. *Ibid*, 163. Concerning the 28th Division, see Blumenson, *Breakout and Pursuit*, 187.

<sup>48</sup>. Cabbage, "The Success of Operation Fortitude," 248.

<sup>49</sup>. *Ibid*, 70.

<sup>50</sup>. *Ibid*, 250. David Mure, *Master of Deception: Tangled Webs in London and the Middle East* (London: William Kimber and Co. Limited, 1980), 18, 242-43. Colonel Wild had

Meanwhile, Colonel John Henry Bevans at London Controlling Section (L.C.S.) realized that from that time forward, the bulk of the work of controlled agent work would be focused on the task of implementing the FORTITUDE deception plan, and not on the M.I.5 counterespionage effort. Accordingly, Bevans decided that the right course would be to abolish the TWIST committee and allow the Ops (B) staff to work directly with the B.1.A. Section of the Security Service.<sup>51</sup> This section of M.I.5 was in charge of the management of the controlled enemy agents—the so-called "double agents"—which were by then were proving to be the most effective channel for controlled leakage of information to the Germans.<sup>52</sup>

Thus, in the post-NEPTUNE period, once the Ops (B) Special Means deception plans had been coordinated with Field-Marshal Montgomery's 21st Army Group, or with General Bradley's 12th Army Group, the next step in the controlled leakage process was to work with B.1.A. to decide which of their agents were best suited for each particular task within the plan. As soon as a choice was made, the agent's B.1.A. Case Officer would come across from his office at St. James's Street to the Ops (B) offices at Norfolk House for a meeting to decide on the general sense of the particular messages to be sent to the Germans. Thereafter, the Case Officer and the agent would translate the messages into the particular reporting and idiomatic style of the agent. At the appropriate time the

---

served as deputy commander of "A" Force in Cairo under Brigadier Dudley Clarke—the officer in charge of, first, British, then, all Allied deception operations throughout the Anglo-American North Africa and the Mediterranean campaigns. Cabbage, *op. cit.*, 251.

<sup>51</sup>. Cabbage, *op. cit.*, 250. The TWIST Committee was a subgroup of the L.C.S.; its task was to work with the Foreign Office and the B Department of M.I.5 to implement those parts of the various L.C.S. deception plans which had to be put across by means of the controlled leakage of information. *Ibid*, 249.

<sup>52</sup>. *Ibid*. The leakage of information—both true and false—through the covert use of diplomatic channels was another, albeit far less effective, means of controlled leakage. The L.C.S. continued to serve as the channel for coordinating with the W. Board all the deception efforts requiring the use of diplomatic channels; similarly, the Twenty Committee's oversight function with regard to the true information being released also continued as before. *Ibid*.

message would be sent to the *Abwehr* by the agent's Radio Officer via wireless transmitter.<sup>53</sup>

As it turned out, practically the whole of the Special Means cover plan for Operation MARKET was passed to the Germans by two controlled agents: GARBO (the Spaniard Juan Pujol-Garcia) and BRUTUS (the Polish air force officer, Wing-Commander Roman Garby-Czerniawski).<sup>54</sup> What this meant was that in practice one of the Special Means officers was closeted at Norfolk House almost every day with Tommy Harris and Hugh Astor, the B.1.A. Case Officers who ran GARBO and BRUTUS.<sup>55</sup> It was during those long daily sessions that the details of the agent's messages and their replies to intelligence queries from their German controllers were finalized.<sup>56</sup>

---

<sup>53</sup>. *Ibid.*, 252.

<sup>54</sup>. *Ibid.* GARBO, had as his cover occupation a minor job in the Spanish Section of the British Ministry of Information in London; BRUTUS worked in the Polish military headquarters in London. Hesketh, "FORTITUDE," 27, 66.

Ops (B) also put some information over through agent TATE. TATE was a *Nazi* parachute agent who was captured and turned during September 1940; from May 1944 forward he had as his notional or cover occupation, the job of a farm worker in Kent, a job that had given him a freedom of movement within the Visitor's Ban zone in the coastal areas of Kent. Fewer of his messages actually were used by the Germans in their intelligence summaries, possibly due to the fact that TATE's reports were more about what he had observed, and not about the intentions of the Allies. Hesketh, 27-28, 49-50.

Appendix XIII of Hesketh "FORTITUDE" lists the content and the date of the Ops (B) messages sent by GARBO, BRUTUS, and TATE which found their way into the OKH Lagebericht West between 11 June and 14 December 1944.

<sup>55</sup>. Cabbage, "The Success of Operation Fortitude," 252.

<sup>56</sup>. *Ibid.*

## Uncontrolled German Agents

Life would have been relatively simple for Ops (B) and B.1.A. if their game had been—so to speak—the only one in town. That was not the case. During the summer and fall of 1944 the Germans certainly were paying close attention to the controlled agents GARBO and BRUTUS. However, they also were relying on the reports of several other trusted agents; that fact was a source of concern at SHAEF.<sup>57</sup>

One of the other *Abwehr* secret agents was Paul Fidrmuc, a German-Czech businessman living in Lisbon. He was known to *Abwehrstelle Madrid* and to *RSHA Mil. Amt* as agent or *V-Mann* OSTRO. He was highly paid for his regular reports from what turned out to be an imaginary network of agents Fidrmuc said were in Britain, France, the United States, North Africa and the Middle East.<sup>58</sup> OSTRO's fictional reports were a problem to the SHAEF Ops (B) staff in September 1944, as were the reports of others.

Another uncontrolled *Abwehr* agent was Dr. Karl-Heinz Krämer, a German journalist living in Stockholm. He "ran" two sub-agents, JOSEPHINE and HEKTOR, and it is highly probable that they were purely fictional agents—the notional product of Krämer's fertile journalistic imagination. Krämer's motive for his game was pecuniary and he used the supposed needs of his agents for a certain compensation to get money from the *Abwehr*—money he pocketed for himself. In intelligence jargon, Dr. Krämer—like Fidrmuc—simply was a "papermill."<sup>59</sup>

---

<sup>57</sup>. *Ibid.*

<sup>58</sup>. Hesketh, "FORTITUDE," 102 fn. 18.

<sup>59</sup>. Cabbage, "The Success of Operation Fortitude," 257; Hesketh, "FORTITUDE," 101-102, 102 fn. 19, 146-47. Krämer also has been described as the Counsellor at the German Legation in Stockholm. David Irving, *Hitler's War 1942-1945* (London: Papermac, 1983), 842, fn. 531. Copies of the JOSEPHINE and HEKTOR reports may be

Nevertheless Krämer presented a unique threat to the Allies. He had access to *Abwehr* documents. It was through these documents that Dr. Krämer read the successive installments of the FORTITUDE story coming from Ops (B) and handed them back to the Germans a second time with his own embellishments. The effect of this practice upon the Ops (B) efforts to deceive the Germans in regard to the plans of the First Allied Airborne Army—and Operation MARKET in particular—will be considered in greater detail later in this article.<sup>60</sup>

It was during the post-Normandy invasion period, the Deception Staff at Ops. (B) discovered that they were not the only people involved in the ongoing FORTITUDE deception effort. According to Roger Hesketh:

*The evidence of Most Secret Sources [i.e., the ISOS deciphers of the Abwehr transmissions,] was beginning to make the conclusion almost irresistible that the uncontrolled agents, or at any rate the two most highly regarded ones—V-Mannen OSTRO in Lisbon and JOSEPHINE in Stockholm—had acquired some knowledge of the [Allied] FORTITUDE story. It is true that a second attack on the Pas-de-Calais following after the Normandy invasion might have been guessed at by any intelligent but uninformed person as the likely sequence of future events, but there were too many similarities of detail to allow us to attribute this development to chance.*<sup>61</sup>

---

seen in the *Aüstartige Amt* Files, Serial 98 (Baron Gustav Adolf Steengracht von Moylands), National Archives, Washington.

<sup>60</sup>. Cabbage, *op. cit.*, 257; Hesketh, *op. cit.*, 101-102. Krämer had access to the *Abwehr* intelligence reports which were based on information supplied mainly by the British-controlled double agents and he used them to fabricate his reports. Hesketh notes it did not matter whether Krämer himself believed in the deception story be served up by the British in the reports, "the point is that he knew the Germans believed in it and that it was therefore safe to dish it up a second time." Hesketh, *op. cit.*, 146.

<sup>61</sup>. Cabbage, *op. cit.*, 257; Hesketh, *op. cit.*, 101-102. It is interesting to note that in the end the Germans wrongly concluded that JOSEPHINE was a double agent under British control for deception purposes! Hesketh, *op. cit.*, 173, and Appendix XIV, 245-46. According to a *Luftwaffe Ic* staff study:

The fact that the OSTRO and JOSEPHINE reports might alert the Germans to the actual Allied intention—even if by accident—was of serious concern, and this danger had been a worry for some time.

In fact, the deception staff at Ops (B) first learned about OSTRO in late 1943. According to J. C. Masterman:

*In the autumn of 1943 ... we became aware that certain Germans in the [Iberian] Peninsula, notably OSTRO, were in fact giving information to the Germans which, as they declared, came from their agents in England. In fact these agents were notional, and their reports were constructed from rumor aided by invention and surmise. To us, however, they seemed in the highest degree dangerous. Not only was it possible that OSTRO reports would gain more credence in Berlin than the reports of our own agents, but it was not impossible that [an] OSTRO [report] might by a fluke give the exact area of the attack on the Continent, and thus destroy the deception plan .... [A] variety of schemes were put forward for the elimination of OSTRO. They did not succeed.<sup>62</sup>*

Masterman does not give the details of what these schemes were, but we do know that GARBO was discovered by reading ISOS traffic, then he was located

---

In conclusion, it must be pointed out that JOSEPHINE was thus a participant in the enemy's decoy plans, which were aimed at holding down strong German forces for as long as possible at various points from Norway to France.

*Luftwaffenführungsstab Ic, Fremde Luftwaffen West, Nr. 109/45 g. Kdos (A), 6.I.45.*

<sup>62</sup>. J. C. Masterman, *The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1972), 151. Paul Fidrmuc may have had access to *Abwehr* documents, which he then used to improve the quality of his guesses, though this point has not been proved. Hesketh, "FORTITUDE," 102. There was another troublesome uncontrolled agent, BRANDES, in Lisbon. Hesketh, *op. cit.*, 57.

and recruited.<sup>63</sup> If OSTRO had been found and refused to cooperate he might have been compromised to the Germans or simply eliminated.

The deception staff at Ops (B) did not know about JOSEPHINE until much later.<sup>64</sup> Hesketh notes:

*We had no idea at the time [of the June Normandy landings and for some time thereafter] that [the German agent in Stockholm, Dr.] Krämer was playing with our toys. Having built up the whole of FUSAG from nothing we [at Ops (B) SHAEF] naturally assumed that we had the undivided control of it, and on that assumption a plan was devised for the further employment of the [notional] Fourth Army and the First Airborne Army. About this time [, i.e., in early September,] the airborne operation against Arnhem was decided upon. The Deception Staff was asked to cover the operation by suggesting that an airborne drop on the same date but in a far removed area. If in the process we could increase the threat to the German Northern flank ..., a double advantage would be gained.*<sup>65</sup>

It must be noted that the north Germany threat was being mounted—pursuant to the SHAEF policy directive of 8 September 1944—independently of the plans to land at Arnhem.<sup>66</sup>

As will be noted in detail below, the scope of operations projected by Dr. Krämer in his three messages of 15-17 September was more detailed than anything that

---

<sup>63</sup>. Juan Pujol and Nigel West, *Operation Garbo: The Personal Story of the Most Successful Double Agent of World War II* (New York: Random House, Inc., 1985), 68-72.

<sup>64</sup>. The JOSEPHINE messages went to *RSHA Mil. Amt* in Berlin from *Abwehrstelle Hamburg* via land lines. Thus there was no regular radio traffic—and no ISOS decrypts—from the Hamburg post of the *Abwehr*.

<sup>65</sup>. Hesketh, "FORTITUDE," 147.

Ops (B) had offered. Thus, Roger Hesketh has noted: "This illustrates the dangers that uncontrolled agents can sometimes present. Special Means had been utilized to provide a cover objective for the Arnhem operation and had chosen Kiel-Bremen as the target. Dr. Krämer, having picked up our weapon in the shape of the [notional] British Fourth Army had preceded to straddle our own cover target, aiming his first shot at Scandinavia and his second at the bull's-eye of the real one. Very fortunately... no harm was done."<sup>67</sup> In this instance, as in regard to the Normandy landings, the uncontrolled *Abwehr* agents did not uncover the real secret of the Allied plan and report it in a context that prompted Hitler and the *OKW* staff to act in a manner that materially prejudiced Operation MARKET. Nevertheless, the real potential for a disaster always was present.<sup>68</sup>

---

<sup>66</sup>. *Ibid*, 143, Appendix IX, 217, citing and reproducing there SHAEF/19011/Ops (B)(Fwd.) GCT/370.28-202/Ops (B), 8 Sep 44, Subject: "Current Cover and Deception Policy." A copy of the directive is Appendix I to this Article.

<sup>67</sup>. *Ibid*, 148. "*Special Means*" was the euphemism for the controlled leakage of deception by way of controlled agent or diplomatic channels; the term also was used to designate the section of Ops (B), G-3, SHAEF, that dealt with deception stories put across using a special means channel.

<sup>68</sup>. Cabbage, "The Success of Operation Fortitude," 263 fn. 47; Hesketh, "FORTITUDE," 173 fn. 1. According to Roger Hesketh: "On the 31st May, 1944, [Paul Fidrmuc, a German-Czech businessman in Lisbon, known to the *RSHA Mil. Amt* as agent] OSTRO, gave a correct forecast of the [time and the place of the Normandy-Cherbourg] invasion. There is no evidence to show that his message was based on anything more solid than his own imagination." Hesketh, *Ibid*, Conclusion, 173 fn.1. According to Albert Speer, the *Führer* made pointed reference to the "correct" agent report at the mid-day conference at the *Berghof Führerhauptquartier* on 6 June:

*Hitler seemed more set than ever of his preconceived idea that the enemy was trying to mislead him. "Do you recall? Among all the many reports we've received there was one that exactly predicted the landing site and the day and the hour. That only confirms my opinion that [this landing in Normandy] is not the real invasion yet."*

Speer, *Inside the Third Reich: Memoirs by Albert Speer*, Richard and Carla Winston, trans., (New York: Macmillan Company, 1970), 354.

## German Concerns and Estimates

### What the German Thought They Knew

Now is the moment to see what sort of reports and concerns the Germans had about airborne operations in the post-Normandy and pre-MARKET time period. This should be done while remembering the words of Brigadier Dudley Clarke—the mastermind of deception in the Middle East the officer who taught Colonel Noël Wild wisely and well: "*You can never by deception, persuade an enemy of anything not according to his expectations, which are not far removed from his hopes [or fears].*"<sup>69</sup> By studying the German estimates one can see two things: first, that the Ops (B) deception effort was properly focused; and, second, that the Germans were influenced by the Allied deception effort.

As it turned out, the initial waves of the Allied D-Day assault forces were barely ashore before the Germans began to watch the sky for more enemy airborne forces. For example, at 1850 on 9 June *Generalmajor* Max Pemsel, *Generalstabchef (GsChef)* at *Armeeoberkommando 7 (A.O.K. 7)*, called *Generalfeldmarschall* Erwin Rommel, the *Oberbefehlshaber, Oberkommando der Heeresgruppe B (H.Gr. B)*, and told him that the stiff German resistance in the Contentin Peninsula south of Montebourg soon might prompt the Anglo-Americans to deploy more of their airborne troops in that sector in order to hasten the capture of the key port city of Cherbourg. *Feldmarschall* Rommel told Pemsel that the *Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW)* expected another large assault on the *Kanalküste* by 15 June—a view Rommel then shared—and that future enemy landings in the Pas-de-Calais sector would prevent the deployment of additional enemy airborne units in the area south of Cherbourg. The enemy would save the airborne forces for use in the Pas-de-Calais said Rommel.<sup>70</sup>

---

<sup>69</sup>. Mure, *Master of Deception*, 101 (emphasis added).

<sup>70</sup>. *Armeeoberkommando 7, Kriegstagebuch, Westen-Anlagen, 6.VI.-31.VIII.44*, at 9 June 1944. Records of the German Field Commands, Record Group 1030, Item

Entries in the *Kriegstagebuch (KTB)* of the *Seekriegsleitung, 1 Abteilung (SKL/1 Abt.)* on 10 and 11 June reflect some of the information being received by the Germans which pointed to the real possibility of an additional landing in northern France:

*The [enemy] Army Group in Southeast England and the close combat formations belonging to it did not take part in the [landing] operations [west of the Orne River]. Fremde Heere West expects that these forces will be directed against Belgium.*"<sup>71</sup>

And,

*[The Reichssicherheitshaupamt (RSHA) in Berlin] ... [has] transmitted an agent report, from the same source [—agent OSTRO—] which provided correct information of the [June] landing at Cherbourg, that a[nother] landing operation will be staged in the Dieppe, Abbeville [and] Le Touquet-Paris-Plage areas [of the Côte d'Opale] on 14 or 15 June.*"<sup>72</sup>

It was logically assumed that airborne forces would be used in conjunction with these attacks as they had been at Normandy.

If there were to be further airborne attacks, which of the Allied divisions would be involved? The *OKH Lagebericht West* of 11 June, noted the presence of the British 2nd Airborne Division in England:

---

#75106/12, Modern Military Records, National Archives, Washington, D.C. According to a message intercepted by the British, the Germans believed that the enemy was reinforced by a night landing near Caen. "SUNSET" Daily Intelligence Report No. 586, 8 June 1944, SRS 1869 (Part II), Records of the National Security Agency, Record Group 457, File No. "SUNSET" *Daily Intelligence Reports, May-July 1944*, MRB, NA.

<sup>71</sup>. *Seekriegsleitung, 1 Abteilung, Kriegstagebuch, Tiele A, Hefts 49-58, 1.V.43.-31.VI.44.*, 10 June 1944. The *SKL/1 Abt.* is the Naval Warfare Directorate of the *Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine* at Eberswalde. Office of the Chief of Naval History Directorate, Washington.

<sup>72</sup>. *SKL/1 Abt., KTB*, 11 June 1944. See fn. 66, *ante*.

*According to [agent BRUTUS,] an Abwehr source which has reported accurately for a long time, the English 2nd Airborne Division, heretofore thought to be in the Western Mediterranean, location unknown, now is in the Grantham area (30 km east of Nottingham)."*<sup>73</sup>

Actually, the 2nd Airborne Division was only a notional unit—part of the fictional Allied Order of Battle.<sup>74</sup>

The *OKH Lagebericht West* for 12 June reported that the enemy had three to five airborne divisions in England and that the most likely place for their employment was in the Pas-de-Calais between the Seine and the Somme—predicting that they would be used in conjunction with an amphibious assault expected in that sector.<sup>75</sup>

On that same day (12 June), in an 1140 hours (BDST) report, *Generalmajor* Pemsel, at *A.O.K. 7*, informed *H.Gr. B* that he suspected that the Americans were relieving their two parachute divisions in the Contentin Peninsula. He added that he feared that the 82d and the 101st airborne divisions would be refitted, and thereafter, be committed soon to a new operation.<sup>76</sup>

---

<sup>73</sup>. Hesketh, "FORTITUDE," Appendix XIII, 236, citing *OKH Lagebericht West Nr. 1293, 11.VI.44*. The *LBW* report was based on a message sent by BRUTUS on 7 June at 1620 GMT. *Ibid.*

<sup>74</sup>. *Ibid.*, 119, Appendix XI, 223.

<sup>75</sup>. Ralph Bennett, *Ultra in the West: The Normandy Campaign of 1944-45* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1980), 90, citing Msg. KV 8251. This and all the other Ultra messages referenced in this article are in the DEFE 3 file at the Public Records Office, Kew, England.

<sup>76</sup>. *A.O.K. 7, KTB, Westen-Anlagen*, 12 June 1944. In fact, the two U.S. Airborne divisions were not withdrawn and returned to England until early July. It was mid-August before either was again ready for combat. Blair, *Ridgway's Paratroopers*, 294, 311-12. "BDST" means British Double Summer Time. 1200 hours BDST in London was 1100 hours Middle European Time (MET) in northwest Europe. 1200 hours BDST also was 1000 hours Greenwich Mean Time (GMT). In order to allow for the proper real time integration of Allied and German sources and reports, all Continental and GMT times

Nine days later, at 1330 BDST on 21 June *Generalmajor* Pemsel called *Generalleutnant* Dr. Hans Speidel, *Generalstabchef* at *H.Gr. B* and reported: "*A.O.K. 7 considers it meaningful that the enemy has not deployed any airborne troops at Cherbourg [to hasten its capture]... [We] surmise that the [enemy's] airborne troops are needed for some other large scale actions.*"<sup>77</sup> Having worried about more airborne attacks since 9 June, Pemsel finally came around to the view of Rommel expressed twelve days earlier. He would not rest easy for long. On 22 June the *OKH Lagebericht West* stated that FUSAG, with a strength of 28 infantry and three to four airborne divisions stood ready for action in southern England and might be used in a *coup de main* against the port of Brest.<sup>78</sup>

Earlier, and probably around 13-15 June, *Feldmarschall* Gerd von Rundstedt, *Oberbefehlshaber West* (*Ob. West*) had submitted a report to the *OKW* in which he discussed the Normandy landing and the lessons learned. Noteworthy is his discussion of the enemy's airborne capabilities and tactics:

*The following most important combat experiences are to be utilized for instruction and exercises on all fronts which have not yet been attacked; ... Four facts must be emphasized [not the least of which is]:*

*... (2) Skillful and overwhelming employment of airborne troops. . .*

*... Simultaneously [with the start of airborne operations], flights of strong formations of bombers were made over various sectors of the front and on rear areas. The enemy [commander] aimed at initiating air*

---

must be converted to a common time base. Where a real-time understanding is important, all times in this book are converted to BDST. Some of the histories apparently do not make this change; therefore, it always is important to determine which time standard is being used, or whether all are used. If a history dealing with the airborne assault at Arnhem says that the initial landings occurred at just past 1300 hours, then the time is being expressed as BDST. If the attack surprises the Germans at noon then the time standard is MET.

<sup>77</sup>. *A.O.K. 7, KTB, Westen-Anlagen*, 21 June 1944.

<sup>78</sup>. Bennett, *Ultra in the West*, 90, citing Msgs. XL 103 and XL 130.

*[raid] warnings to cause the troops to seek shelter while he could drop his parachutists without being detected. At various places parachutists turned out to be [only] straw dummies (with wooden boxes filled with [gunfire-simulating] explosives). The purpose of this maneuver was to force local reserves to disperse and troops to withdraw from crucial points, thereby causing the defenders to lose time. Numerous gliders of varying sizes, carrying airborne troops, were uncoupled from their aircraft far out over the sea and at quite different places over land, according to plans that had been worked out in every detail prior to the invasion. The gliders in general reached their points of destination safely and accurately.*

*... Techniques and tactics of enemy airborne troops are highly developed. Also combat training reached a high degree of efficiency. The men are tough fighters and well trained to adapt themselves to any type of terrain.*

*It is to be expected that in addition to paratroopers for regular combat there will also be specialized parachutists [—the Special Air Service, Essex, and Jedburghs forces—] with special missions such as seeking out and reporting the location of command posts, ammunition dumps, rearward [centers of] communications, etc., carrying out demolitions, erection of obstacles, surprise attacks. These specialists either may be dropped individually or may emerge from troops already landed. These men will keep absolutely quiet in order not to attract attention or to become involved in combat. They must be expected to be well acquainted with the country and to know resources of every [sort and] description.<sup>79</sup>*

---

<sup>79</sup>. Brereton, *The Brereton Diaries*, 291-93. The von Rundstedt report was captured by the Allies and Brereton had a translation of it at the FAAA headquarters at Ascot on 26 June. The report contains many of the points emphasized in *Feldmarschall Rommel's Lagebeurteilung des H.Gr. B fuer 11.VI.44* which was sent forward to *Ob. West* on 12

It is clear that the *Feldmarschall* and his staff were aware of, and had a prudent respect for, their enemy's proven airborne capability. The staff at *Ob. West* remained sensitive to a continuing airborne threat in the post-Normandy period.

At 1330 BDST on 26 June *Generalleutnant* Dietrich von Choltitz, *Kommand.General, Armeekorps LXXXIV* told *Generalmajor* Pemsel, *GsChef, A.O.K. 7*, that he was very concerned about the possibility that the enemy might land by air and sea on the western coast of the Contentin Peninsula between Coutances and Granville. *Generalleutnant* Speidel, *GsChef, H.Gr. B*, was consulted. Speidel noted that since the enemy had not taken advantage of the chance to use the airborne forces to hasten the capture of Cherbourg, it was unlikely that they would use seaborne forces in the Western Contentin region under the guns of the heavy caliber batteries on the Channel Islands. However, Speidel added that he could not completely exclude the possibility of such an operation.<sup>80</sup> How right he was to consider that the enemy might exercise that very option.<sup>81</sup>

An air and seaborne landing at St. Malo was considered and rejected by the Allied naval staffs.<sup>82</sup> At about the same time TEXAS LEAGUER I, II and III were under consideration as three parts of an integrated plan. The TEXAS LEAGUER concept was first conceived by the Operations Division of the AEAFF and

---

June. *Lagebeurteilung*, PP/MCR/C 30, Reel 14, BLM 150/22, Imperial War Museum (IWM), London.

<sup>80</sup>. *A.O.K. 7, KTB, Westen-Anlagen*, 26 June 1944. A landing at St. Malo was considered and rejected by the Allied navy staffs. Memo of Mtg., 21 AGp, 21 Jun 44, in File: 21AGp/20720/G (Plans), "Opn LUCKY STRIKE," WO 205/688, PRO; Ltr, SHAEF (Smith) to AEAFF, n.d. Jul 44, AIR 37/775, PRO; Golden, *Echoes of Arnhem*, 97-98.

<sup>81</sup>. In regard to the need to consider all options when making an intelligence estimate, see T. L. Cabbage II, "The German Misapprehensions Regarding Overlord: Understanding Failure in the Estimative Process," in 2 *Intelligence and National Security* (July 1987): 51-58.

presented to Air Chief-Marshal Leigh-Mallory on 20 July with the expectation that airborne landings might be made at Coutances (30 July), Granville (4 August) and Avranches (9 August).<sup>83</sup> On 22 July, two days before Operation COBRA was set to begin, General Montgomery, at 21st Army Group, suggested to Lieutenant General Omar Bradley, at First Army, that it might be helpful if airborne troops were used to establish bridgeheads across both the Sée and Sélune rivers in the area north and south of Avranches. General Bradley vetoed the idea on 23 July; the ground forces of his First Army were past Avranches and across both rivers by 31 July.<sup>84</sup>

Three weeks after the landing at Normandy, the time invested in the FORTITUDE SOUTH deception was still paying dividends. On 27 June *Feldmarschall* von Rundstedt sent the weekly *Ob. West* situation report for the period 19 to 25 June to the OKW. It read in part:

*Ob. West makes the following appreciation of the [enemy] situation as a whole:*

*The enemy still has not committed the American [First U.S.] Army Group assembled in Southeast England which is ready to jump off. It is stronger in force than Montgomery's Army Group. Its airborne troops will be reinforced with parts of the battle-trying airborne units and also may be stiffened with battle-trying units now appearing in Normandy. In connection with the intentions of gaining an operational base against*

---

<sup>82</sup>. Memo of Meeting, 21 AGp, 21 Jun 44, File: 21 AGp/20720/G (Plans), subject: "Opn LUCKY STRIKE," WO 205/688, PRO; Ltr., SHAEF (Smith) to AEAFF, Jul 44, AIR 37/775, PRO; Golden, *Echoes of Arnhem*, 97-98.

<sup>83</sup>. Memo, HQ AEAFF, Bagby to Leigh-Mallory, 20 July 1944, "Proposal for Airborne Operations (Texas Leaguer)," AIR 37/775, PRO.

<sup>84</sup>. Blumenson, *Breakout and Pursuit*, 331; Thomas E. Griess, ed., *Atlas for the Second World War: Europe and the Mediterranean* (Wayne, NJ: Avery Publishing Group Inc., 1985), Map 63.

*Paris, the American Army Group could be used for landings staggered in time [and] extending from points on both sides of the Somme to the Seine, with the mission of encircling and capturing the port of Le Havre; then, together with the British Army Group launching a pincer movement against Paris on both sides of the Seine. Our forces behind A.O.K. 15 are not sufficient, particularly for repelling the large-scale air-landings that must be expected. Furthermore, the mobile units behind A.O.K. 15 are not sufficient for a powerful counter-offensive. High losses are to be expected on both sides.*<sup>85</sup>

Two weeks later, in the *OKW/WFSt.* situation report for the period 1 to 7 July, *General der Artillerie* Alfred Jodl's staff noted that "Army Group Patton" was located in southeastern England and that it had the mission of invading France in the Pas-de-Calais region. That report was issued in spite of the fact that an increased number of German estimates were rating the Allied troops then thought to be in England as being capable of only a diversionary effort.<sup>86</sup>

As it turned out the Allied planners seriously considered an airborne operation in the Pas-de-Calais area—an operation to be executed in late August. An airborne attack was to be part of Operation BOXER—the proposed seaborne assault against the - Pas-de-Calais near Boulogne-sur-Mer. The plan called for the five units which ultimately would be used in Operation Market—the U.S. 82d and 101st, and the British 1st airborne divisions along with the British 52d (Lowland) Division and the Polish 1st Independent Parachute Brigade—to capture the *Landfront* defenses of the fortified port city of Boulogne-sur-Mer and the adjacent

---

<sup>85</sup>. *Oberbefehlshaber West, Lagebeurteilung Durch Ob. West Fuer Die Zeit Vom 19. Bis 25.6.44*, 27 June 1944. Records of the Army Staff (Cover and Deception), Record Group 319, File No.: *Appendix 1, Informal Report to Joint Security Control by Special Plans Branch, G-3, 12th Army Group*, Entry 101, Folder #28, Box 2, MRB, NA. What SHAEF Ops (B) called FUSAG, the Germans referred to as "Army Group Patton," or the "American Army Group."

<sup>86</sup>. Blumenson, *Breakout and Pursuit*, 32.

V-1 flying bomb launching sites. First Allied Airborne Army (FAAA) also hoped that the proposed attack would draw off some of the enemy units defending the line along the Seine and put the airborne forces in place to block a [northeastwardly] retreat of the *Armeeoberkommando 15* forces located between the Seine and Boulogne. On 23 August the concept was disapproved by 21st Army Group. The plan was rejected by General Montgomery on the ground that it would put the FAAA forces too far from his front lines.<sup>87</sup>

Adolf Hitler was the target of the FORTITUDE SOUTH deception effort, and the SHAEF Ops (B) effort had scored a bulls-eye.<sup>88</sup> On 8 July, while at the *Berghof FHQu.*, on the Obersalzberg above Berchtesgaden, the *Führer* published a new *Führerweisungen* (*Führer* directive) for the conduct of military operations in the West.<sup>89</sup>

He told his commanders, in pertinent part:

---

<sup>87</sup>. File: 21 AGp/20760/G(Plans), subject: "Operation Linnet," WO 205/692, PRO; Brereton, *The Brereton Diaries*, 334, 336; Golden, *Echoes from Arnhem*, 99; Blair, *Ridgway's Paratroopers*, 317-18. It would have put the units in 1st Airborne Corps down 100 km beyond the front line and, at that moment, the rapid advance from the Seine into Belgium and to the Dutch border could not be imagined.

<sup>88</sup>. M.55814, SHAEF (Eisenhower) to AMSSO, *et al.*, subject: "ANVIL," in File: MS.MO1. COLL/168/3, "Bodyguard," WO 193/822, IWM ("SHAEF considers [the] FORTITUDE threat to Pas-de-Calais vital to OVERLORD and nothing should be allowed to distract from this threat.").

<sup>89</sup>. *Führerweisungen*, 8.VII.44. A *Führerweisungen* (a *Führer* Directive) is a directive related to very large operations (i.e., *H.Gr.* and higher) and covered a range of operations extended over a considerable area and time period. A directive allowed the local commanders a degree of latitude in deciding how to fulfill their assignments. For example, *Führerweisungen 41* (5.V.42.) was the entire plan for the 1942 summer offensive. In contrast there is the *Führerbefehle* (a *Führer* Order). An order covered a particular operation such as the attack on a particular town or place or an enemy formation. Unlike the directive, an order was summary, imperative and immediate, allowing the local tasked commander no discretion.

*The enemy has succeeded in landing in Normandy and in seizing with astonishing speed the [entire] Contentin Peninsula....*

*In spite of all the attendant risks, the enemy [now] probably will attempt a second landing in the A.O.K. 15 sector, all the more so, as public opinion [in England] will press for the elimination of the sites of the long-range [V-1] weapons firing on London. The [current] disposition of the forces still available in England suggests [preparations for] attacks primarily against the Kanalküste] sector between the Somme and the Seine [Rivers] by the divisions assembled north of the Thames; but [attacks probably will] also [be made] against [both] Belgium and Southern Holland. At the same time, surprise attacks designed to effect the capture of one of the large ports in Brittany cannot be ruled out.*

*Similarly, an [enemy] attack against the French Mediterranean coast also may be expected. The chosen time for it will depend on the enemy's intentions and [the] progress in his operations in general. It is unlikely that he will conduct two large-scale operations in the Mediterranean simultaneously....<sup>90</sup>*

Once again the Germans were anticipating by some forty-five days the FAAA plan for Operation BOXER.

On 12 July, during the mid-day situation conference with Hitler, *Grossadmiral* Karl Dönitz, *Oberbefehlshaber, Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine*, pointed out the necessity for maintaining continued aerial reconnaissance by the *Luftwaffe* over the Thames River estuary so that any enemy operation forming up in that area could be detected. Reports of the transfer, several days prior, of large numbers of American troops from south of the Thames to north of the river suggested to Dönitz that a surprise attack might be launched soon in the

---

<sup>90</sup>. Lionel Frederic Ellis, *Victory in the West. Vol. I, The Battle for Normandy* (London: HMSO, 1962), 322.

direction of the Pas-de-Calais, Holland-Belgium, the *German Bight* or the *Jutland-Skagerrak* sector. One of the *OKW* staff officers pointed out that the move might have been made to get the units out of the line of flight of the *V-1* weapons, but for the moment, Dönitz's more pessimistic view of the move prevailed.<sup>91</sup> It is important to note that this is the first serious expression of a German concern for the German Bight and Jutland-Skagerrak region in the post-Normandy period.

On 13 July the possibility of an Anglo-American attack being launched from the Thames River area was discussed again with the *Führer* during the mid-day conference. Dönitz pointed out the particular danger to the Skagerrak coastal area, stating that the enemy, being experienced in amphibious attack, favored coasts that were well protected from prevailing winds. The *Führer* told Dönitz that he was still more inclined to believe that the second attack would come in the Holland-Belgium sector or in the Pas-de-Calais region.<sup>92</sup>

Meanwhile, concerns on the Eastern Front were demanding the attention of the *Führer*, and on 14 July Hitler and his entourage—including the field echelons of the *OKW* and *OKW/WFSt.*--moved the *Führerhauptquartier* from the "*Berghof*" to the "*Wolfsschanze*" near Rastenburg in East Prussia.<sup>93</sup> Six days later, on 20 July at 1400 BDST an attempt was made to assassinate the *Führer*. *Oberst Graf Claus von Stauffenberg* placed a briefcase containing explosives under a conference table in the briefing hut during the daily military situation conference and the powerful blast collapsed the flimsy wooded building. Of the twenty-four

---

<sup>91</sup>. Emphasis added. Anthony Martiensen, *Hitler and His Admirals* (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1949), 207.

<sup>92</sup>. *Ibid*, 208.

<sup>93</sup>. Peter Hoffmann, *Hitler's Personal Security* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1979), 155. Except for a trip to the "*Wolfslucht II*" *FHQ*. near Soissons on 16-18 June to see von Rundstedt and Rommel; to Salzburg on 1 July for the funeral of *General Dietl*; and two roundtrips to the "*Wolfsschanze*" *FHQ*. on 20 March and on 9 July, Hitler had been at the *Berghof FHQ*. since 24 February 1944.

people in the room, four eventually died; however Hitler was merely dazed and only slightly injured.<sup>94</sup>

On 19 July SS *Oberstgruppenführer* Paul Hausser, *Oberbefehlshaber*, A.O.K. 7, sent *Feldmarschall* von Kluge, the successor to von Rundstedt at *Ob. West*, an appreciation of the situation:

*In the last two and one half weeks of battle in West Normandy the foe has been unable to achieve the operational break-through at which he aimed. He did, however, succeed in a series of local penetrations and encirclements which led to a gradual withdrawal of our lines and to the loss of St. Lô. The course of the main defensive line is generally unfavorable, as the left wing is formed considerably too far forward. It is favorable by the terrain only on the Northern front.*

*... In the battle area of Western Normandy the foe has at present sufficient fighting formations to be able to go over to a renewed major attack soon....*

*With a renewed main offensive we also must reckon with air-landings and, in certain circumstances, with landings from the sea on the West coast....*<sup>95</sup>

On 21 July, von Kluge forwarded Hausser's assessment to Hitler and the OKW, adding that "resistance is being tried but has not been successful so far owing to the enemy air-superiority over the main battle fronts."<sup>96</sup>

---

<sup>94</sup>. Ibid., 246-53; "Magic" Diplomatic Summary No. 855, 28 July 1944, 2, SRS 1377, Records of the National Security Agency, RG 457 (*Magic Summaries*), MRB, NA.

<sup>95</sup>. *Lagebeurteilung des, A.O.K. 7, Vorg. Gef. Stand, 19.VII.44, Ia. Nr. 226/44 Kdos*, BLM 150/20, IWM. Von Kluge replaced von Rundstedt on 3 July 1944. Gordon A. Harrison, *U.S. Army in World War II - Cross Channel Attack* (Washington: Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1951), 447.

On 21 July at 1723 GMT, *Abwehrstelle Hamburg* received the following wireless message from agent BRUTUS in England: "FUSAG has three airborne divisions in its Order of Battle of which one, namely the American 21st, is to be found in the Grantham area."<sup>97</sup> It is from this point in time that the Allied deception effort can be seen as having an effect on the German concerns about airborne operations; previously their concerns were *self-induced*.

The *OKH Lagebericht West* of 22 July, reported on the presence of the American 11th Airborne Division in England: "According to credible report [from agent BRUTUS], the American airborne division shown [on the OB map] in an unknown location [in England] (and presumably with the number 11), is situated in the Grantham area ([45 km] north-east of Leicester)."<sup>98</sup>In fact, the U.S.

11th Airborne Division was neither a real nor a notional unit in the Allied Order of Battle. BRUTUS's message had reported on the U.S. 21st Airborne Division, but the Germans associated the report with the U.S. 11th Airborne Division which they believed to exist in England. Later the Germans also would recognize the U.S. 21st Airborne Division as a separate formation. Thus, the Allied Order of Battle gained an unintended extra airborne division.<sup>99</sup>

On 23 July Japanese Ambassador Baron Hiroshi Ōshima had a three hour meeting with Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop at *Steinort Herrenhaus*,

---

<sup>96</sup>. *Meldungen und Empfehlung, Ob. West., 21.VII.44, Nr. 4896/44 Kdos. Chefs*, BLM 150/20, IWM.

<sup>97</sup>. Hesketh, "FORTITUDE," Appendix XIII, 237.

<sup>98</sup>. *Ibid*, citing *OKH Lagebericht West Nr. 1334, 22.VII.44*. The *LBW* report was based on a message sent by BRUTUS on 21 July at 1723 GMT in which the agent had identified the U.S. 21st Airborne Division as one of the three airborne divisions assigned to FUSAG. *Ibid*.

<sup>99</sup>. *Ibid*, Appendix XI, 223. The U.S. 11th Airborne Division is mentioned in the Appendix to *OKH Lagebericht West 1397, 23.XI.44*: "To the airborne corps still in Great Britain belong presumably the English 2d [Airborne Division] and [the] American 9th, 11th and 21st airborne divisions." *Ibid*, 149.

the minister's East Prussia *Auswärtige Amt* field headquarters. The Foreign Minister gave Ōshima a report on the anti-Hitler revolt and on the German political and military situation.<sup>100</sup> After his meeting with von Ribbentrop, Ambassador Ōshima met at the nearby "Wolfsschanze" FHQu. with an OKW staff officer who gave him details on the realignment of enemy forces under General Patton, saying: "We have information that about five divisions of Patton's Army Group have been transferred to France and assigned to Montgomery. In addition, three [more] of Patton's divisions have been sent to the London area. Accordingly, it would be difficult for Patton's Army Group to undertake a landing at an early date."<sup>101</sup> When the "MAGIC" report of Ōshima's visit to East Prussia was read by the senior officers at Ops (B) on 29 July it was seen as a clear indication that the Pas-de-Calais deception effort was wearing thin.<sup>102</sup>

Similarly, on 24 July H.Gr. B noted the following in its Situation Report for the period 17-13 July:

*"The more territory Montgomery, from the [Normandy-Contentin] bridgehead, obtains in the south, and the more quickly he gains it, the less likelihood there is of a sea landing at another point of his forces still in Britain. It is more likely that in this case that the British and Americans will feed the reserves they still possess into the bridgehead and perhaps only make a large-scale landing south of the present bridgehead with their airborne troops, which will then be used operationally."*<sup>103</sup>

---

<sup>100</sup>. "Magic" Dip. Sum. No. 856, 29 Jul 44, A1, SRS 1378, RG 457, MRB, NA. *Steinort Herrenhaus* (Stony Point Manor) was located about 10 km northeast of the "Wolfsschanze" FHQu.

<sup>101</sup>. *Ibid*, A3.

<sup>102</sup>. *Ibid*. Thereafter, on 8 September, SHAEF issued a new deception policy directive. See Appendix I.

<sup>103</sup>. *Wochenmeldung 17.VII - 23.VII.44, H.Gr. B, 24.VII.44, Ia Nr. 5110/44 g.Kdos,* BLM 150/25, IWM.

DECEPTION and OPERATION MARKET: *SURPRISE DOES NOT MEAN VICTORY*

On 31 July *H.Gr. B* noted the following in the Situation Report for the period 24-30 July:

*In the area of A.O.K. 7 the anticipated major enemy attack commenced [at St. Lô] on 24 July. After an intense bombardment and carpet bombing on a heretofore unknown scale, the enemy succeeded, after protracted fighting, in penetrating the front between Vire and the sea....*

*A second large enemy landing on the west coast of Europe appears to be increasingly more improbable. ... Further [enemy] forces are to be expected to an increasing extent now that Cherbourg is being used.*

*The enemy now has in the landing area about 45 divisions and powerful G.H.Q. troops. Out of about 45 large formations in England, he can transfer at least 35; in addition, further units from the United States are to be expected.*

*The British and American forces first will attempt to extend their land base to the south and then, with the bulk of their army, once the break-through is successful, to make the thrust towards Paris.*

*The Americans also will try to seal off Brittany from the land side. To create these new operational possibilities, a large-scale landing of airborne troops south of the present bridgehead [now] must be reckoned with.<sup>104</sup>*

The staff at *H.Gr. B* was anticipating what the FAAA was planning under the code name of Operation TRANSFIGURE.

TRANSFIGURE was designed to assist in the breakout and the drive to the Seine. The airborne commanders believed that their forces might be able to play a rôle in blocking the Germans and in establishing an advanced depot for the

advancing armored forces of American 12th Army Group. Planning at the Air Troops Headquarters began in late June and by 4 July a planning premise had been established. The concept was to put an airborne forces down in the area east of Chartres to establish a blocking force in the Paris-Orleans gap. In addition, the airborne troops could capture an airfield and a fuel depot could be established ahead of the 12th Army Group forces as they advanced toward the River Seine. On 7 August the commanders of FAAA and 1st Airborne Corps, Lewis Brereton and Boy Browning, met with Bradley who agreed in principle to an airborne attack in the 16-19 August period.<sup>105</sup>

An outline plan for TRANSFIGURE was complete by 10 August. Due to limitations in the number of available troop transport aircraft, a two-day operation was planned. At dusk on D-Day the 101st Airborne Division and several U.S. airborne battalions, would land in the vicinity of Rambouillet—44 km southwest of Paris—and capture the airfield. During the night the 52nd (Lowland) Division would be airdropped. At dawn on D plus 1 the 1st Airborne Division and 1st Independent Polish Parachute Brigade would land. The operation would be under the command of 1st Airborne Corps. The plan called for the ground forces to link up within twenty-four hours. By 13 August the airborne units had moved to their assault airdromes and were sealed in. SHAEF gave orders to stand by for an attack within receipt of forty-eight hours' notice. At 1715 hours on 13 August the airborne forces were notified that the 48 hour notice to be in effect as of 15 August for an attack on 17 August was cancelled. Six hours later the airborne

---

<sup>104</sup>. *Wochenmeldung 24.VII - 30.VII.44, H.Gr. B, 31.VII.44, Ia Nr. 5360/44 g.Kdos*, BLM 150/26, IWM.

<sup>105</sup>. Meeting Notes., 4 July 44, Headquarters AIRTRPS, in File: 21 AGp/20721/1/G(Plans), "Employment of Airborne Forces 'LUCKY STRIKE,'" WO 205/669, PRO; Memorandum, Headquarters 21 AGp, in File: 21AGp/7815/G(Air), "TRANSFIGURE," WO 205/428, PRO; Hq FAAA Plans - Signals Part, 15 August 44 Outline Plan, in File: 21AGp/20752/G(Plans), "Opn TRANSFIGURE, August 1944," WO 205/691, PRO; Brereton, *The Brereton Diaries*, 329-30; Golden, *Echoes from Arnhem*, 99; Blair, *Ridgway's Paratroopers*, 316-17.

units were put back on a three day alert to start on 16 August for an assault to be made on 19 August. By 13 August Bradley's forces were wheeling north for the short envelopment designed to trap the Germans in the Carentan-Falaise pocket and TRANSFIGURE was put on hold. The airborne planners conceived several variations of the plan that could be used to support Bradley's forces in the Carentan area but none were utilized. Meanwhile, facing little opposition, units under Patton rapidly moved east toward Orléans, Chartres and Dreux; on 16 August they overran the proposed TRANSFIGURE drop and landing zones. On 17 August the order to stand down was given to the TRANSFIGURE units; the plan was cancelled on 20 August.<sup>106</sup>

On 7 August *H.Gr. B* noted the following in the Situation Report for the period 31 July - 6 August:

*The widely spaced nature of the enemy operations and forces thereby required makes it safer to conclude that a second large-scale landing on the west coast of Europe need no longer be expected, but instead a major*

---

<sup>106</sup>. Mtg. Notes, 4 Jul 44, Hq AIRTRPS (original concept), in File: 21AGp/20721/1/G (Plans), "Employment of Airborne Forces 'LUCKY STRIKE,'" WO 205/669, PRO; Msg to 1AB/101AB/1POL, 131715 Aug 44 (alert cancelled), WO 205/428; Msg AIRTRPS to EXFOR, 171820 Aug 44 (stand down), WO 205/428, PRO; Hq. AIRTRPS Msg. 0735, 202330 Aug 44 (operation cancelled), WO 205/691, PRO; Golden, *Echoes from Arnhem*, 99; Blair, *Ridgway's Paratroopers*, 316-17. The 52d (Lowland) Division had retrained and gone from being the only British mountain division to being its only air-portable division. WO 205/428.

At one point in the planning of Operation TRANSFIGURE it was decided that if the American divisions were in retraining when the time for action came, then the 1st Airborne Division and the Polish 1st Independent Parachute Brigade would make the assault. WO 205/691. On 12 August SHAEF ordered that one thousand tons a day of supplies be airlifted to 12th Army Group; two days later the aerial resupply rate was increased to two thousand tons a day. *Blair, op. cit.*, 317.

*landing near the front of airborne formations to open the way for the thrust to Paris [can be expected].*<sup>107</sup>

In a supplementary report issued that same day, *H.Gr. B* noted:

*The transfer of the Supreme Command of the allied invasion troops under General Eisenhower to Normandy affords fresh proof that a second large-scale landing across the sea on the west coast of Europe is not to be anticipated. On the other hand, the possibility of a large-scale landing of the airborne army at readiness in Britain, in connection with operations against H.Gr. B, is more and more to be reckoned with.*"<sup>108</sup>

Thus it was that the staff at *H.Gr. B* were of like mind with the FAAA staff in their thinking about an airborne operations in front of the Seine. As it turned out, neither *H.Gr. B* nor FAAA comprehended how fast the advance on the ground would proceed.

Intelligence collection efforts concerning the Allied airborne forces continued. On 9 August at 2002 GMT *Abwehrstelle Madrid* sent the following message to GARBO in England:

*Is the U.S. 11th Division reported by [your subagent] SEVEN, an airborne, assault or infantry division?*<sup>109</sup>

---

<sup>107</sup>. *Wochenmeldung 31.VII. - 6.VIII.44, H.Gr. B, 7.VIII.44, Ia Nr. 5690/44 g.Kdos, BLM 150/27, IWM.*

<sup>108</sup>. *Wochenmeldung 31.VII - 6.VIII.44, Anlage, H.Gr. B, 7.VIII. 44, Ia Nr. 6070/44 g.Kdos., BLM 150/28, IWM.*

<sup>109</sup>. Hesketh, "FORTITUDE," Appendix XIII, 238. In the letter—Nr. 23 in the secret ink series—dated 28 July 1944, GARBO reported the presence of the 11th Infantry Division near Norwich. *Ibid.*

The following day the *OKH Lagebericht West* reported on the formation of the First Allied Airborne Army, the creation of which had been made public in London on that day:

*According to the official British [radio] announcement, all British and American airborne forces, including the Anglo-American glider and transport formations are being combined to form a new airborne army. The commander of the army is an American, Lieutenant General Lewis H. Brereton (hitherto commander of the American Ninth Air Force). Lieutenant-General Frederick A. M. Browning (hitherto Commander-in-Chief, [British] Army Air Corps) has been appointed his deputy.*<sup>110</sup>

Within five days the *Abwehr* began to send queries to England to the agents and asked for information on the new Allied command.

On 15 August, at 1713 GMT, *Abwehrstelle Hamburg* asked agent BRUTUS: "What do you know about the new command under Brereton and Browning? Which divisions belong to it?" At 2111 and 2119 hours GMT on 16 August, BRUTUS's controller followed up with this set of questions:

*According to [B.B.C.] news given by Daventry on 11 August, there has been created in England an Allied Airborne Army, Commander-in-Chief Brereton, Deputy Commander Browning. We would like to know details about this army such as organization, composition, disposition and tasks.... Has the army been created for a special importance operation or is its [public] appearance [now] only the result of an [earlier] organizational measure that has been broadcast [now] for reasons of [Anglo-American] propaganda?"<sup>111</sup>*

---

<sup>110</sup>. *Ibid.*, 140, citing *OKH LBW Nr. 1353, 10.VIII.44.*

<sup>111</sup>. *Ibid.*, citing *Abwehrstelle Hamburg*, messages of 151713, 162111 and 162119 Aug 44 GMT

It would, of course, take BRUTUS several days to investigate and report his findings. In the meantime, in a message sent to *Abwehrstelle Hamburg* at 1252 hours GMT on 13 August, BRUTUS reported that the British had gliders capable of carrying tanks, artillery and other heavy equipment of war.<sup>112</sup>

On 16 August Hitler ordered a withdrawal in the West.<sup>113</sup> The day before American and French forces had landed on the south coast of France. When OKW learned that the enemy airborne assault in the south of France was a success, they judged that they had no alternative but to defend the coast with the fortress troops and save what they could of the units still mobile enough to conduct a retrograde operation; Hitler agreed.<sup>114</sup> It also was time to save the remnants of the army in Normandy. Accordingly, the German headquarters and staffs that had been in Paris and its environs since the occupation in June 1940 were given permission to evacuate the French capital.<sup>115</sup> At the same time the *Feldheer* formations fighting in Normandy were given orders to begin retrograde movements. *Armeeoberkommando 7* and *Gruppe Eberbach* were ordered to fight their way out of the Falaise pocket; then, with the balance of the *H.Gr. B* forces, to move back to and defend a line on the lower Seine.<sup>116</sup> On 17 August

---

<sup>112</sup>. *Ibid.* The giant British Hamilcar glider, with a 17,500 lb. lift capacity, could carry the Tetrach tank, and several tanks were delivered to the British with the evening glider landings on 6 June 1944. Warren, *Airborne Operations in World War II*, 79, 98.

<sup>113</sup>. MS # ETHINT-1, *General der Artillerie* Walter Warlimont, "From Invasion to the Siegfried Line," 19-20 July 1948, 41, Records of the United States Army Commands, Record Group 338 (Foreign Military Studies), MRB, NA.

<sup>114</sup>. *Ibid.*, 45-46.

<sup>115</sup>. *Ibid.*, 43.

<sup>116</sup>. *Ibid.*, 44; Blumenson, *Breakout and Pursuit*, 661-2. As early as 14 August the Allied commanders believed that the bulk of the Germans had escaped from the Falaise pocket. They discovered otherwise on 15 August. To make matters even worse, Allied intelligence overestimated the strength of the units still in the pocket. After his experiences in the battle of the Falaise Gap, General Omar Bradley says he learned a

Hitler also ordered the withdrawal of the bulk of the units of *Generaloberst* Johannes Blaskowitz's *Heeresgruppe G (H.Gr. G)* from the south coast of France.<sup>117</sup>

The *OKH Lagebericht West* of 17 August reported on the presence of the American 21st Airborne Division in England:

*It appears from several credible reports that the American airborne division [identified in LBW Nr. 1334 on 22 July as the American 11th Airborne Division] in the area east of Leicester is the American 21st Airborne Division.*"<sup>118</sup>

In fact, the U.S. 21st Airborne Division was a notional unit in the Allied Order of Battle.<sup>119</sup> The same report also said the following concerning the U.S. 11th Airborne Division:

*Several reliable Abwehr sources have given repeated reports of an American 11th Infantry division in England in the Bury St. Edmunds area. The existence of an 11th Infantry Division besides the 11th Airborne Division seems therefore not impossible; confirmation must, however, be awaited.*"<sup>120</sup>

---

hard lesson for the second time: "never to over-rely, tactically, on Ultra." Bradley and Blair, *A General's Life*, 303-304.

<sup>117</sup>. ETHINT-1 (Warlimont), 46.

<sup>118</sup>. Hesketh, "FORTITUDE," Appendix XIII, 238, citing *OKH Lagebericht West Nr. 1360, 17. VIII.44*. The *LBW* report was based in part on a message sent by BRUTUS on 21 July at 1723 GMT in which he had identified the U.S. 21st Airborne Division as one of the three airborne divisions assigned to FUSAG. *Ibid*.

<sup>119</sup>. *Ibid*, Appendix XI, 223.

<sup>120</sup>. *Ibid*, Appendix XIII, 238, citing *OKH Lagebericht West Nr. 1360, 17. VIII.44*. The *LBW* report was based in part on messages sent by BRUTUS on 10 July at 2014 GMT, and 29 July at 2014 GMT; a letter sent by GARBO on 28 July; a message sent by GARBO on 14 August at 14 August; and a message from TATE on 28 July at 0630 MET. At 2002 GMT on 9 August, *Abwehrstelle Madrid* queried GARBO by wireless: "*Is the 11th U.S.*

It is curious that the Germans had not discovered that the U.S. Army divisional numbering system never duplicated infantry and airborne division numbers; however, the fact that American infantry and armored division number were duplicated may have confused this point for the Germans order of battle analysts at *Fremde Heere West*.

On 20 August the German radio broadcast that Anglo-American airborne operations were in progress along the Seine River. As there were no such operations in progress, the Allied planners at FAAA in Ascot believed that the broadcast was a German feeler for information, but they did not rule out the possibility that there was some loose talk going around about the plans of the FAAA.<sup>121</sup>

On 21 August *H.Gr. B* noted the following in the Situation Report for the period 14-20 August:

*The enemy thus exhibits the clear intention of first dealing with our forces in the Normandy area, and then proceeding east.*

*At the same time, two [enemy] corps operating between Chartres and the Loire [River] in order to secure possession of the Loire and Seine crossing by a thrust eastward south of Paris. From previous experience, a swing toward Paris from the southeast must be reckoned with in that case....*

*In connection with these operational intentions, the likelihood of a large-scale landing from the air by the airborne troops at readiness in Great*

---

*Division, reported by [subagent] SEVEN, an airborne, disembarkation [(i.e., assault)], or infantry division?" Ibid.*

<sup>121</sup>. Brereton, *The Brereton Diaries*, 335. The FAAA had two plans under consideration—CHASTITY and AXEHEAD—which were designed to assist in crossing the Seine, and the FAAA G-2 was directed to investigate the security of operational planning. *Ibid.*

*Britain must be reckoned with, as only weak airborne forces have been deployed in southern France.*<sup>122</sup>

Again the Germans are anticipating Operation TRANSFIGURE.

On 21 August, in three wireless telegraphy messages sent at 1714, 1718 and 1725 GMT, the British-controlled deception agent BRUTUS sent the first message which responded to his *Abwehr* controller's inquiry concerning the existence of a headquarters called the First Allied Airborne Army.<sup>123</sup> He also reported that from time to time airborne divisions would be taken from the Airborne Army and "attached to armies or groups of armies for particular tasks."<sup>124</sup> BRUTUS commented:

*With regard to General Brereton: a new force has been formed composed of all airborne divisions, of whom the chief is [the American] General Brereton and his Second in command [is the British] General Browning. As reported, the Allies attach great importance to airborne operations in the future in the hope of bringing them under a joint command. In addition, certain infantry divisions have undergone air-landing training and also can be included in this type of operation....*<sup>125</sup>

In a message sent at 1740 GMT on 22 August, BRUTUS further noted:

*It is supposed that seaborne operations no longer will be possible after the late autumn [due to weather conditions in the Channel], whereas airborne operations always will be possible. Furthermore, it is expected that the*

---

<sup>122</sup>. *Wochenmeldung 14.VIII. - 20.VIII.44, H.Gr. B, 21.VIII. 44, Ia Nr. 6375/44 g.Kdos, BLM 150/20, IWM.*

<sup>123</sup>. Hesketh, "FORTITUDE," 140-41, 147 fn. 6, citing BRUTUS's message of 1725 GMT on 21 August.

<sup>124</sup>. *Ibid*, 147 fn. 6.

<sup>125</sup>. *Ibid.*, Appendix XIII, 238

*most important operations will take place on the continent far from the sea, where surprise can be obtained only by airborne operations. Thus the Allies hope to use airborne divisions for delivering a decisive coup and to facilitate this they deem it necessary to create a new [airborne joint] command.*"<sup>126</sup>

Thus, Ops (B) had drawn the curtain on one act in the FORTITUDE SOUTH scenario and had set the stage for a new phase in the SHAEF deception effort.

On 24 August *Feldmarschall* Model sent the following—his own appreciation of the situation—to *General* Jodl at *OKW/WFSt.* and requested that it be submitted to the *Führer*:

*I. The enemy in northwest France at the present time has 53 divisions, which he can increase [this force] by 2 to 4 divisions by 1 September. In southern France the enemy has been operating with [a force of] about 8 divisions....*

*The following options are available to the enemy:*

*(a) After winning the Seine bank crossing, thrust between Rouen and Mantes northward past Paris to the Somme (Objective: base of V-1 and the vital Belgian industrial basin). He can put 30-35 divisions [into action] for this thrust;*

*(b) Thrust via Paris [in the] direction [of] Riems to the old invasion route (Einfalltor) to Germany. For this purpose he can put in [to action] 35 divisions;*

*(c) Thrust south of Paris via the line Troyes-Auxerre [in the] direction [of] Dijon (in order to cut off H.Gr. B) and then a movement forward*

---

<sup>126</sup>. *Ibid*, Appendix XIII, 238.

*through the Trouée de Belfort toward Alsace. He can put in[to action some] 25 divisions for this purpose.*

*For all three options the enemy can put in the airborne army (5-6 divisions) for the opening of the break-through (Seine-Somme crossings).*

*The enemy can simultaneously conduct operations (a) and (b) with 15 and 25 divisions respectively.*

*II. Our own troops are, as reported on 18 August, played out. No significant reinforcements are expected before 1 September....*

*In view of the keen enemy conduct of operations and reinforcements, the possibility will have to be reckoned with that the Seine-Dijon line cannot long be held and that we [soon] shall have to fall back on the Somme-Marne line.<sup>127</sup>*

It had been ten weeks since the Allied airborne troops were used in Normandy and the expectation of their further use became a routine part of most German intelligence estimates.

The Appendix to the *OKH Lagebericht West* of 26 August contains a note concerning the Allied Airborne Army:

*A further report from a particularly trusted source about the retention of the Allied Airborne Army [in the British Isles] for a big operational task deserves special notice. Concrete indications of the target are not available."<sup>128</sup>*

---

<sup>127</sup>. *Lagebeurteilung der Feldmarschall Model, H.Gr. B, 24.VIII. 44, Ia Nr. 6660/44, g.Kdos, BLM 150/11, IWM.*

<sup>128</sup>. Hesketh, "FORTITUDE," 141, 238, Citing the Appendix to *OKH Lagebericht West Nr. 1369, 26.VIII.44*. The *LBW* Appendix was based on messages from BRUTUS at 1714, 1718, and 1725 GMT on 21 August, and 1740 GMT on 22 August. *Ibid.*

This report was highlighted in the *OKH/Fremde Heere West* Situation Report of 27 August.<sup>129</sup>

The *OKH Lagebericht West* of 27 August noted the presence of the American 9th Airborne Division in England:

*According to a reliable Abwehr report [from agent BRUTUS,] there is in Great Britain in addition to the American 21st Airborne Division, an American 9th Airborne Division. This may be [same as] the American division shown [unlocated] in Great Britain as the 11th Airborne Division. Confirmation must be awaited."*<sup>130</sup>

In fact, the 9th Airborne Division was a notional unit in the Allied Order of Battle.<sup>131</sup>

According to a 29 August teleprinter message from *RSHA Mil. Amt* in Berlin to the *OKW* at its "Wolfsschanze" headquarters, the agent Dr. Krämer in Stockholm, had reported the following, which was attributed to JOSEPHINE, one of his fictional agents in England:

*Increased troop transports from South and Central England to Northern England are being associated with the movements of parts of FUSAG. Operations in North and Central Norway, starting from England, are not expected, but landings in Jutland and Southern Norway [are likely]."*<sup>132</sup>

---

<sup>129</sup>. *Ibid*, Appendix XIII, 238.

<sup>130</sup>. *Ibid*, Appendix XIII, 239, citing *OKH Lagebericht Nr. 1370, 27.VIII.44*. The *LBW* report was based on a message from BRUTUS sent at 1725 GMT on 21 August. The agent TATE also had reported the 9th Airborne Division in messages of 31 July (at 1808 MET) and 6 August (at 1803 MET). *Ibid*.

<sup>131</sup>. *Ibid*, Appendix XI, 223. The U.S. 11th Airborne Division is mentioned in the Appendix to *OKH Lagebericht West 1397, 23.XI.44*. *Ibid*, 149.

<sup>132</sup>. *Ibid.*, 146 fn. 2, citing *RSHA Mil. Amt B/L 13869, 29.VIII.-44*. When Dr. Krämer sent this report, the Allied Fourth Army had not started to move—at least in the sense that

This message surprised *RSHA Mil. Amt* and prompted a request to Dr. Krämer for further data concerning the reported movements.<sup>133</sup>

On 29 August Hitler issued the *Führerbefehl* entitled "Order for Completion of Defenses in the German Bight." It provided as follows:

*1. I issue the following orders for the strengthening of our defenses in the German Bight.*

*(a) The fortification of the entire coast from the Danish to the Dutch frontier, as well as those of the North and East Frisian Islands, which have not yet been fortified (Programme A). The islands already fortified will be brought up to a full state of [anti-invasion] defense [readiness].*

*(b) The planning and preparation of all measures for the quick construction of a second position which will run from the Danish border, in a depth of about 10 km from the coast; a cross-line somewhere along the German-Danish border, further cross-lines in Schleswig-Holstein to the north of the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal. In addition, Militärbefehlshaber Dänemark will plan and construct further east-west cross-lines along the north of the German-Danish border.*

*2. Gauleiter Kaufmann [in Hamburg] will be responsible for the construction, for which all available means and the Organization Todt will be employed.*

*3. Admiral Marinegruppenkommando Nord, as [the] commander of forces for the defense of the German North Sea coast, will assume the direction of [the] purely military tasks, according to the directives of the OKW/WFSt.*

---

such a notional command could move—for the Allied deception agents had not yet reported any movements of it in their messages.

<sup>133</sup>. Hesketh, "FORTITUDE," 146.

*Vize-Kommand.General Armeekorps X [also] will be responsible under [Admiral MKG Nord] ... for carrying out military tasks.*

**Tasks:**

*(a) To plan the whole defensive system (including estimates of materials required), for the construction of a permanent system of field fortifications for which the estimate of forces necessary for an adequate garrison capable of full defense is the basic requirement.*

*(b) To settle the tactical siting of the line of defenses in detail.*

*(c) To establish priorities for the completion of the individual sectors.*

*(d) To decide upon the form which the construction should take, in the light of tactical and technical experience, and the material available....*

*4. General Rules for the Construction. The following will be fortified as a first priority: The North and East Frisian Islands, the coastal sector opposite Sylt (Hindenburgdam); the Eiderstedt peninsula, the river defense of the Elbe-Weser estuary, and the coast from Brunsbüttel-Cuxhaven-Wesermünde to Wilhelmshaven inclusive, the Ems estuary with Delfzijl.*

**Second Priority.** *The entire remainder of the coast....*<sup>134</sup>

The order goes on to provide that reports on progress were to be made on the 1st and 15th of each month. Inasmuch as the German Bight sector covered by this *Führerbefehl* had a seafront of over 250 km, it is clear that Hitler was reacting to an immediate and deeply-felt concern. It is clear that the *Führer* had seen and has believed the intelligence reports of an Allied sea and airborne

---

<sup>134</sup>. Emphasis in original. *Führerbefehl, 29.VIII.44* (Order for Completion of Defenses in the German Bight), in H. R. Trevor-Roper, ed., *Hitler's War Directives 1939-1945* (1964; reprint, London: Pan Books Ltd, 1983), 265-68.

threat to the German Bight sector.<sup>135</sup> While there is no definite proof that it was JOSEPHINE's 29 August message which prompted Hitler to act when he did, it is probable that the timing of his order was not coincidental.

On 30 August at 1926 GMT *Abwehrstelle Madrid* received the following message from agent GARBO in England:

*To investigate your questionnaires about airborne and armored troops, I sent agent SEVEN (TWO) for a short trip to [the] Larkhill-Bulford area where airborne and armored troops were located before the landing [in the Normandy sector]. He discovered the following troops in this area: British 2nd Airborne Division with [the unit] sign of [the] winged horse....*<sup>136</sup>

In fact, the 2nd Airborne Division was a notional unit in the Allied Order of Battle. The 1st Airborne Division, a real British airborne unit, was located at Bulford.<sup>137</sup>

According to a 1 September teleprinter message from *RSHA Mil. Amt* to the *OKW*, Dr. Krämer in Stockholm responded to the earlier *RSHA* query of 29 August as follows:

*I was expecting your further inquiry, as my own suspicions also had been at once aroused. All [my] sources [in England—JOSEPHINE and HEKTOR—] confirm that FUSAG formations have been stationed as far [north] as the Humber [River (or 240 km north of London)]. In addition, there are individual reports about troop transports to Northern*

---

<sup>135</sup>. Trevor-Roper, *Hitler's War Directives*, 265-68.

<sup>136</sup>. Hesketh, "FORTITUDE," Appendix XIII, 240. For an excellent diagram of the entire GARBO network, see Michael I. Handel, "Introduction: Strategic and Operational Deception in Historic Perspective" (Final Draft), 25-26, which will appear in Michael I. Handel, ed. *Strategic and Operational Deception in the Second World War* (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1978, scheduled for publication in September 1987).

<sup>137</sup>. *Ibid*, Appendix V, 202, Appendix XIII, 223.

*England/Scotland.... It is quite clear [to me] that either a large-scale decoy maneuver is planned, to cover the employment of FUSAG in Belgium, Holland and the Heligoland Bight, or that an operation against Denmark actually is intended.*<sup>138</sup>

This message is a clear example of how Dr. Krämer was getting the Ops (B) story a little ahead of itself—which is why his earlier message had surprised the *RSHA Mil. Amt* staff.

On 24 August the *Führer* ordered the four *Gauleiters* in the West to call-up the civilian population to work on the "defensive positions in the West." Then, on 1 September, Hitler issued a new *Führerbefehl*, this one entitled "Order Placing the West Wall in a State of Defense." It provided for the immediate strengthening and extension of the *Westwall* by a call-up of civilians all along the western border of Germany and in Holland.<sup>139</sup> This activity was followed up on 3 September by a *Führerweisungen* addressed to *Feldmarschall* Model at *Ob. West*; it was a directive for the conduct of further operations in the West. Then, on 7 September, the *Führer* recalled *Feldmarschall* von Rundstedt and once again placed him in the position of *Oberbefehlshaber West*; Model was now to command only *H.Gr. B*. Once again Hitler was focusing his attention on the West and on another defensive wall.<sup>140</sup>

---

<sup>138</sup>. *Ibid*, 146-47 fn. 3, citing *RSHA Mil. Amt, B/L 10031, 1.IX.-44*.

<sup>139</sup>. *Führerbefehl 24.VIII.44* (Order for the Construction of German Defensive Position in the West), and *Führerbefehl 1.IX.44* (Order Placing the West Wall in a State of Defense), both in Trevor-Roper, *Hitler's War Directives*, 268-72.

<sup>140</sup>. *Führerweisungen 3.IX.44* (Directive for Further Operations by *Ob. West*) and *Führerbefehl 7.IX.44* (Military Powers of *Ob. West*) in Trevor-Roper, *Hitler's War Directives*, 268-72. First von Kluge and then Model had held the dual command of *Ob. West* and of *Ob. H.Gr. B* since 17 July. Blumenson, *Breakout and Pursuit*, 169. *Generalfeldmarschall* von Rundstedt had been dismissed from his position at *Ob. West* on 2 July after he had endorsed *Feldmarschall* Rommel's proposal to move the main Normandy defense line well back from the coast and out of range of the Allied naval artillery. Harrison, *Cross-Channel Attack*, 446.

On 1 September, in a radio message sent at 1725 GMT, agent BRUTUS sent the first message by which he identified the divisions attached to the First Allied Airborne Army. According to BRUTUS, the following divisions were subordinate to FAAA: American 9th and 21st airborne divisions; and British 2nd Airborne Division.<sup>141</sup>

On 4 September *Feldmarschall* Model sent another personal appreciation of the situation to Jodl at the *OKW/WFSt*; Model also requested that Jodl submit it to the *Führer*:

*1. Enemy Situation: The British [21st] Army Group is making its main thrust northeast toward the mouth of the Scheldt (Antwerp), in order to gain the double objective of taking the V-1 bases and bottling-up A.O.K. 15. The formations conducting this operation on a broad front even now are closing up.*

*An American Army [—the First—] of the 12th Army Group with some six to eight divisions has attached itself to this forward thrust [by the British] and may bring up still further forces....*

The mass of the American Third Army has for the past three days been closing up in the region of Verdun. It can at any time launch a new and strong offensive against the Luxemburg-Metz line.

In ever increasing numbers, French and Belgian resistance groups are taking part in the battle.

The anticipated large-scale air-landing appears most likely in the *Westwall* region.<sup>142</sup>

---

<sup>141</sup>. Hesketh, "FORTITUDE," 147 fn. 7. All notional units.

<sup>142</sup>. *Lagebeurteilung der Feldmarschall Model, H.Gr. B, 4.IX.44, Ia Nr. 6940/44, g.Kdos, BLM 150/14, IWM.*

Thus, as September began, *Feldmarschall* Model was expecting a large-scale airborne attack on the American 12th Army Group front in conjunction with large-scale ground attacks. At that time he was not forecasting a landing on the British sector to the north.

On 4 September *Feldmarschall* von Rundstedt, at *Ob. West*, also sent a personal appreciation of the situation to *General* Jodl at the *OKW/WFSt.* and he too requested that Jodl submit it to the *Führer*:

*I. Estimate of the Enemy: The Anglo-Americans in Belgium and Northern France now have some 54 [infantry and armored] ... divisions.... In England, inclusive of the airborne divisions, at least 30 more [enemy] divisions are ready for active service on the Continent....*

*Of its 25 to 27 divisions, the British 21st Army Group has put 8 to 10 divisions, with approximately 600 tanks, [into the sector] between Boulogne and Antwerp for a comprehensive and in part concentrated offensive against the formations of A.O.K. 15. A second group of 5 to 6 divisions, with some 400 tanks, is standing by between Antwerp and Diest. It will have the task of forcing the crossing over the Albert Canal in order to push forward with Rotterdam-Amsterdam as its point of main effort (Schwerpunkt)....*

*The American 12th Army Group stands ready with 15 to 18 divisions, and about 1000 tanks, between Hasselt and Toul on a wide front in [readiness for] an offensive towards the east with the object of pushing forward to the Rhine....*

*II. Against this it must be stated: Our own forces are all tied up in battle, and in part have been severely mauled.... With H.G. B at this time there are some 100 tanks available for action. The enemy airforce dominates the battle area.... The current enemy pressure in the direction of Liège (Meuse-Tal) with a clearly defined thrust in the direction of Aix-la-Chapelle (Aachen) to the Rhine-Westphalian industrial region has developed into a serious danger. All*

*[our] available forces “” are on the march from Ob. West to the Aachen region.*

*... In agreement with Feldmarschall Model, I perceive [that] here [in the Aachen sector there is] the acute danger threatening not only the rear, but also the Westwall linking up with it to the south. Strategic enemy air-landings have not yet taken place. They may be timed according to further developments of the situation to materialize in the rearward area of the Westwall and also for the formation of a bridgehead on the east bank of the Rhine [behind the Westwall]. They will take place where the enemy thrust in the Rhine direction has proved successful.<sup>143</sup>*

*Feldmarschall* von Rundstedt had been recalled from retirement on 7 September and was again the *Oberbefehlshaber West*.<sup>144</sup> He, like Model, reckoned that the main enemy threat was on a line from Aachen south in the American front sector. He expected that the drive being mounted by Montgomery would go north from Antwerp to Rotterdam, Amsterdam and The Hague—capturing along the way the V-2 rocket launching areas. Three days later, to von Rundstedt's surprise, the British 30th Corps launched a ground attack aimed in a more northeasterly direction—toward Eindhoven and the Ruhr.

On 6 September the *Ic* at *H.Gr. B* became concerned about the possibility that the Anglo-Americans might utilize airborne forces to disrupt the process of consolidating the battle line on the western borders of Germany. He predicted that the enemy might utilize airborne formations in the area of Aachen and further south in the Saar region.<sup>145</sup>

---

<sup>143</sup>. *Lagebeurteilung der Feldmarschall von Rundstedt, Ob. West, 7.IX. 44, Ia Nr. 805/44, g.Kdos, BLM 150/10, IWM.*

<sup>144</sup>. *Führerbefehl 7.IX.44 (Military Powers of Ob. West), Trevor-Roper, Hitler's War Directives, 276.*

<sup>145</sup>. MacDonald, *The Siegfried Line Campaign*, 135 fn. 49, citing *Lagebeurteilung, Ic/AO, KTB, H.Gr. B, 6.IX.44*

Beginning on 9 September and continuing through 14 September, the *Ic* at *H.Gr. B* issued daily warnings of an imminent Allied offensive. He speculated that the objective of the attacks would be the Ruhr and that the *Schwehrpunkt*, or main thrust, would be made in the Wesel-Arnhem sector of the front.<sup>146</sup> In view of the attacks launched by British 30th Corps along the Albert Canal starting on 7 September, the warnings from the *Ic* appear to have been appropriate.

According to the *OKH Lagebericht West* of 9 September, which had mentioned the possible movement of the Fourteenth U.S. Army to the South Coast of England:

*There are at present no reports of transfers or movements of British formations so there is no concrete evidence provided by the distribution of forces in England to support the reports which have been accumulating about imminent landings in Jutland or the German Bight. However, it must be emphasized that such reports can, in general, only, be checked by detailed air reconnaissance of the relevant invasion ports.*<sup>147</sup>

It would appear that Dr. Krämer's inventions about the movement of British formations—whether for real or deceptive purposes—were not being accepted.<sup>148</sup>

On 9 September in a series of messages sent at 2032, 2048 and 2101 GMT, *Abwehrstelle Madrid* received the following information, *inter alia*, from GARBO in England:

---

<sup>146</sup>. *Ibid*, 134, citing the *Ic-Tagesmeldung, Kriegstagebuch, H.Gr. B, 9.IX.-14.IX.44*.

<sup>147</sup>. *Ibid*, 147, fn. 3, citing the Appendix to *OKH Lagebericht West No. 1383, 9.IX.44*. At the end of each day the staff of *Oberkommando des Heeres* at Zossen issued a report of the significant activity of the day. The backup details, which included intelligence reports were collected in an appendix to the *Lagebericht West*.

<sup>148</sup>. *Ibid*, 147.

*Large number of staff cars with the sign of the British Fourth Army ... seen outside the Cups Hotel [in Colchester]. These belong to staff officers in transit."<sup>149</sup> The deception planners in London had begun the process of linking the Allied Airborne Army and the British Fourth Army. In the same series of messages GARBO also sent the first messages of the movement of British formations in the FUSAG area.<sup>150</sup> The next day, in radio messages sent at 1714 and 1724 GMT, agent BRUTUS sent the first message which identified the First Airborne Army and the divisions attached to it as being part of FUSAG. He also identified, in addition to the three subordinate divisions he had identified on 1 September, the "newly arrived American 17th Airborne Division."<sup>151</sup>*

At the same time BRUTUS's messages began to spell out the link between the Airborne Army and the Fourth Army, saying:

*Allied Airborne Army is now under FUSAG. [I now can] confirm that airborne divisions can be detached and that a task force consisting of four airborne divisions has already been posted to take part in the operations in conjunction with the Fourth Army.... From these changes one can suppose that the FUSAG operations will be preceded by an airborne attack which can be carried out even at long range. An attack against the*

---

<sup>149</sup>. Hesketh, "FORTITUDE," Appendix XIII, 241.

<sup>150</sup>. *Ibid*, 147 fn. 5.

<sup>151</sup>. *Ibid*, 147 fn. 8. On 1 September, BRUTUS had identified the U.S. 9th Airborne Division; the U.S. 21st Airborne Division; and the British 2nd Airborne Division as being subordinate to FAAA. Except for the 17th Airborne Division, all of the divisions that BRUTUS had identified were notional. The 17th, along with the 6th Airborne Division, jumped on 24 March 1945 in Operation VARSITY—the Rhine crossing. Blair, *Ridgway's Paratroopers*, 453-75.

*north [coast] of Germany in the regions of Bremen or Kiel is not excluded.*<sup>152</sup>

By now the SHAEF Ops (B) deception story—in its more coherent form—was catching up with the fictional yarn being spun by the *Abwehr* agent, Dr. Krämer in Stockholm.

On 11 September *Feldmarschall* Model at *H.Gr. B* received a report which stated that the enemy was assembling landing craft in British ports. Model reasoned that the movement of ships signaled an indication to make a seaborne attack on the Dutch coast, with the possible objective of opening the Scheldt estuary. He alerted *General der Flieger* Friedrich Christianson, *Wehrm.Befh. i. d. Niederlanden*, and ordered him to defend the Dutch coast with all the forces at his disposal. *Feldmarschall* Model also alerted *SS-Obergruppenführer* Bittrich at *SS-Panzerkorps II* to the possibility that he might have to detach a mobile element of *PzD 9* and move it to the coastal area to counterattack any landing site. Model also detached *Infanteriedivision 59* (*Generalleutnant* Poppe) from *A.O.K. 15* and ordered it to move to the Eindhoven area to rest and refit as a *H.Gr. B* reserve formation. As things turned out, *Inf.Div. 59* was in transit near Tilburg, about 28 km northwest of Eindhoven, when Operation MARKET began.<sup>153</sup>

In his daily report for 14 September, the *lc* at *H.Gr. B* elaborated on the rationale behind his warnings of an imminent British offensive—warnings that he had issued daily since—9 September. He stated that he believed that the enemy General Eisenhower was probably thinking along the following lines:

*The British Second Army will assemble its units at the Maas-Schedt [Meuse-Escaut] and Albert Canals. On its right wing it will concentrate an*

---

<sup>152</sup>. *Ibid*, and Appendix XIII, 241. On 20 November 1944, in anticipation that there might be a German collapse in the West, FAAA began to actually plan for the capture of the port of Kiel (Operation ERUPTION). Brereton, *The Brereton Diaries*, 340, 370.

*attack formation mainly composed of armored units, and after forcing a crossing of the Maas [which will be effected by the U.S. First Army] ... will launch operations to break-through to the Rhenish-Westphalian Industrial area [the Ruhr] with the main effort via Roermond. To cover the northern flank, the left wing of the [British Second Army will close to the Waal at Nijmegen, and thus create the basic conditions necessary to cut off the German forces [—the troops of A.O.K. 15 and others formations—] committed in the Dutch coastal areas.*<sup>154</sup>

Having thus outlined the supposed scheme of maneuver of the Anglo-American ground forces, the *Ic* continued with his predictions concerning the use of airborne formations: "*In conjunction with the [British Second Army attack] a large-scale airborne landing by the First Allied Airborne north of the Lippe River in the area south of Münster is planned for a yet indefinite date....*"<sup>155</sup>

On 14 September, in wireless messages sent to *Abwehrstelle Hamburg* at 1835, 1840 and 1846 GMT, agent BRUTUS said:

*From one of my colleagues, I have learned that the British First Parachute Brigade was due to take part in an airborne operation against the Pas-de-Calais on 3 September and that the operation was cancelled on account of the rapid advance of the British 21st Army Group. There is great secrecy about airborne [actual] preparations and my informant did not even know the number of the units of the British 1st Airborne Corps.*

*On the other hand, I have just learnt that recently there has been great activity at the headquarters of the Allied Airborne Army and that they have even formed a second task force. In view of the general situation, **there is***

---

<sup>153</sup>. MacDonald, *The Siegfried Line Campaign*, 135-36, citing the *H.Gr. B Befehl fuer Wehrm.Befh. i. d. Niederlanden*, 11.IX.44.

<sup>154</sup>. *Ibid*, 134, citing *Ic-Tagesmeldungen, Kriegstagebuch, Ic/AO, H.Gr. B, 14.IX.44*.

***talk in our headquarters that in three or four days one should expect an airborne attack against Denmark, [the] Kiel Canal or against ports in Northern Germany. This appears to confirm my own opinion, already transmitted several days ago, especially when I learned of the move of the Fourth Army into the Essex-Kent region. In my opinion the attack can be undertaken by the special task force I have reported as being attached to the Fourth Army.***<sup>156</sup>

With this message BRUTUS laid the ground work to establish his credibility with regard to *when* an airborne attack would occur.<sup>157</sup> At this point it was expected in London that—barring a weather delay—Operation MARKET would be launched on 17 September.

On 14 September and again on the following day, *Ob. West* advised its subordinate commands and the *OKW* that a large-scale airborne assault was to be expected in Holland in conjunction with a ground thrust on both sides of Eindhoven extending probably as far north as Arnhem.<sup>158</sup> There is no evidence that this warning—which did not call for any special precautions—was based on anything in the way of a message from either JOSEPHINE or OSTRO. It is probable that it was a routine concern about an airborne attack in conjunction with any major ground operation and echoes the daily warning from *H.Gr. B*. Both headquarters had been following the actions of British 30th Corps in the

---

<sup>155</sup>. *Ibid.*

<sup>156</sup>. Emphasis added. Hesketh, "FORTITUDE," 148 fn. 9, and - Appendix XIII, 241. The messages from BRUTUS were delayed after being received at *Abwehrstelle Hamburg* which was his control. References to this message does not appear in any intelligence reports until 19 September when they are noted in the Appendix to *OKH Lagebericht West Nr. 1393, 19.IX.44. Ibid*, 149, 241.

<sup>157</sup>. See text associated with footnotes 43 and 44, *ante*.

<sup>158</sup>. Bennett, *Ultra in the West*, 154, citing Msgs. HP 175 and HP 242. See also, MacDonald, *The Siegfried Line Campaign*, 134, citing *KTB, Ob. West, 15.IX.44*.

area southwest of Eindhoven since 7 September and no doubt rightly expected the British to resume their efforts to get the ground offensive moving again.

On 15 September Dr. Krämer in Stockholm sent the following message from JOSEPHINE to control officers at *Abwehrstelle Hamburg*: "*FUSAG continues [to be located] in Eastern England as far [north] as the Humber. Formations in Northern England and Scotland do not belong to FUSAG.*"<sup>159</sup> A little later that day, Dr. Krämer sent a second message to his control, attributing it to JOSEPHINE:

*In London on 11 and [again on] 12 September Air Vice-Marshal Trafford [Leigh-Mallory] stated to a reliable informant that FUSAG is not to be employed in [either] Jutland or Southern Norway, but that it is to be used in connection with operations of the English Second Army, the American First Army and the Canadian First Army. The English Second Army will be advanced on a broad front as far as the Meuse and, if possible, even as far as the Waal by September 24. After that, the employment of powerful airborne forces in Eastern and Northern Holland and the German frontier region is planned. Immediately on completion of the air-landing action, which is intended to eliminate German river positions in the rear, it is intended to use FUSAG in Eastern Holland and in the Heligoland Bight.*<sup>160</sup>

Being privy to the *Abwehr* reports sent to Stockholm and to the news accounts of fighting along the Albert Canal, and possibly to the warnings of *H.Gr. B* and *Ob. West*, Dr. Krämer had guessed at the essence of Operation MARKET, albeit his timing was off. For some unexplained reason, *Abwehr* control in Hamburg did not

---

<sup>159</sup>. Hesketh, "FORTITUDE," 148 fn. 11, citing *Anlage Nr. 3 to Luftwaffe Führungsstab Ic No. 109/45 g. Kdos, 06.I.45.*

<sup>160</sup>. Hesketh, "FORTITUDE," 148 fn. 12, citing *Anlage Nr. 3 to Luftwaffe Führungsstab Ic No. 109/45 g. Kdos, 06.I.45.*

get this message decoded and passed to *RSHA Mil. Amt* in Berlin until mid-day on 17 September, about the time the Allied air assault began in Holland.<sup>161</sup>

On 16 September, and in order to explain away his previous references to Norway and Denmark, Dr. Krämer sent the following message to *Abwehrstelle Hamburg*:

*In the entourage of the exiled Norwegian and Danish Governments, information is being given out deliberately to the effect that a FUSAG operation is projected in the North; moreover, in Denmark and Norway these reports also are being given by said Governments to their own resistance movements.*<sup>162</sup>

Dr. Krämer could hardly expect that the Allied landings in Holland on the next day would give credence to his own phony explanation that the report concerning talk of action in Norway and Denmark was being deliberately put out by the enemy as a deception to cover the actual landings in Holland.

On 16 September, *Generaloberst* Kurt Student, commanding the *Fallschirm-armee 1* along the line of the Meuse-Escaut Canal, noted, in his daily situation report to *Feldmarschall* Model at *H.Gr. B*, that "*increased motor transport activity and confirmed armoured preparations strengthen the appreciation that a heavy*

---

<sup>161</sup>. *Ibid*, 148 fn. 13. This delay caused a certain amount of inquiry and recrimination. *Ibid*. Whenever, as here, there is an apparent blunder on the part of the *Abwehr*, some are prone to seek the presence of a hidden hand that was working on behalf of the Allied cause. Such ideas make for good plots in modern novels, but there is no evidence that this message was delayed on purpose by someone in *Abwehrstelle Hamburg*. Signal delays, especially in the case of coded traffic, were common on both sides of the line in World War II; e.g., decrypts of General Eisenhower's four paragraph message of 051945 Sep 44 were delivered to Field-Marshal Montgomery in two parts: paragraphs 3 and 4 at 1015 hours on 7 September; and paragraphs 1 and 2 at 0900 hours on 9 September. Bernard L. Montgomery, *The Memoirs of Field-Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein*, K.G. (1958; reprint, New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1982), 244.

<sup>162</sup>. *Ibid*, 148 fn. 12, citing *Anlage Nr. 3 to the Luftwaffe Führungsstab Ic No. 109/45 g. Kdos, 06.I.45*.

*attack must be expected very shortly.*" He expressed no concern about the threat of an airborne attack.<sup>163</sup> In fact, while he expected an attack by the armored divisions of the British 30th Corps, Student was not overly concerned about it. As he viewed the situation:

*The enemy was now approaching the maze of the Dutch system of canals which was most favorable for defense and which did not lend itself to the employment of [the enemy's] . . . far superior tank forces for [a] wide-aiming thrust as [had been done by the British ten days earlier] on the ideal area of the Beverloo army exercise ground."*<sup>164</sup>

On Saturday, 16 September Hitler and the senior officers at the "Wolfsschanze" *Führerhauptquartier* were not anticipating an Allied airborne invasion in the Netherlands. In fact, on that day the *Führer* was planning an attack of his own aimed at Antwerp. It was on that Saturday that Hitler outlined a plan for a massive counteroffensive in West. *General* Jodl was giving his briefing at the mid-day war conference: he had just told Hitler, Keitel, Guderian and several others that there were 55 German divisions in the West and they were faced by 96 enemy divisions. In addition, said Jodl, the Anglo-Americans had 10 more divisions enroute from Britain where the strategic reserve—the First Allied Airborne Army—was poised for action. At that moment Hitler interrupted Jodl saying: "*I have just made a momentous decision. I shall go over to the counterattack, that is to say, here (pointing to a map)—out of the Ardennes, with the objective of Antwerp.*" Hitler told them that he considered that the German defensive positions were strong enough to outweigh the enemy's clear numerical advantage. "*The present front can easily be held!*" said Hitler. "*Our own attacking force will consist of 30 new Volksgrenadierdivisionen, and [many] new*

---

<sup>163</sup>. Wilmot, *The Struggle for Europe*, 502, citing Liddel Hart's notes of the interviews of Student.

<sup>164</sup>. Kurt Student, "The Allied Airborne Operation Against Arnhem-Nijmegen-Veghel, 'From the Other Side,'" to Bill Williams, thence to Field-Marshal Montgomery, May 1949, 2-3, PP/MCR/C 30, Reel 12, BLM 130/5, Imperial War Museum, London.

*Panzerdivisionen, plus Panzerdivisionen from the Eastern Front. Split the British and American armies at their seam,"* he continued, "*then [we will have] a new Dunkirk!"* Well, not quite another Dunkirk he told them—with Antwerp again in German hands the encircled British army would have no port from which to escape and they would be totally destroyed.<sup>165</sup>

Guderian said that the situation on the Eastern Front would make it impossible to withdraw combat-worthy *Panzer* formations. Jodl voiced concern about the enemy's air superiority, and their capability to make further airborne landings in Holland, Denmark and also in northern Germany. The *Führer* noted their objection but was not dissuaded: "*Acid comments. That is why our offensive will begin in a bad-weather period, when the enemy air forces is grounded.... Von Rundstedt will take command. All [offensive] preparations [will be finished] by 1 November.*"<sup>166</sup> It is obvious that on the day before Operation MARKET began Hitler did not have the slightest inkling that a large-scale enemy airborne attack was near at hand.

In order better to round out the intelligence collection and estimate picture with regards to the Germans in the hours just prior to the start of Operation MARKET, it is well to see where the key German commanders were located and note what they were doing. *SS-Obergruppenführer Bittrich*, commanding *SS Panzerkorps II*, was at his headquarters at Doetinchem (26 km east of Arnhem); the commander of *Fallschirmarmee 1*, *Generaloberst Student*, was at his headquarters at Vught (27 km northwest of Eindhoven); *Feldmarschall Model* was at his tactical headquarters in the Tafelberg Hotel at Oosterbeek in the western suburbs of Arnhem (4 km west of the main bridge in the city); and, 200 km to the south, *Generalfeldmarschall von Rundstedt*, the *Oberbefehlshaber*

---

<sup>165</sup>. David Irving, *Hitler's War: 1942-1945* (1977; reprint, London: Papermac, 1983), 705. See also, MacDonald, *The Siegfried Line Campaign*, 135, citing MS # P-069, *General der Flieger* Werner Kreipe, "Kreipe Diary (22 July - 2 November 1944)," Record Group 338 (Foreign Military Studies), MRB, NA.

West, was at his headquarters in Aremberg near Koblenz. Moreover, none of these four senior headquarters were operating under a heightened state of combat-readiness alert.<sup>167</sup>

As it turned out, while von Rundstedt was not "on alert" to the danger of an immediate airborne attack, he was concerned. On the morning of 17 September he discussed the subject of an enemy air-landing with the *Ob. West Ia*, who noted that "*the general situation and [a] notable increase on enemy reconnaissance activities ... has caused [von Rundstedt] ... to again examine the possibilities of an amphibious assault and air-landing operations.*" The *Feldmarschall* asked his operations officer to prepare a message to Model asking *H.Gr. B* to investigate the possibility that preparations were underway for an enemy landing on the coast of Holland with airborne troops in support. The message arrived at Model headquarters and was being deciphered at about 1300 hours that day—about the same time the Allied air-assault armada crossed the Dutch coastline.<sup>168</sup>

Then it began—the airborne attack was underway. Student remembered the moment:

*[T]he Allied airborne operation [in Holland on that day] completely surprised us.... Now the 17th of September was a Sunday and [it was] a beautiful late summer day. My headquarters was, for the past few days, at Vught ... in a cottage. There was general quietness along the front line. ... About noon I was disturbed at my desk by a roaring in the air [of aircraft motors] ... so I left my study and went out onto the balcony [of the cottage]. Wherever I looked, I saw aircraft: both the troop transport aircraft*

---

<sup>166</sup>. *Ibid.*

<sup>167</sup>. Wilmot, *The Struggle for Europe*, 502.

<sup>168</sup>. Ryan, *A Bridge Too Far*, 200-202. See also, MacDonald, *The Siegfried Line Campaign*, 135, citing *KTB, Ob. West, 17.IX.44*.

*and the large airplanes towing gliders.... It was an immense stream which passed at quite a low height near the house.*

*I was greatly impressed by this mighty spectacle. I must confess that during these [first few] minutes I did not think of the danger of the situation, but reflected with regret the memory of my own airborne operations, and when my Chief of Staff came out on the balcony, I could not say more to him but: "Oh, how I wish I had such a powerful means at my disposal!" It may seem funny, but there it is.<sup>169</sup>*

And so it was, after waiting since 9 June for another large-scale use of airborne forces by the Allied, the forces of *H.Gr. B* were once again—as they had been at Normandy—taken by surprise by an attack which came like a bolt out of the blue.

### German Post-MARKET D-Day Estimates

In order to gauge the effectiveness of the SHAEF Ops (B) deception effort —*qua* deception operation, as compared to its effect on Operation MARKET—it is necessary to follow the German intelligence estimates out to mid-December, long after the Battle of Arnhem had ended. The reader will see how successful the strategic deception effort turned out to be.

*Generaloberst* Student, *Oberbefehlshaber, Fallschirmarmee 1*, at Vught had a clear idea of the nature of the game that was afoot almost from the beginning—and certainly by mid-afternoon on the day of the attack. The Germans had captured a copy of the Allied battle plan—at least they found the plan in a briefcase in a Waco glider that crashed near the *Fallschirmarmee 1* headquarters. According to Student:

*A few hours later [or about 1600 hours,] the enemy orders for the complete airborne operation were on my desk; they had been captured in*

*a glider which had been shot down near Vught. From these orders, the following was clear:*

*The corridor Eindhoven-Veghel-Graves-Nijmegen-Arnhem was to be opened by a large air-landing operation and be held open; for this purpose, the bridges within the corridor were to be captured.*

*Immediately after establishing this corridor, parts of the British Second Army were to be thrust along the corridor at high speed and link up with the airborne troops. Operationally employed were—*

*The U.S. 101 Airborne Division in the area*

*Eindhoven-Veghel.*

*The U.S. 82d Airborne Division in the area*

*Grave-Nijmegen.*

*The British Airborne Division at Arnhem.*

*The whole operation was under [the] command of the British Airborne Corps. The Corps Hq. accompanied the 82d division into the Nijmegen area.<sup>170</sup>*

*It was incredible. In the [brief] case was the complete enemy attack order for the operation. [My staff and I poured over the plans and] they showed us everything—the dropping [and landing] zones, the corridor, [all of] the objectives, even the names of the divisions involved. Everything!*

*Immediately we could see the strategic implications. They had to grab the bridges before we could destroy them. All I could think of was, "This is retribution. Retribution! History is repeating itself." During our airborne*

---

<sup>169</sup>. Student, "The Allied Airborne Operation Against Arnhem-Nijmegen-Veghel," 3-4, BLM 130/5, IWM.

*operation in Holland in 1940, one of my officers, against strict orders, had taken into battle [some] papers that detailed our entire attack, and these had fallen into enemy hands. Now the wheel had turned full circle. I knew exactly what I had to do.*<sup>171</sup>

The officially accepted story is that someone in an American glider that was shot down near Vught was carrying a copy of the Allied operational order.<sup>172</sup> Due to communication difficulties, it took ten hours to get the news of the captured plans to Model who had fled from his headquarters near Arnhem.<sup>173</sup>

The first German intelligence reports from the *OKH/Fremde Heere West* at the "Zeppelin" HQ, in Zossen, concerning the air-landings in Holland suggested that only British airborne divisions were then involved. The following appreciation appeared in the *OKH Lagebericht West* for 17 September, which was issued late that evening:

---

<sup>170</sup>. *Ibid*, 4.

<sup>171</sup>. Ryan, *A Bridge Too Far*, 254-55. Since Student reported that the plans were removed from a Waco freight glider it has generally been assumed that someone with the 101st Airborne Division, which landed near Vught, lost the plans. Ryan points out that the staff of Browning's British 1st Airborne Corps were landed in the Waco gliders, and one was reported to have crashed-landed near the town of Vught. Ryan is also skeptical about the fact that a copy of the plans could have been lost. Perhaps one of the officially numbered copies was not lost; detailed briefing notes, or what is more likely, a signals communication diagram showing units and location would have served as well to tell Student what he needed to know—what he apparently did know.

<sup>172</sup>. MacDonald, *The Siegfried Line Campaign*, 141, which relies on MS # B-717, *Generaloberst Kurt Student*, "First Parachute Army (4 September - 31 October 1944)," Record Group 338 (Foreign Military Studies), MRB, NA, saying: Though no confirmation of this event is to be found in American records, there appears no reason to question Student's recollection." Omar Bradley certainly accepts this account. Bradley and Blair, *A General's Life*, 332 ("battle plans ... stupidly taken into battle by an American officer.").

<sup>173</sup>. Ryan, *A Bridge Too Far*, 255. When the attack came, Model got in his staff car and drove to Bittrich's headquarters east of Arnhem at Doetinchem. *Ibid*, 219. The fact that it was nearly 0200 hours on 18 September before Model learned of the captured plans does not mean that Student had been unable to advise others of his find by phone.

*An [enemy] airborne landing which began at mid-day on 17 September in the area of the Dutch Lower Rhine, comprises, according to reports so far available, some two to three presumably British airborne divisions. All available English airborne divisions from England are believed to have been engaged.... If [the initial] assumption is confirmed that all the airborne formations employed were **English**, then the enemy still has some four American airborne divisions at its disposal and their employment may well be expected in the sector of the American army group. Nevertheless, the employment of the First Airborne Army as a whole in the present landing area is not to be excluded. Concrete evidence for this is not [yet] available.<sup>174</sup>*

and,

*In connection with the air landings which have taken place, particular attention is deserved for an agent's report which has only just come in and which predicted these air landings correctly. In this report we are told [by agent JOSEPHINE] that immediately after the air landing a landing operation by Fourth English Army (some 15 divisions) would take place against Holland and the German Bight. The agent mentioned above considers that reports emanating particularly from diplomatic circles about landing intentions against Norway and Denmark are deliberate camouflage. Although the latest photographic reconnaissance of the Southern England ports showed no landing ships, we must reckon on their*

---

<sup>174</sup>. *Emphasis in original.* Hesketh, "FORTITUDE," 148 fn. 12, citing to the Appendix of *Lagebericht West No. 1391, 17.IX.44*. From this intelligence summary it is clear that the Germans are crediting the Americans with two real and two notional airborne divisions, and the British with two real and one notional division of airborne forces. The Germans appear to have accepted as true all BRUTUS' information on the composition of the First Allied Airborne Army.

*arrival at short notice in the presumed invasion ports of the English Fourth Army. Continuous watch from the air is required.*<sup>175</sup>

The OKH was referring to Dr Krämer's message of 15 September which predicted the airborne operation would occur after 24 September.

In the Appendix to *OKH Lagebericht West* of 17 September there was a note concerning the movement of the British Fourth Army:

*According to messages from a particularly trustworthy source, following on the withdrawal of the American division hitherto in the area northeast of London (County of Essex), parts of the British Fourth Army ... have moved into the area. As part of this regrouping, the headquarters of the British Fourth Army has moved to Colchester ([about 80 km] northeast of London)."*<sup>176</sup>

Remember, the British Fourth Army was a notional command in the Allied Order of Battle.<sup>177</sup>

---

<sup>175</sup>. *Ibid*, 148-49. In a 15 May 1944 report, the intelligence staff at *Fremde Heere West* noted

*It must be considered, however, that without a doubt, considerable parts of the well-camouflaged landing ship areas were not observed, so that a much higher landing ship tonnage must be expected.*

*Oberkommando des Heeres, Gen.St.d.H, Abt. Fremde Heere West III/V, Überblick Britisches Reich Nr. 29, 15 May 1944, 4-5.* Thus, it would seem that by late September the "well-camouflaged" landing craft had the additional ability to converge on the embarkation ports on short notice.

<sup>176</sup>. *Ibid*, Appendix XIII, 241, citing the appendix to *OKH Lagebericht West No. 1391, 17.IX.44.*

<sup>177</sup>. *Ibid*, Appendix XI, 223.

By the second day of the battle the Germans had sorted out the correct Order of Battle of the several airborne divisions. According to the *OKH Lagebericht West* for 18 September:

*The confirmation of the forces engaged, namely so far about three airborne divisions, shows that they are composed of two battle-trying American airborne divisions (the 82nd and 101st) and the British 1st Airborne Division (in action for the first time) to which the Polish and Dutch parachute units, which also are engaged according to the English wireless, may belong.... The fact that the only two battle-trying American airborne divisions were dropped in front of the **English** sector makes it seem improbable that a **second large-scale** air-borne operation is planned for the American sector. Rather, we must deduce that the main effort of the whole operation lies in the sector of the English Second Army. According to our present picture of the battle, the main objective of the airborne operation is the capture of the bridges along the Eindhoven-Arnhem road: the object being to facilitate a quick thrust by the main forces of the English Second Army through Holland to form a [new] bridgehead at Arnhem. This confirms the general intentions already suspected: that is, to cut off the German forces in Holland and at the same time to win a [good bridgehead] base from which to continue the operation east of the Rhine.<sup>178</sup>*

---

<sup>178</sup>. *Emphasis in original. Ibid*, 149 fn. 14, citing the Appendix of *OKH Lagebericht West No. 1392, 18.IX.44*. It is interesting to compare the *OKH* report with what the Germans put out for public consumption. A German radio announcement on 20 September, attributed to the International Information Bureau, stated that the American 83d and 104th airborne divisions had taken part. On 21 September the *Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro* (German News Agency) stated that the "111 Airborne Division headquarters had been mopped up." Memo. (Strangeways), G(R) to P&PW, 21 AGp, 26 Sep 44, in File "Airborne Operations," WO 205/194, PRO.

The detail of this estimate suggests that *OKH* had by then received a report on the content of the captured Allied battle plan.<sup>179</sup>

BRUTUS's message of 14 September—the message predicting a large-scale landing in several days—finally was noted by the Germans. In the Appendix of the *OKH Lagebericht West* for 19 September the following appears:

*The possibility of a new [seaborne] landing operation in conjunction with planned airborne operations [now] is suggested by a further report from a very trustworthy agent, according to whom the present airborne operation should be coupled with future plans for the English Fourth Army. The agent [BRUTUS] mentions in this connection the already reported moves of [several] formations of the English Fourth Army to the Essex-Kent area.... There still is no sure evidence of such plans.*"<sup>180</sup>

From this report and the course of the battle, there is no reason to assume that BRUTUS' message diverted the attention of the Germans from the attack at Arnhem; however, subsequent reports will show how the concern in the minds of the German analysts about actions in the future were nurtured.<sup>181</sup>

On 20 September, in radio messages sent at 2122 and 2144 GMT, agent BRUTUS said:

*Regarding the airborne attacks [in Holland three days ago]: I have learnt that it was an operation of the British 1st Airborne Corps and the American XVIII Airborne Corps, and not the [other] task force as supposed by me.*

---

<sup>179</sup>. See text with fn. 170, *ante*.

<sup>180</sup>. *Emphasis in original*. Hesketh, "FORTITUDE," 149 fn. 16, and Appendix XIII, 241, citing to the Appendix of *Lagebericht West No. 1393, 19.IX.44*. When the authors of the *Lagebericht West* used the phrase "there is no sure evidence" they were referring to a "sure source" (*sichere quelle*) in the sense of wireless intercept information. *Ibid*, 149 fn. 15.

<sup>181</sup>. *Ibid*, 149.

*As far as I know, this [other] task force is still ready for the operation with the Fourth Army. It included the American 9th, 17th and 21st airborne divisions and the British 2nd Airborne Division.*"<sup>182</sup>

The threat to the Kiel-Bremen areas was being kept alive by SHAEF.

The Appendix to the *OKH Lagebericht West* for 23 September contains a long discussion of the First Airborne Army and its missions:

*From various reports by proven [secret] agents, the following picture of the present airborne operations [in Holland] and of future plans emerges; it is known that three airborne corps are included in the Allied First Airborne Army. The British 1st Airborne Corps and the American XVIII Airborne Corps—so far engaged—comprise the English 1st, and the American 82nd and 101st airborne divisions, one Polish brigade as well as possibly the American 17th Airborne Division—and here it is not yet finally clear whether the last-named is the American 17th Infantry Division (Airborne) though there are some indications of this. The subordination of other enemy formations and smaller airborne army units is probable. To the airborne corps still in Great Britain belong presumably the English 2nd and the American 9th, 11th, and 21st airborne divisions and possibly the American 59th Infantry Division equipped for transport by air. The last-named [division] having been mentioned in this connection should also appear as an "assault division." This [airborne] corps is said to be destined for employment as part of **landing operations by English Fourth Army** which are predicted against the German Bight in the sector Wesermünde-Emden. The reports mentioned above make a convincing impression and have been partially confirmed by the course of [actual] operations [to date around Arnhem] and by [enemy] troop identifications in recent days.... On the basis of the aforesaid [agent] reports, therefore, **new landings,***

---

<sup>182</sup>. *Ibid*, 148 fn. 10.

*coupled with strong airborne landings must be expected in the area of the German Bight. So far we have no information as to the date of such [new] undertakings. However, it must be assumed that these intentions will only be capable of execution when a bridgehead has been successfully created at Arnhem and further operations from this bridgehead seem to the enemy command to be assured of success. The seasonal weather conditions in the [English] Channel, which [even now] are [rapidly] deteriorating will, however, set a time limit to these plans and will, therefore, tend to advance them.*<sup>183</sup>

It is clear that the essence of the SHAEF deception message had been understood and accepted by the German intelligence analysts at *OKH/Fremde Heere West*. At the same time, the operation along the Eindhoven-Nijmegen-Arnhem corridor disclosed Montgomery's strategy in the north; the Germans now understood that the *Schwehrpunkt* of his effort "was clearly to be in the area between the Lower Rhine bend and Aachen, with the primary objective the Ruhr and the North German plain, and [with the] ultimate objective [being the capture of] Berlin."<sup>184</sup>

On 23 September the weather, which had been bad since the first day of the battle, turned good and additional reinforcements that had been scheduled to arrive on D plus 2 were brought in. In the 82d Airborne Division area the 325th Glider Infantry Regiment came in and were soon engaged in the fighting. The 907th Glider Field Artillery (105mm) landed in the 101st Airborne area just as the German attacks on the "Hell's Highway" between Veghel and Uden were being turned back. For the Americans it meant that the two divisions—on the sixth day of battle—were getting up to the full strength. Forty-one sticks of the Polish 1st

---

<sup>183</sup>. *Emphasis in original. Ibid*, 149 fn. 17, Appendix XIII, 241-42, citing to the Appendix of *Lagebericht West Nr. 1397, 23.IX.44*.

Independent Parachute Brigade were dropped on the south bank of the Neder Rijn at Driel, and some 123 bombers and transports dropped supplies at Arnhem. The Germans were convinced that the new airborne activity marked the arrival in the battle zone of entirely new airborne formations which were arriving to reinforce the divisions already engaged at Nijmegen and along the highway corridor.<sup>185</sup>

On 24 September, in a message to von Rundstedt at *Ob. West, Feldmarschall* Model expressed his concern about the latest turn of events, saying:

*The position of H.Gr. B in the north sector has progressively deteriorated since the air-landings of 17 September because the enemy has succeeded in throwing in further substantial forces by means of further air-landings which continue daily. [Meanwhile,] our own reinforcements proved inadequate. As a result it was possible only to delay the attainment by the enemy of the operational objective—a break-through via Eindhoven-Nijmegen to Arnhem, as a base for the further offensive against the Ruhr. This delay was achieved by hard fighting during the past week, but, apart from firmly holding Arnhem, the enemy's aims could not be [fully] obstructed. The renewed [enemy] air-landings on 23 September [were] in considerable strength, [and] although their extent cannot yet be assessed, must lead to critical developments unless it is possible to bring up promptly further and adequate forces to support the severely menaced front of Fallschirmarmee 1.<sup>186</sup>*

and,

---

<sup>184</sup>. Bodo Zimmerman, "France 1944," in *The Fatal Decisions*, Seymour Freidin and William Richardson, eds., Constantine Fitzgibbon, trans. (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1956), 237.

<sup>185</sup>. MacDonald, *The Siegfried Line Campaign*, 192-93; Brereton, *The Brereton Diaries*, 355.

<sup>186</sup>. Msg., Model to von Rundstedt, 24 Sep 44, PP/MCR/C 30, Reel 14, BLM 150/3, IWM.

*The fact that the new landings took place as early as 23 September, i.e., [only] six days after the first [air-landings], suggests that the enemy probably had originally intended [that] the [new] forces landed on 23 September [were] to be used for another objective, but [the enemy] has now considered the time ripe for decisive reinforcement of the current operation, clearly with the aim of effecting a penetration to the southeast also between the Rhine and the Maas. The danger of this area is therefore particularly grave, as there are [few] permanent strongpoints in the presumed line of the enemy offensive. Our own forces are inadequate in view of the substantial reinforcements thrown in by the enemy, to hold up the threatened advance. Further forces must be brought up or made available elsewhere.*

*The quickest expedient for restoring the position would be by means of an offensive. That [object] has been attempted both in the direction of Veghel and Nijmegen. The units available for [the counterattack at] Veghel were insufficient for the objective, and our own pressure against Nijmegen could be reinforced only to an inadequate degree.*

*After yesterday's air-landings, which the enemy is in a position to continue at any time, we [now] can only reckon with the probability that it will not be possible to throw the enemy back over the Waal [at Nijmegen], and that the area of the Lower Rhine on both sides of Arnhem will have to be defended.<sup>187</sup>*

Model told von Rundstedt that additional *Panzertruppen* and a new *Infanteriedivision* should be sent to the Arnhem sector, and other forces should reinforce the Aachen sector.<sup>188</sup>

---

<sup>187</sup>. *Ibid.*

<sup>188</sup>. *Ibid.*

Lacking the reinforcements requested by Model, *Feldmarschall* von Rundstedt sent a message to Hitler on 24 September in which he requested permission for a phased withdrawal of all German forces in Holland to a line on the River Maas to Hertogenbosch, thence on the River Waal to Nijmegen, and from there to the extended Siegfried Line. The *Führer* would not agree; instead, he ordered that the forces of *H.Gr. B* should counterattack and drive the enemy from the bridgehead at Nijmegen and annihilate the British threat to the northwest face of the Ruhr.<sup>189</sup>

Believing that the enemy had launched a large airborne effort on 23 September—which they had not in fact done—the concerns of the Germans about further airborne landings in the battle area in Holland and elsewhere are reflected in the intelligence collection requirement in the following message sent on 24 September at 1723 GMT from *Abwehrstelle Hamburg* to GARBO in England: "*How many aircraft and gliders can be reserved in Great Britain for air-landing operations on a large scale?*"<sup>190</sup>

Concerned about what lay ahead, the *Abwehr* began to query its agents in England. On 29 September the double agent GARBO in England received the following instructions from his *Abwehr* controller, *Hauptmann* Karl-Erich Kühnlenthal, at *Abwehrstelle Madrid*:

Please send somebody to the principal ports of the East and North Coasts as soon as possible ... in order to investigate movements and troops in

---

<sup>189</sup>. Hamilton, *MONTY*, 90, citing Ellis, *Victory in the West, Vol. II, The Defeat of Germany*.

<sup>190</sup>. Hesketh, "FORTITUDE," Appendix XIII, 242. The message to BRUTUS continued: "*Airborne divisions are composed of [one] . . . air-landing and two parachute brigades; we do not, therefore, understand your message No. 988 of 20 August.*" Unfortunately, Hesketh's manuscript does not contain a copy of BRUTUS' 20 August message.

these ports; also it would be interesting if you could get news about destination of forthcoming operations of the British Fourth Army."<sup>191</sup>

And, on 30 September, the double agent TATE was asked:

*What are the anchorages or bases of aircraft-carriers or auxiliary aircraft-carriers on the East coast of Great Britain between the Thames and Scapa [Flow]? Can you find out if and where on the English and Scottish east coast, invasion preparations are taking place? Are invasion materials being assembled?"*<sup>192</sup>

On 3 October 1944, controlled agent BRUTUS also was asked to report on the ports of the east coast of England.<sup>193</sup>

On 30 September the *OKH Lagebericht West* commented on the presence of the British 2nd Airborne Division in England:

According to prisoners of war and various reliable *Abwehr* sources, the presence of the British 2nd Airborne Division has repeatedly been confirmed in Great Britain."<sup>194</sup>

---

<sup>191</sup>. *Ibid*, 150. GARBO's M.I.5 radio case officer received the request by wireless at 1910 GMT on 29 September 1944. *Ibid*, 150 fn. 18. *Hauptmann* Karl-Erich Kühenthal was the head of the *Vertrauensman (V-mann)* section of *Abwehrstelle Madrid*. In addition he was GARBO's agent-controller. *Ibid*, 24, 169-70; Pujol and West, *Operation Garbo*, 77-78.

<sup>192</sup>. *Ibid*. The messages to TATE from his *Abwehr* control came at 1911 and 1917 MET on 30 September 1944. At that time agent TATE's notional occupation was that of a farm worker in Kent so the types of questions asked of him were a bit general. *Ibid*, 150 fn. 19.

<sup>193</sup>. *Ibid*. The message to BRUTUS from his *Abwehr* control was received at 2144 GMT on 3 October 1944. *Ibid*, 150 fn. 20.

<sup>194</sup>. *Ibid*, Appendix XIII, 242, citing to the *OKH Lagebericht West Nr. 1404, 30.IX.44*. The *LBW* is based on two messages from BRUTUS that were received by *Abwehrstelle Hamburg* at 1307 and 1311 GMT on 13 August 1944. *Ibid*.

And,

*[S]ince the British 4th Parachute Brigade, assumed to be in ... the 2nd Airborne Division) was identified with the British 1st Airborne Division in the landing area in Holland, the recent report from [agent BRUTUS,] a proven Abwehr source, according to which the British 2nd Airborne Division was made up of the 11th and 12th Parachute Brigades and the 13th Air Landing Brigade, may be regarded as credible. The [2d Airborne's] Divisional Commander seems to be a Major-General D'Arcy, [who] formerly [was] commander of the British 9th Armored Division."*<sup>195</sup>

In fact, the British 2<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division was a notional unit in the Allied Order of Battle.<sup>196</sup>

On 1 October von Rundstedt signaled his after action report on the use of parachutists in the Eindhoven-Nijmegen-Arnhem sector of Holland. He acknowledged that the Germans had been surprised and that had led to a high casualty rate among officers. He noted that the presence of *SS Panzerkorps II* in the Arnhem area had been an unpleasant surprise for the enemy. The *Feldmarschall* stated that the enemy's biggest mistake was in spreading the air assault over three days instead of concentrating it in one day. He noted that the battle probably had taught the enemy—as the battle of Crete had taught the Germans—that success was hardly worth the buying at so high a price in terms of casualties and equipment lost. While von Rundstedt did not believe that the enemy would attempt any more deep drops, he did state that airborne operations would be attempted in Holland or in north Germany, probably in conjunction with

---

<sup>195</sup>. *Ibid.*

<sup>196</sup>. *Ibid*, Appendix XI, 223.

a seaborne landing.<sup>197</sup> A fortnight later von Rundstedt sent out a warning of probable enemy parachute attacks against the main Rhine River bridges.<sup>198</sup>

On 21 October the *OKH Lagebericht West* reported on the fact that FUSAG had been disbanded: "[*Abwehr V-Mann BRUTUS*,] a proven source reports from Great Britain that the staff of the First American Army Group (FUSAG) has been disbanded. The same source reports that British Fourth Army which has hitherto been under the command of FUSAG, is now directly under the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Invasion Forces, *i.e.*, General Eisenhower."<sup>199</sup> Having outlived its usefulness, FUSAG was disbanded by the Allied deception planners, but the threat of the British Fourth Army, the ground force component of a long-range operation to be staged by it and the Allied Airborne Army, was allowed to continue.

On 10 November *Feldmarschall* von Rundstedt sent out a message warning of "a large-scale attack on western Germany which may begin in the very near future." The message stated that airborne attacks were expected in the Aachen sector in mid-November.<sup>200</sup>

On 17 November at 1752 GMT BRUTUS sent the following message to his control at *Abwehrstelle Hamburg*:

---

<sup>197</sup>. Bennett, *Ultra in the West*, 157, citing Msgs. HP 2134 and HP 2188. *Generalmajor* Kussin, *Feldkommandeur* of Arnhem was the most senior of the German casualties. He died in the opening hours of the battle while on a personal reconnaissance. Urquhart, *Arnhem*, 40, 47. For a photo of Kussin and his bullet-ridden car, see Ryan, *A Bridge Too Far*, 300.

<sup>198</sup>. *Ibid*, citing Msg. HP 4082.

<sup>199</sup>. Hesketh, "FORTITUDE," Appendix XIII, 242, citing to the *OKH Lagebericht West Nr. 1425, 21.X.44*. The *LBW* report was based on a message sent by BRUTUS at 1815 GMT on 17 October. *Ibid*.

<sup>200</sup>. Bennett, *Ultra in the West*, 157-58, citing Msgs. HP 4082 and HP 6374.

*Reference divisions trained as airborne: as already reported, the American 48th Infantry Division has undergone this training. Formally it was included in the American XXXIII Corps, which appears to have been disbanded as this division, together with the American 11th and 17th airborne divisions, are under the command of British Base Section.*"<sup>201</sup>

By that time the deception planners had caught on to the fact that the Germans accepted the existence of the U.S. 11th Airborne Division—a figment of their own imagination—and so they took this opportunity to attach it and the real U.S. 17th Airborne Division, to a new corps level headquarters, to which they added the 48th Infantry Division (Air-Portable).

The *OKH Lagebericht West* of 25 November noted the existence of the U.S. 48th Airborne Division:

*The American 48th Infantry Division, also accepted [as being located] in Great Britain, has been repeatedly reported as "airborne." It must, therefore, be assumed that this division is destined for employment in connection with further planned airborne landings.*<sup>202</sup>

In fact, the American 48th Division—airborne or infantry—was a notional unit in the Allied Order of Battle.<sup>203</sup>

On 12 November the 82d Airborne Division was withdrawn from the battle line and began to rest and refit at Sissonne, northwest of Riems, and sixteen days later the 101st Airborne Division also was pulled out of action and sent to

---

<sup>201</sup>. Hesketh, "FORTITUDE," Appendix XIII, 243.

<sup>202</sup>. *Ibid*, citing to Appendix of *OKH Lagebericht West Nr. 1460, 25.XI.44*. The *LBW* report was based, at least in part, on a message sent by BRUTUS at 1752 GMT on 17 November. *Ibid*.

<sup>203</sup>. *Ibid*, Appendix XI, 223.

Moutmelon-le-Grand, southeast of Riems.<sup>204</sup> In an appreciation of the situation dated 2 December, *Fremde Heere West* made the forecast that both the American 82nd and the 101st airborne divisions would be refitted and ready for use in another airborne attack.<sup>205</sup>

On 2 December at 1910 GMT *Abwehrstelle Hamburg* sent a message to BRUTUS in England requesting that the "*location and future moves of the British Fourth Army should be monitored closely.*"<sup>206</sup>

That same day, in messages sent at 1915, 1924 and 1944 GMT, GARBO sent the following coincidental report to *Abwehrstelle Madrid*:

*[Agent SEVEN (SEVEN) reports from York: [He] has discovered that British Fourth Army has moved here.... He is continuing [his] investigations, though he states there is no sign of preparation for embarkations, and has been told that the Fourth Army and [the] Northern Command are being amalgamated and will control any future landings in Germany, whether to help the present offensive or to occupy areas which you abandon, in the same way as other commands have been given similar rôles (for instance Norway in the case of Scottish Command and the Channel Islands in the case of Southern Command)....*<sup>207</sup>

Two days later, at 1759 GMT on 4 December, BRUTUS replied to the queries of 28 November and 2 December from *Abwehrstelle Hamburg*, saying:

---

<sup>204</sup>. Brereton, *The Brereton Diaries*, 370-71. It was expected that the two division would receive replacements, rest and refit and be ready for new operations by 1 February 1945. Ibid, 380. As it turned out, both would be on the move on 20 December as they rushed 225 km to the east to meet the German counterattack in the Ardennes. Ibid, 374-76.

<sup>205</sup>. Bennett, *Ultra in the West*, 158, citing Msgs. HP 7092 and HP 9288.

<sup>206</sup>. Hesketh, "FORTITUDE," Appendix XIII, 243.

<sup>207</sup>. *Ibid*, 243-44.

*Reference [is made] your message of 28 November. Confirmation that the Fourth Army is at present in Yorkshire. From what I was told I had supposed that it already would have left from the Humber region [for Germany to be deployed in operations] against the region of Emden. I believe that I was mistaken as to the date and that the [planned] operation [against the northern coast of Germany] has only been postponed.*"<sup>208</sup>

BRUTUS dealt with the fact that he had predicted a landing in the Kiel-Bremen area by simply saying that he got the date right but the operation wrong—a simple explanation that accounts for the reality that being a spy is neither easy nor an exact science. Thus, the deception planners were keeping alive the threat to the north coast of Germany—the supposed follow-up to the landings in Holland in September.

In a 1747 GMT message on 7 December to *Abwehrstelle Hamburg*, BRUTUS noted that the British 6th Airborne Division was in the region of Salisbury. That fact was noted in the Appendix to the *OKH Lagebericht West* issued on 14 December 1944.<sup>209</sup>

At this point the tale of Allied deception efforts has been brought up to the eve of the German offensive in the Ardennes which began on the morning of 16 December and which involved the American XVIII Airborne Corps in the thick of the fighting in the Battle of the Bulge. It is a fitting point to close this review of the intelligence being collected and the reports being produced by the Germans

---

<sup>208</sup>. *Ibid*, 244.

<sup>209</sup>. *Ibid*, citing Appendix to *OKH Lagebericht West Nr. 1479, 14.XII.44*. The British 6th Airborne Division was not released from the line after the landings at Normandy and returned to England for refitting until late in August. Blair, *Ridgway's Paratroopers*, 311-12. Before the end of December the 6th Airborne Division would be back on the continent and involved, along with the 82d and 101st airborne divisions, and the 17th Airborne which also was brought over from England, in the Battle of the Bulge. Hamilton, *MONTY: Final Years*, 253, 291.

concerning the post-NEPTUNE and post-MARKET airborne invasion threats.<sup>210</sup>

The Germans continued to have very real concerns about the Allied airborne forces, but the story of such matter and of Operation VARSITY—the crossing of the Rhine in March 1945 by the British 6th and U.S. 17th airborne divisions—is best left for another day.<sup>211</sup>

## DISCUSSION

In the broadest context of Operation MARKET and the factors that led up to it—those both on a strategic and tactical level—there are a number of comments that could be made about the operational aspects of Operation MARKET. Was it a wise move? Was it well planned? Was there an Allied intelligence failure, or was there a failure to appreciate the available intelligence. This author is tempted to comment at length on these, and several other questions which relate to the operations and intelligence side of the MARKET-GARDEN equation. But, as that part of the tale has not been factually developed in this article, the temptation shall be resisted. Suffice to say: *there was hubris before nemesis*.<sup>212</sup>

---

<sup>210</sup>. In fact, the Germans continued to remain concerned about the Allied threat to Southern Norway, Denmark and the German Bight area right up to the end of the war. Hesketh, "FORTITUDE," 163.

<sup>211</sup>. For two good discussions of the airborne operations in the January to May 1945 period, and Operation VARSITY, see both Blair, *Ridgway's Paratroopers*, 432-75, and Warren, *Airborne Operations in World War II, European Theater*, 156-91.

<sup>212</sup>. "Pride *goeth* before destruction, and a haughty spirit before a fall." Prov. 16: 18. For a review of the operational and intelligence conclusions of several others see: Omar N. Bradley, *A Soldier's Story* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1951), 418-19; Bradley and Blair, *A General's Life*, 332-33; Brereton, *The Brereton Diaries*, 360-65; Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War, Vol. 6, Triumph and Tragedy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1953), 198, 200; de Guingand, *Generals at War*, 105, 202; Horrocks, *A Full Life*, 231-32; Richard Lamb, *Montgomery in Europe 1943-1945: Success or Failure?* (New York: Franklin Watts, 1984), 243-51; Ronald Lewin, *Montgomery as Military Commander* (New York: Stein and Day Publishers, 1971), 303-307; MacDonald, *The Siegfried Line Campaign*, 198-200; Montgomery, *The Memoirs*, 264-67; Powell, *The Devil's Birthday*, 232-52; Urquhart, *Arnhem*, 198-205; Warren, *Airborne Operations in*

MARKET-GARDEN failed in its objective. For now this author is content to determine—on the basis of the facts noted above—whether the reason, or reasons, for the failure can be found in the planning and execution of the SHAEF Ops (B) deception effort, or because of a lack of surprise at the outset of the operation.

### Regarding Deception

Long ago Bishop Joseph Butler (1692-1752) asked this question:

*Things and actions are what they are, and the consequences of them will be what they will be: why, then, should we desire to be deceived?*<sup>213</sup>

As shall be seen, the success of deception in war depends as much on the attitude of the target as on the artfulness, *vel non*, of the deceiver.<sup>214</sup>

The true rôle of deception in military operations—and its limitations—has to be properly understood. David Mure explains the rôle well:

*No purely deceptive plan ever "won" a battle ... [in World War II]. You can, perhaps, persuade your opponent that since you are going to hit him in the eye, he should guard that organ, whilst in fact, your intention is to hit him in the stomach. You still have to hit him and, after you have done so,*

---

*World War II*, 149-55; Weigley, *Eisenhower's Lieutenants*, 317-19. See also, Hans Krebs, "Report on experience gained in the battle with and defeat of the First British Airborne Division in the Western Arnhem Sector," RG 331 ("1st AAA - Opn MARKET"), MRB, NA.

<sup>213</sup>. Matthew Cooper, *The German Army 1933-1945: Its Political and Military Failure* (New York: Stein and Day, Publishers, 1978), vii, quoting Bishop Joseph Butler (1692-1752).

<sup>214</sup>. Cubbage, "The German Misapprehensions Regarding Overlord," 46, 48-51, 65, 70.

*guard yourself against his agonized and furious reaction. The first is for the deceiver, in war: the second is for the commander.*<sup>215</sup>

Brigadier Dudley Clarke, himself a master of deception in the Mediterranean Theater, has noted that as regards the deception practiced against the Germans, "*it usually paid to provide fabricated evidence to support any false notion [that] they themselves might have formed.*"<sup>216</sup> Deception is not something concocted out of thin air for the sake of deception alone. It must be understood then as a military weapon which sometimes can be used wisely to advantage.

Military deception is defined as—

[T]he art of misleading the enemy into accepting a particular predetermined appreciation of friendly dispositions, capabilities and intentions ***for the purpose or mission of causing him to react in a particular preselected manner disadvantageous to himself and advantageous to friendly forces.***<sup>217</sup>

---

<sup>215</sup>. Mure, *Master of Deception*, 142.

<sup>216</sup>. Dudley Clarke, "Some Personal Reflections on the Practice of Deception in the Mediterranean Theatre from 1941 to 1945" (Memo. dtd. 6 Sep 72), in Mure, *Master of Deception*, Appendix, 274.

<sup>217</sup>. Emphasis in original. JCS Memo., Sweeney to Harris, 18 Dec 46, subject: "Projects," Attachment 5, "General Definitions," Records of the Army Staff, Record Group 319, File No. *Cover and Deception*, Entry 101, Folder 77, Box 4, MRB, NA. Deception also has been defined by Michael Handel as:

*The process of supplying the enemy with selective information, the acceptance of which would cause him to make decisions disadvantageous to himself.*

Introduction: Strategic and Operational Deception in Historic Perspective," 1, and, earlier, as:

[A] purposeful attempt by the deceiver to manipulate the perceptions of the target's decisionmakers in order to gain a competitive advantage.

What is important to note—and note well—in regard to this definition of military deception is that the object of deception is not to make the enemy *think something*; rather the object is to get the enemy *to do what you plan for him to do*. Fooling the enemy is not the object; but making him make a foolish move is.

This point—making the enemy do what you want him to do—is aptly made in a letter written by Brigadier Dudley Clarke, the commander of "A" Force (the counterpart of Ops (B) in the Middle East and Mediterranean Theater), to Major General Lowell Rooks of the U.S. Army. Clarke wrote in pertinent part:

*And it is this mention of the "object" which brings me to the last of the principles I have tried to enunciate. For the theatrical impresario this presents no difficulty—all he wants is to see the audience moved to tears, laughter or rhythm in concert with the play—but to the General it is a problem which merits more careful thought. His audience is the enemy and he alone must decide what he wants them to do—to advance? To thin out or to reinforce? Whatever he chooses, the main point is that his "object" must be to make the enemy do something. It matters nothing what the enemy THINKS, it is only what he DOES that can affect the battle. It is therefore wrong, and always wrong, for any Commander to tell his Deception Staff to work out a plan "to make the enemy think we are going to do so-and-so." It may be that the plan will succeed but that the enemy will react to it in a totally unexpected way, upon which the Commander will probably blame the Deception Staff who have in fact produced exactly the results they set out for. It is this boomerang effect which has made many people apprehensive of using the Deception weapon, and it cannot be stressed too strongly that, if used in the wrong way, it can prove a real danger. But there is one sure way to avoid any possible risk and that is to*

---

Idem, "Military Deception in Peace and War," 38 *Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems* (Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations) (1985): 3. This author prefers the one quoted in the text because it deals not with what the enemy may perceive, or with his decisions, but with how he actually acts.

*get the OBJECT right. Given a correct "object" the Deception Plan may fail but it cannot do any harm. Give it a wrong "object" and it will inevitably give [the] wrong results. Our theatrical Impresario after all will not attempt to dictate to the author the plot of the play, but that is precisely what the General does who tells his Deception Staff that he wants the enemy to be made to "think" something. It assumes a knowledge of the enemy's likely reactions which the Deception Staff should know from experience very much better than the General. It is for the latter to say what he wants them to do, and for the specialists to decide what the enemy must be made to think in order to induce them to act in the manner required.*<sup>218</sup>

With the foregoing in mind the reader can judge the deception effort that was ongoing in the MARKET-GARDEN period.

On 8 September SHAEF issued a new deception directive. The new cover and deception policy was based on the following estimate of the situation:

*The enemy is in retreat in the West in the face of Superior Allied forces. He is being compelled on all sectors to conform to the Allied manoeuvres. It is considered that he is unlikely to react to any large-scale deceptive operation on the Allied front in the West, but that he may be susceptible to making faulty dispositions elsewhere, and is in a position where disintegration of control may take place at any time.*<sup>219</sup>

Thus it is clear that the "object" of the new policy was not to make the German's think or do anything along the actual battle front. Thus, no miscarriage of the deception effort could have a harmful effect along the front line. The "object" was to prompt the Germans—that is to prompt the *Führer*—to "make faulty dispositions

---

<sup>218</sup>. Ltr, Clarke to Rooks, quoted in JCS Memo, Sweeney to Harris, 18 Dec 46, subject: "Projects," Attachment 4, "Basic Theories Governing Cover and Deception," RG 319, MRB, NA.

*elsewhere.*" The rationale for that "object" was the belief that if any of the scarce German resources—whether men, equipment or raw material—were used at places other than along the *Westwall*, then those resources were the same as destroyed vis-à-vis the defense of the German border and Rhine River area. The SHAEF deception effort can be seen as working in tandem with the strategic bombing effort—one program with the object of the destruction of the German war making effort, the other with the object to dissipate what could not be destroyed. Thus, "*in order to extend further the enemy forces and accelerate his retreat, threats [were] ... maintained against his rear communications and Northern flank.*"<sup>220</sup>

The decision to create and maintain a threat against the northern flank of Germany actually preceded the issuing of the policy directive of 8 September. The 23 February 1944 plan for Operation FORTITUDE provided for the maintenance of a threat against Denmark, which notionally was supposed to be attacked after the Allied forces had established themselves in southern Norway and in Sweden.<sup>221</sup>

By 12 July *Grossadmiral* Dönitz was expressing his concerns to Hitler about "a surprise attack" against the German Bight or the Jutland-Skagerrak sector.<sup>222</sup> This was at a time when the concerns of the *Führer* were firmly focused on the Pas-de-Calais.<sup>223</sup> It was not until 29 August that Hitler issued the *Führerbefehl* which provided for the immediate improvement of the defenses in the German

<sup>219</sup>. SHAEF/19011/Ops (B)(Fwd) GCT/370.28-202/Ops(B), 8 Sep 44, "Current Cover and Deception Policy," in Hesketh, "FORTITUDE," Appendix IX, 217.

<sup>220</sup>. *Ibid.*

<sup>221</sup>. SHAEF (44) 13, 23 Feb 44, "Plan 'FORTITUDE,'" RG 319 (Cover and Deception), MRB, NA.

<sup>222</sup>. Martienssen, *Hitler and His Admirals*, 207. See text with fn. 91, *ante*.

<sup>223</sup>. *Ibid*, 208. See text with fn. 91, *ante*.

Bight and along the German-Denmark border.<sup>224</sup> As has been noted, that order may have been prompted by the 29 August report from *RSHA Mil. Amt* in Berlin which forwarded a message from the *Abwehr* agent JOSEPHINE who reported that landings in Southern Norway and Jutland were likely.<sup>225</sup> In any event, Hitler's own decision was made to look all the more wise by the 1 September message from JOSEPHINE that said an operation against Denmark or the Heligoland Bight was in the final stages of pre-embarkation implementation, and by the 10 September message from *Abwehr V-Mann*\_BRUTUS who said that the possibility of an attack against the north coast of Germany in the Kiel or Bremen region could not be excluded from consideration.<sup>226</sup> The deception staff at SHAEF Ops (B) continued to play this threat out through the end of the year and there is no evidence that Hitler ever perceived the notional threat to be part of an Anglo-American deception effort.

It is well to note at this point that:

*[I]n order to make any plans for strategic deception effective, two conditions must be satisfied:*

*First, the operation must be regarded by the enemy as a feasible one; and second, it must be intended to last for a reasonable length of time, for even under the most favorable conditions one must assume that it will take at least a fortnight to develop a strategic threat and not less than another fortnight to dissipate it.*<sup>227</sup>

A gradual dissipation of the notional threat is important because it provides a way to maintain the credibility level of the double agents as they report the apparent

---

<sup>224</sup>. *Führerbefehl*, 29.VIII.44. See text associated with fn. 134, *ante*.

<sup>225</sup>. Hesketh, "FORTITUDE," 146 fn. 2.

<sup>226</sup>. *Ibid*, 146-47 fn. 3, 147 fn. 8. See text with fns. 138 and 152, *ante*.

<sup>227</sup>. *Ibid*, 152.

fact that plans to do one thing or another are discussed and made, then changed, postponed or even cancelled. The SHAEF Ops (B) deception being mounted in the Operation MARKET period was both feasible and of long duration. In fact, the deception effort in September 1944 was feasible because of the much earlier efforts to build-up a false Order of Battle in the minds of the Germans. The work on the false OB situation reached a high point in May 1944 when the Germans overestimated the Allied Order of Battle by about 100 percent. Because the Germans had misjudged the size of the force opposing them, deceptions which utilized these notional forces had an air of feasibility. As the false Order of Battle work was done with great care, the Germans never unraveled that aspect of the deception—a fact which gave a durability to the strategic deception effort which lasted well into 1945.

It is known that considerable work was done in the German Bight sector to improve the defensive readiness of the area. On 8 September Allied intelligence noted that 33 trains left Henner and Kolding in Denmark and headed for Holland. The G-2 at Second Army speculated that the trains might be carrying the troops of *Infanteriedivision 160*, but that division remained in the Jutland area into 1945. Thus, it seems that the threat to the German Bight was believed to be serious enough to prevent the movement of troops from that area to Holland or elsewhere. The SHAEF Ops (B) strategic deception effort rightly can be judged a success.

But, at the same time it is difficult to say that the SHAEF deception effort was of any practical tactical value to Operation MARKET-GARDEN. Unlike the situation in the Normandy and Pas-de-Calais sector in June, there was no powerful German force nearby whose presence on the MARKET-GARDEN battlefield might have been decisive if it had not been kept in place by the deception effort.

Neither were troops on the way to the battle area turned away by a timely message from a deception agent as happened on 10 June 1944.<sup>228</sup>

While the deception effort may not have had a measurable effect on the Battle of Arnhem and the fighting along the highway corridor, Operation MARKET certainly assisted in the strategic deception effort. What Operation MARKET did was to enhance the credibility of the B.1.A. agents GARBO and BRUTUS as they played out the continuing threat to the German Bight sector. *Wehrmacht* units that could have been more usefully deployed by the Germans continued until the end of the war to guard northwest Germany and Denmark, and continued to defend Norway lest it become a stepping stone for the Anglo-American Fourth Army and the airborne forces which the Germans believed were poised to strike.<sup>229</sup>

Thus, the value of the deception presenting a threat to the German Bight was strategic in its character and had no tactical payoff. It was like David Mure said, a situation where Hitler had to be on his guard in one place—a false place—while the real fighting raged elsewhere.

### Regarding Surprise

As *Feldmarschall* Erich von Manstein noted:

*War came upon us by stealth; only when we looked back, could we see how it had come; by Hitler.*<sup>230</sup>

---

<sup>228</sup>. *Armeeoberkommando 15* was kept in the Pas-de-Calais because of the FORTITUDE SOUTH deception, and the 9 June message from the controlled-agent GARBO is credited with causing Hitler to countermand the orders that had *SS PzD 1* and *PzD 116* along with several strong and mobile *Infanteriedivisionen* on the move from the Pas-de-Calais to Normandy. Cubbage, "The Success of Operation Fortitude," 254-55, 258-60.

<sup>229</sup>. Hesketh, "FORTITUDE," 163.

<sup>230</sup>. Cooper, *The German Army*, 94, quoting *Feldmarschall* Erich von Manstein.

It is ironic that Hitler—who himself often made effective use of surprise—was again and again to be the victim of it, as was the German *OKW*. In 1939 *General Waldemar Erfurth*, head of the Historical Section of the German General Staff, wrote: "*Secrecy, speed, movement and surprise are ... the prerequisites of Victory. Luck and art must combine to catch the enemy by surprise. In war, the unexpected is the most successful. Thus, surprise is the key to victory.*"<sup>1231</sup>

Erfurth also wrote: "*The history of modern wars shows the chances of strategic surprise are small indeed. The question might therefore be asked whether in a war which is fought by millions of soldiers strategic surprise is possible at all.*"<sup>232</sup>

The five years of war which followed proved how wrong Erfurth was on both counts. Indeed, strategic surprise was possible, but, as often as not, it was not the key to a final victory. One need only study the Allied airborne invasion of the Nijmegen-Eindhoven-Arnhem corridor in September 1944 to see how wrong Erfurth was about his vision of the future of war in the 1940's. *The Battle of Arnhem illustrates that strategic surprise was possible, and that surprise is not always the key to victory.*

Notwithstanding the fact that on 14 and 15 September *Ob. West* had advised *H.Gr. B* that a large scale airborne assault was to be expected in Holland in conjunction a ground thrust on both sides of Eindhoven as far north as Arnhem, the actual MARKET airborne assault took *Generaloberst Kurt Student*, the *Oberbefehlshaber, Fallschirmarmee 1*, by surprise. After the war—and with a bit of embarrassment—he spoke about it with Basil Liddel Hart, saying:

*Judging the situation, I considered that the enemy was now approaching the maze of the Dutch system of canals which was most favorable for defense and which [certainly] did not lend itself to the employment of his far superior tanks forces for wide-aiming thrust....*

---

<sup>231</sup>. Waldemar Erfurth, *Surprise*, Stephan T. Possony and David Vilfroy, eds (Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing Company, 1943), 199.

*This was the situation on 17 September 1944, the day at which the great Allied air-landing operation began. On our side, nobody calculated with [meeting] such a possibility. **It is important to make this statement and to emphasize, as psychologically interesting, that it concerns the highest German parachutist staff.** Those who had planned and inaugurated with complete success the first airborne operations of military history, had not even thought of such a possible action by the enemy. Actually, it was but logical in such a situation to proceed with airborne operations, by way of gliders and parachutists, in order to secure the bridges intact. I myself have planned and solved identical operational problems during the first year of the war.*

*As stated, the Allied airborne action completely surprised us [at the headquarters of Fallschirmarmee 1 at Vught where I was working at my desk].<sup>233</sup>*

When Student says that no one thought such an airborne operation was possible he meant that they did not expect it there along the Albert Canal line. As noted earlier, there were serious concerns about a combined air and seaborne assault on the coast—but not along the Eindhoven-Nijmegen-Arnhem corridor.

*SS-Obergruppenführer Wilhelm Bittrich, Kommand.General, SS Panzerkorps II* was surprised by the airborne attack. He was at his headquarters at Doetinchem when he received the first reports (over a *Luftwaffe* communications net) that enemy glider and parachute troops were in Arnhem. Within minutes he also had reports of landings near Nijmegen and Eindhoven. Earlier in the day he had taken note of the Allied air strikes that preceded the attack but considered "it was routine fare." He tried to call Model, and Student, and the town commander of Arnhem but got no answer from any of them. His "first thought was that this

---

<sup>232</sup>. *Ibid.*, 31

airborne attack was designed to contain von Zangen's army" in the Scheldt area. Then, he reasoned, "the [probable enemy] objective would be to drive the British [21st] Army across the Rhine and into Germany." Bittrich knew that if that was the game that was afoot, then the enemy was going to have to capture the bridges at Nijmegen and Arnhem. He had the only forces capable of preventing that from happening, and he immediately alerted his two divisions, the under-strength, but battle-tested *SS-Panzertruppen* formations: SS *Panzerdivision 9 "Hohenstaufen"* and *SS Panzerdivision 10 "Frundsberg."* Both of these SS divisions then were just north and east of Arnhem along the Apeldoorn road and the Ijssel River.<sup>234</sup>

Bittrich may have been surprised but he had the presence of mind to order *SS-Brigadeführer* Heinz Harmel to move the 6,000 men and 20 *Panther* tanks of *PzD 9* into Arnhem, and to send the 3,500 men and the few tanks of *Obersturmbannführer* Walter Harzer's *PzD 10* to Nijmegen. The latter division was preparing to move to Germany and had to unload its vehicles from railroad flat cars— another indication of the completeness of the Allied surprise. At about 1900 hours, and before any of the British troops reached the main bridge at Arnhem, *SS-Hauptsturmführer* Paul Gräbner and the thirty-two armored fighting vehicles of *Panzeraufklärungsabteilung 9*, the armored reconnaissance unit of PzD 9 went across the Neder Rijn on the Arnhem highway bridge and headed for Nijmegen. Bittrich had ordered the battalion to cross the river and provide a screen to the south while *PzD 10* readied itself to move.<sup>235</sup>

*Feldmarschall* Walter Model was both surprised and frightened by the airborne attack. He, his Chief of Staff *General d. Inf.* Hans Krebs, and his *la*, *Oberst* Hans von Tempelhof, were having lunch in the *H.Gr. B HQu.* at the Tafelberg Hotel in

---

<sup>233</sup>. Student, "The Allied Airborne Operation Against Arnhem-Nijmegen-Veghel," 3, BLM 130/5, IWM. (Emphasis added)

<sup>234</sup>. Urquhart, *Arnhem*, 43, 52; Ryan, *A Bridge Too Far*, 149-50, 201, 229-30, 270.

<sup>235</sup>. *Ibid.*

Oosterbeek. One of their staff officers came in and reported that he "just had news that gliders are landing in Wolfheze" about 4 km to the northwest. "Well, now we are in for it," remarked Tempelhof. "They are after me and this headquarters," said the *Feldmarschall*. Model, no doubt remembering the close call he had earlier at la Roche Guyon on the Seine, gave immediate orders to evacuate the area. He and the others then fled the area—driving east, away from the landing zones, bound for Doetinchem and the headquarters of *SS Panzerkorps II*. When Model arrived about an hour later his first words to *General Bittrich* were: "*They almost got me! They were after the headquarters. Imagine! They almost got me!*"<sup>236</sup>

*General Krebs*, who was with Model remembers that the preparatory attacks by the Allied air forces did not tip off the defenders. He recalled that the "preparation by the [enemy] air forces began about three hours before the landing in the form of bombing attacks against anti-aircraft emplacements which did not greatly exceed normal air activity."<sup>237</sup> In fact, the officers at *H.Gr. B* misunderstood the object of the air bombardment: "The attack against the anti-aircraft positions was thought to be an attempt to destroy [the] bridges."<sup>238</sup>

Adolf Hitler and his *Führerhauptquartier* staff were surprised by the landings in Holland. They were in the midst of the mid-day situation conference when the first reports of the airborne attack at Arnhem and elsewhere came in. Hitler blamed the *Luftwaffe* for allowing it to happen and demanded to know what sort of fighter sorties were being mounted against the enemy. Then he talked to

---

<sup>236</sup>. MacDonald, *The Siegfried Line Campaign*, 140-41; Ryan, *A Bridge Too Far*, 218-19, 253. The Allied commanders in the know as to ULTRA—which did not include either Browning (1st Airborne Corps) or Urquhart (1st Airborne Division)—had known since the morning of 15 September that *H.Gr. B* had established itself in the Oosterbeek suburb of Arnhem. They knew, but dared not tell due to the exceptional need-to-know limits of Ultra intelligence dissemination. See Bennett, *Ultra in the West*, 153, citing Msg. HP 220.

<sup>237</sup>. Krebs, "Report on experience gained, etc.," RG 331, MRB, NA.

<sup>238</sup>. *Ibid.*

*Feldmarschall* Model who reported that he and his entire staff had barely escaped being captured by the enemy airborne troops.<sup>239</sup>

Model's report—with the retelling of his almost being caught by the British—seems to have impressed Hitler deeply and he told his staff that it could happen to them too—even in his Rastenburg location:

At any rate, the business [of an air-landing] is so dangerous that you must understand [it] clearly; if such a mess happens here -- here [where] I sit with my whole *OKW* and *OKW/WFSt*; here [where] sits the *Reichsmarschall!* [Göring], the *OKH*, the *Reichsführer SS* [Himmler], the *Reich* Foreign Minister [Ribbentrop]: well, then, this [area] is the most worthwhile catch [in Germany], that is obvious. I would not hesitate to risk two parachute divisions here if with one blow I could get my hands on the whole German command.<sup>240</sup>

Hitler's concern may have been further heightened the next day when *Ob. West* reported that a U.S. airborne division had landed in Warsaw, Poland.<sup>241</sup> In any event, of all the more than thirty airborne plans studied by FAAA, an attack on the "*Wolfsschanze*" *FHQ* was not seriously considered.

Thus, it is clear that the Allied airborne forces achieved a complete surprise, and yet in an all-important sense they did not. The Germans in Holland

---

<sup>239</sup>. MacDonald, *The Siegfried Line Campaign*, 141; Irving, *Hitler's War*, 706-707.

<sup>240</sup>. *Ibid*, citing Minutes of Hitler Conferences, 17 Sep 44 (Fragment No. 42).

<sup>241</sup>. *Ibid*, citing a memo of a telephone conversation between the *la*, *Ob. West* and the *la*, *H.Gr. B.* at 1905 hours MET on 18 Sep 44. On 12 September the Soviet Army had made a small supply airdrop at Warsaw—supplies for the use of the Polish resistance forces in the city. On 18 September U.S. aircraft flew to Warsaw and made a massive airdrop of supplies for Warsaw's underground army. Robert Gorklaski, *World War II Almanac: 1931-1945 - A Political and Military Record* (New York: Bonanza Books, 1981), 345, 347. It was the latter airdrop that the Germans mistook for a U.S. airborne assault. *This incident illustrates how unrelated happenings may be misinterpreted in the context of an ongoing situation.*

certainly were surprised by the *initial* airborne assault, but the element of *tactical* surprise needed to assist in the swift capture of the several key bridges was lost. This was particularly true both at Nijmegen and Arnhem. The delay attendant the capture of the Nijmegen Bridge was especially costly in terms of the efforts to get the Guards Armoured and the British 43d Infantry divisions up to Arnhem.

The plans for COMET had included the landing of *coup de main* forces by glider at the bridges. Operation MARKET did not attempt such a move. Three times earlier in the war, such a bold move had succeeded: in Belgium in 1940, when the Germans glider troops landed atop Fort Eben Emael while others landed by amphibious planes to capture river bridges; in Greece in 1941, when Germans parachutists captured the Corinth Canal; and at Normandy in 1944, when British gliderborne forces captured and held the bridges over the Orne River and canal at Bénouville and Ranville. As British Major-General Urquhart later explained, the COMET *coup de main* concept was dropped from the Operation MARKET plan because Allied intelligence had reported (*wrongly as it turned out*) a significant increase in *Flak* batteries near the main Arnhem bridge.<sup>242</sup>

On 6 June, at Normandy, the Germans suffered both a strategic and a tactical surprise. For a considerable period of time thereafter they continued to be the victims of complete strategic surprise. That surprise, the efficacy of Operation FORTITUDE, along with the resultant confusion of the battle, caused them to

---

<sup>242</sup>. Urquhart, *Arnhem*, 6-7; Ambrose, *Pegasus Bridge*, 65, 72. In Operation MARKET, the 1st Airborne Reconnaissance Squadron—Major C. F. H. Gough's force of men on 31 heavily armed jeeps—was to be used as the substitute for the COMET *coup de main* force. His men would land by parachute and when the vehicles arrived by glider mount up and race the ten kilometers to the Arnhem Bridge, seize and hold it until reinforced. Gough, his men and 28 of the jeeps arrived at drop and landing zones X and Y at 1250 hours. The jeeps were recovered from the gliders and at 1540 hours Gough's force left for the bridge. Twenty minutes later the column was ambushed by a strong German force supported by armored cars. Elements of the Recce force finally managed to get to the bridge, but it was after 2000 hours, and after the men of Lieutenant-Colonel John Frost's 2nd Battalion of the 1st Parachute Brigade arrived on foot. As things turned out,

make very serious mistakes in their counter-invasion reaction. In the end they were unable to destroy the Allied beachhead. The D-Day invasion at Normandy is one of those occasions where the attacking force achieves both a strategic surprise and the final victory. Such was not to be the case in Operation Market.

The fact that an attacker achieves an initial surprise certainly does not mean that surprise alone will carry the day. For, as Napoleon has said: "*Uncertainty is the essence of war, [and] surprise its rule.*"<sup>243</sup> Michael Handel duly notes that if it does anything, history consoles military men and political leaders with the observation that there is no direct correlation between an enemy achieving the highest degree of surprise at the outbreak of a battle or war and ultimately emerging victorious.<sup>244</sup> Handel notes well that "*one reason for this is that the attackers are often so amazed by the effectiveness of their own attack that they are caught unprepared to fully exploit the opportunities it presents.*"<sup>245</sup>

Sometimes, as at Arnhem, the attacker may be ready to exploit his opportunity but will be unable to do so. On D-Day at Arnhem the First Allied Airborne Army did not have sufficient aircraft to put all of the parachute and glider forces down in the initial lift. Some of the initial forces had to guard the drop and landing zones which further diluted the fighting strength of the initial assault lift. On D plus 1 bad weather prevented the second lift from landing on time. In the Nijmegen area the 82d Airborne Division had to both guard its landing areas and secure the high ground at Groesbeek before going for the bridges across the Waal River. The Allied airborne forces simply had to little in the way of manpower, firepower and mobility on the ground to cope with the tasks, the distances and the opposition

---

neither group arrived in time to capture the south side of the bridge. Golden, *Echoes from Arnhem*, 120-21, 126, 258-60; Ryan, *A Bridge Too Far*, 228, 258-60, 273-74.

<sup>243</sup>. Michael I. Handel, "Strategic Surprise: Politics of Intelligence and the Management of Uncertainty," in *Intelligence: Policy and Process*, Alfred C. Maurer, Marion D. Tunstall, James M. Keagle, eds. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), 265.

<sup>244</sup>. *Ibid.*

<sup>245</sup>. *Ibid*, 240.

that faced them. "To know your enemy's intentions is fine, but such knowledge does not always mean that you can stop him."<sup>246</sup> And yet, as was the case at Arnhem, total ignorance of the enemy's intentions may prove to be but a passing inconvenience to the defending force.

### Battle is the Payoff

And so it was: from mid-June through September 1944 there was a masterful deception operation which did not succeed in any measurable way in influencing the outcome of the 17-26 September battle in Holland; there was complete surprise at the moment of the landing of the Allied airborne troops, but not at the critical moments when they tried to accomplish their assigned tasks of capturing the key bridges. In the beginning the object of the operations was to use the airborne forces to open the road from the Albert Canal to the far side of the Neder Rijn. It ended in an effort by the forces of 30th Corps to rescue the beleaguered 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem.

Accordingly, *a cautionary conclusion is in order: namely, deception and surprise alone do not win battles*. Deception is the key to the achievement of surprise; in addition, surprise is often a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for victory. Surprise can give one side the edge but it is in battle that the issue is ultimately resolved. The ebb and flow of the battle in Operation MARKET revealed the critical limits of deception and surprise. In the final analysis—then as now—what wins the battle is effective firepower forward. British Lieutenant-General Brian Horrocks, commanding 30th Corps in the GARDEN phase of the attack, said it best on 19 September 1944. During a conference in the midst of the battle he turned to Major General James Gavin, the commander of the 82d Airborne

---

<sup>246</sup>. Ronald Lewin, *American Magic: Codes, Ciphers and the Defeat of Japan* (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1982), 93, citing Samuel Eliot Morison's account of the Battle of Midway.

Division, and said: "*Jim, never try to fight an entire Corps off one road.*"<sup>247</sup> He could have easily have said: "*Never try to advance a Corps on a two-tank front.*" Either way, the idea that is conveyed makes the vital point. "On the first two days of MARKET-GARDEN [Lieutenant-General Miles] Dempsey was able to employ offensively only three of the nine British divisions available [to Second Army], and ... the actual breakout was made by two battalions advancing along one narrow road."<sup>248</sup> Moreover, Major-General Urquhart conceded that the 1st Airborne Division was only able to muster the effective fighting strength of a brigade during the opening phase of the attack on Arnhem—one third of the force had to protect the LZs and DZs while awaiting the balance of the division which did not land until late on the second day of the battle.<sup>249</sup> Only one battalion was able to get up the bridge in Arnhem town and in the end it was forced to withdraw.<sup>250</sup>

The words of Lewis Golden capture the essence of why—in an operational sense—this one potentially great war-ending Allied operation ended in failure:

*MARKET-GARDEN was a brilliant concept for ending the war in Europe in 1944. For success it needed to be mounted in great strength against a retreating enemy. In the event it was launched against a German army which had been given time to establish itself in the path of the attackers, and the one really powerful and full-blooded thrust so dear to the heart of Montgomery never materialized; it was left to 30th Corps, with its one*

---

<sup>247</sup>. James M. Gavin, *On to Berlin: Battles of an Airborne Commander 1943-1946* (New York: The Viking Press, 1978), 170.

<sup>248</sup>. Wilmot, *The Struggle for Europe*, 531.

<sup>249</sup>. Hq 1st Airborne Division (Major-General R. E. Urquhart, (commanding), 10 Jan 44, "1st Airborne Division: Report on Operation 'MARKET' - Arnhem, 17-26 Sep 1944," 43, RG 331, MRB, NA; Urquhart, *Arnhem*, 7; MacDonald, *The Siegfried Line Campaign*, 172.

<sup>250</sup>. MacDonald, *The Siegfried Line Campaign*, 171 ("Frost's force at the highway bridge numbered at peak about 500."), 186 ("At dawn on D plus 4, 21 September, the order had been given to break into small parties and try to escape. None had made it.").

*armored division and two infantry divisions following one behind the other along a single, vulnerable road, to advance [100 km] ... to Arnhem. Small wonder that 30th Corps failed. A punishing delay in starting, and the continuance of supply problems, was all that had resulted from Montgomery's long argument with [General] Eisenhower. Whatever agreement had been reached ... between the two commanders, in reality Montgomery had been thwarted and deflected from his [avowed] purpose; the impending operation would be a derisory shadow of the full-blooded thrust; and only the momentum which MARKET-GARDEN had gathered to itself carried it through, as if with a will of its own, to the day of its launch: Sunday, 17 September 1944.<sup>251</sup>*

Without Operation MARKET, there might still have been something like Operation GARDEN—a thrust up the Nijmegen-Eindhoven road was on the 30th Corps' line of advance. Or the forces of Second Army might have been used by Montgomery for a different purpose: perhaps they would have concentrated on clearing the Scheldt or been used in a drive on Aachen. However, it was the desire—no it was the insistence—at every level that something spectacular and daring be done with the airborne forces, that gathered the momentum that Golden mentions. Unfortunately, Operation MARKET has not been the last operation of modern warfare that has built its own momentum and gone forward in the face of obvious operational faults. Perhaps a better understanding of why the felt need to grab "one bridge too far" is so fraught with danger will make it easier for planners and the intelligence and deception officers who serve with them, to accept the proposition that a *commander can never afford to fall in love with his own plan, or an elite force or weapons system*. Deception and surprise are meant to work in tandem with real military powers and good operational planning: neither is a substitute.

---

<sup>251</sup>. Golden, *Echoes from Arnhem*, 173.

## CONCLUSION

A lot has been written in recent years to the effect that surprise is the great force multiplier, and that a little bit of deception goes a long way. That is only half the story. Roger Hesketh's great study of deception operations in northwest Europe brings out the fundamental truth which is: *Good Intelligence—the truth, timely told—is the real force multiplier*. Without good intelligence, properly used, one can never hope to plan and execute a good military operation—let alone a good deception operation. Without very good intelligence, properly analyzed, one can never defend against deception, avoid surprise or exploit the opportunity that may come from being able to deliver an attack out of the blue. To be able to achieve surprise is never enough ***surprise does not mean victory!*** Surprise is not a free good. It has to be bought and paid for with a proper deception plan that is grounded on reliable intelligence about what one's adversary may be thinking. Similarly, reliable intelligence—and intelligence that is wisely used—should be the sound foundation for every military operation and for the operational exploitation of whatever surprise can be achieved. *Good intelligence—the factor that gives leverage to deception, surprise and military operations—is the force multiplier that no commander can ever afford to ignore*. Sadly many commanders do ignore it!

THE END

(Original Rev. 6-21-1987; Final Rev. and reformat 9-8-2015)