FORTITUDE
A History of Strategic Deception
in North Western Europe
April, 1943 to May, 1945

By Roger Fleetwood Hesketh
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A Review Essay
by Major T. L. Cubbage II, USAR, MI (Ret.)

In February 1949 British Army Colonel Roger Fleetwood Hesketh put the finishing
touches on the preface of a most remarkable World War II historical manuscript. Fifty copies were printed and stamped TOP SECRET. Colonel Hesketh's superb manuscript, entitled "FORTITUDE: A History of Strategic Deception in North Western Europe - April, 1943 to May, 1945," is the definitive history of how the deception operation FORTITUDE SOUTH was accomplished with the use of a handful of Abwehr double agents under the control of Britain's M.I.5 in support of the deception operations plans of Ops (B) at SHAEF. The Hesketh manuscript has remained unpublished for far too long. It needs to be known and talked about.

But first a word about Colonel Roger Fleetwood Hesketh, the manuscript's author. He was born in July 1902. Educated at Eton and Christ Church, Oxford, he joined the Duke of Lancaster's Own Yeomanry in 1922. In 1928 he was called to the Inner Temple Bar, and practiced law until 1939. He served in the British Army from 1939 to 1945. Immediately thereafter Colonel Hesketh spent three years preparing the
official history on the use of double agents in the strategic deception operation called FORTITUDE which was part of BODYGUARD, the theater-wide Allied deception operation.\(^5\)

In 1976, after the disclosures concerning controlled agents and their use for counter-espionage and deception purposes by J. C. Masterman in *The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945* (1972), Hesketh's manuscript was declassified and the author duly received the official clearance required before publication of the manuscript. After a long search for the right publisher for the detailed and heavily footnoted manuscript, and just when it began to appear that the manuscript would at long last be published, the British government of Margaret Thatcher, in the summer of 1986, inexplicably withdrew the needed permission to publish.\(^6\) However, as of the date of this article in June 1987, there was, hope that it would be published in the not too distant future.\(^7\)

The purpose of this article is to review the Roger Hesketh manuscript and to call to the attention of the intelligence and military history communities the fact that the document exists, and, by all rights, ought to be published as soon as possible. Certainly no history of intelligence, deception or surprise in regard to the D-Day invasion of Normandy can be complete without reference to this critical source document.

Perhaps the best way to describe what this very important historical manuscript is all about, is simply to let the reader see Hesketh's own Preface.\(^8\) *FORTITUDE: A History of Strategic Deception* begins with four lines from the *Essay on Vainglory* by Francis Bacon:

> It was prettily devised of Æsop: "The fly sat upon the axle-rod of the chariot-wheels and said, 'What a dust do I raise!'" So are there some vain persons that, whatsoever goeth alone or moveth upon great means, if they have never so little hand in it, they think it is they that carry it.\(^9\)
The manuscript continues:

**PREFACE** – In his report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the operations in Europe of the Allied Expeditionary Force, General Eisenhower remarked: "Lack of infantry was the most important cause of the enemy's defeat on Normandy, and his failure to remedy this weakness was due primarily to the success of an Allied threat leveled against the Pas-de-Calais. This threat, which had proved of so much value in misleading the enemy as to the true objectives of our invasion preparations, was maintained after 6th June, and it served most effectively to pin down the German Fifteenth Army east of the Seine while we built up our strength in the lodgement area to the West. I cannot overemphasize the decisive value of this most successful threat, which paid enormous dividends, both at the time of the assault and during the operations of the two succeeding months. The German Fifteenth Army, which, if committed to battle in June or July, might possibly have defeated us by sheer weight of numbers, remained inoperative during the critical period of the campaign, and only when the break-through had been achieved were its infantry divisions brought west across the Seine—too late to have any effect upon the course of victory." This report seeks to explain why the Germans were persuaded to make such a fatal miscalculation. The interrogation of senior German commanders and the examination of captured documents have revealed with remarkable clarity the causes of our success.

FORTITUDE was the code name given to a series of deceptive operations carried out in support of the invasion. The present narrative opens with the appointment of General Morgan as Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander Designate in April 1943 and is continued until the end of the war with Germany.

A variety of methods were employed to deceive the Germans. Some succeeded, others failed. It has not been thought necessary to spend a great deal of time in examining the methods which did not achieve their object.
These have been studied in so far as it enables us to understand why they failed.

Where the ground has already been covered in an existing report, and this applies mainly to the technical aspects of deception, repetition has been avoided, a reference to the relevant report [by J. C. Masterman and others] being given.\textsuperscript{10}

It is always tempting for those who set out to deceive and who see their objects fulfilled, to claim the credit for their attainment when, in fact, the motive lay in another quarter. Every effort has been made to complete the chain of cause and effect so that the reader can judge for himself to what extent the Germans were influenced by the action of Allied deceivers and to what extent they were impelled by other considerations. At all times the writer has kept before him the boast of Æesop's fly as he set upon the axle-tree. — R. F. Hesketh February 1949.

Before going further into the manuscript itself, it is appropriate at this point to put strategic deception in North-West Europe into an organizational context.

At the SYMBOL Conference held at Casablanca in January 1943, Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt decided that the Combined Commanders planning staff organized early in 1942 should be increased in size by the addition of American personnel and that the entire staff should operate under the direction of a Supreme Commander, or a deputy until the Supreme Commander was appointed.\textsuperscript{11} The enlarged staff was established in April 1943.

Lieutenant General Frederick E. Morgan of the British Army took charge of the staff as the senior planner with the title of Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (Designate). Morgan named his staff COSSAC, after the initials of his title, and on 17 April 1943 the first COSSAC meeting was held. COSSAC's task, per the directive that created the staff, was simply to plan and execute "a full scale assault against the Continent in 1944, as early as possible."\textsuperscript{12}
When General Morgan’s COSSAC staff was set up in April 1943, a section was formed within the G-3 staff, known as Ops (B), under the command of Lieutenant Colonel John V. B. Jervis-Reid, to deal with deception. At the same time Lieutenant Colonel Roger F. Hesketh was posted to Ops (B) and given the task of dealing with any part of deception operations which would be implemented by the controlled leakage of information—a process called "Special Means."  

As General Morgan at COSSAC had no troops of his own, he was obliged, where physical deception was concerned, to enlist the help of the appropriate fighting service or other outside agencies for the execution of any deception plan. For controlled leakage, all the information which COSSAC wished to pass to the Germans was coordinated both with the W. Board and the London Controlling Section.

The W. Board was an informal committee established in July 1940. Its members were the Army Director of Military Intelligence (D.M.I.), the Director of Naval Intelligence (D.N.I.), the R.A.F. Director of Intelligence (D. of I.), the head of B Division of M.I.5, and the Lord President of the Council (who dealt with the civilian affairs). Although not a true member of the Board, John Cavendish-Bentinick of the Foreign Office (the head of J.I.C.), met with it for coordination purposes as required. The purpose of the W. Board was to approve information for its relay to the Germans via controlled agent channels. Concerned initially with data to be used for counterespionage purposes, the Board later also passed on the question of whether particular agents would be used for deception purposes. During the course of the war, the W. Board met only fifteen times, usually on a quarterly basis.

On 26 September 1940 the Board established the W. Section as a working group to handle the detail work of the Board. In January 1941 the W. Section was reorganized and renamed the Twenty Committee. Still a sub-committee of the W. Board, the Committee included representatives from the War Office, Home Forces, Home Defense Executive, Air Ministry Intelligence, N.I.D., M.I.6, Turner’s Department in the Air Ministry (dummy airfields and targets), and M.I.5 (which provided the
Chairman and also the Secretary). The function of the Twenty Committee (also known as the XX- or Double-Cross Committee) was to act as the clearing house for all of the true and the false information that was being passed to the Germans through the Abwehr double agents which were acting under the control of the British. The Twenty Committee met regularly, usually on Wednesdays, first at the Wormwood Prison (headquarters of M.I.5) and later in the basement of the Admiralty Citadel. The Committee met first on 2 January 1941, and last on 10 May 1945; holding some two hundred and twenty-six meetings in all during the course of the war.

At the start of the war the Inter Service Security Board was responsible for British deception planning. In October 1941 Colonel Oliver Stanley was appointed the Controlling Officer for Deception and in April 1941 Colonel Stanley and his deception planning function was transferred to Prime Minister Churchill's Joint Planning Staff (J.P.S.). In June 1942 the deception planning function was reorganized, renamed the London Controlling Section (L.C.S.), and placed under the command of Colonel John Henry Bevan. The new L.C.S. continued to serve as part of the J.P.S. in the Prime Minister's underground headquarters at the Whitehall. In addition to Bevan and his deputy, Colonel Ronald Wingate, there were seven others on the L.C.S. staff. The L.C.S. worked directly with the Prime Minister and the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S.). As an inter-service agency of the C.C.S. the L.C.S. controlled British deception worldwide and was responsible for theater-wide deception plans which were approved by the C.C.S.

Subordinate to L.C.S. was the TWIST Committee. This was the operational group whose task it was to work both with the Foreign Office and the B Department of M.I.5 to implement those parts of the various L.C.S. deception plans that had to be put across by the controlled leakage of information.

As it turned out, the only deception operation sponsored by COSSAC was COCKADE in the fall of 1943. During that effort, Colonel Hesketh would convey COSSAC’s requirements to the TWIST committee who then decided what agent or
other channel would be the most appropriate for conveying the misinformation to the Germans and would see that it was dispatched accordingly.\(^32\)

General Dwight D. Eisenhower was U.S. President Roosevelt's appointee for the post of the Supreme Commander, and although some of his staff had been in London for several weeks, it was not until mid-January that the official appointment was signed and the COSSAC planning staff became part of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). The new Supreme Commander was told that he should "enter the Continent of Europe [in May 1944] and . . . undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces."\(^33\)

At the same time COSSAC was absorbed into SHAEF, Ops (B) was enlarged and divided into two subsections: one dealing solely with physical deception; the other—"Special Means"—concerned with controlled leakage. Colonel Noel Wild—who had served as deputy commander of "A" Force in Cairo under Brigadier Dudley Clarke (the officer in charge of deception throughout the North Africa and Mediterranean campaigns)—became head of Ops (B).\(^34\) Colonel Jervis-Reid was his deputy; the latter also continued to serve as head of the physical deception subsection. Colonel Hesketh also remained in charge of the Ops (B) Special Means subsection.\(^35\)

Meanwhile, Colonel Bevans at L.C.S.—realizing that the bulk of the work associated with controlled agent operations now would be focused on the implementation of the FORTITUDE deception plan, and not on the counterespionage effort—decided that the right course would be to abolish the TWIST committee and allow Ops (B) to work directly with the B.1.A. section of the Security Service. This section of M.I.5 was in charge of the management of the controlled enemy agents—the so-called "double agents"—which by then were proving to be the most effective channel for controlled leakage of information to the Germans.\(^36\) The L.C.S. continued to serve as the channel for coordinating with the W. Board all the deception efforts requiring the use of diplomatic channels; similarly, the Twenty
Committee's oversight function with regard to the true information being released also continued as before.\(^37\)

In the field of deception an important change of command and control was brought about by the FORTITUDE directive issued by General Eisenhower on 26 February 1944. This directive made the three Joint Commanders (General Bernard L. Montgomery, Admiral Bertram H. Ramsey and Air Chief Marshal Trafford L. Leigh-Mallory) responsible for the detailed planning of FORTITUDE SOUTH. In practice this meant that Montgomery's 21st Army Group would do the basic planning in coordination with the naval and air services.\(^38\)

Shortly thereafter General Andrew Thorne, G.O.C. of the Scottish Command, was given the planning responsibility for the army's share of FORTITUDE NORTH.\(^39\)

Thus, from late February until mid-summer, when SHAEF resumed undivided control of FORTITUDE SOUTH, the basic function of Jervis-Reid's physical deception staff in Ops (B) was one of coordinating the plans of the Joint Commanders concerning the Pas-de-Calais sector of France with those of G.O.C. Scottish Command concerning Norway.\(^40\)

Meanwhile, General Eisenhower at SHAEF retained full control of the implementation of both aspects of the FORTITUDE plan by the use of Special Means. The function of Ops (B) Special Means was to adapt the plans concerning France and Norway, to suit the needs of the controlled agent channels made available to SHAEF, and through the double agents, to plant the details of the deception story on the Germans.\(^41\)

The division of deception responsibility demanded the closest of co-operation between SHAEF and 21st Army Group, for whereas Montgomery had charge of the conduct of the FORTITUDE SOUTH operation as a whole, the Special Means subsection was solely responsible for the day to day implementation of all controlled leakage. Accordingly, every real or notational troop location or movement that Ops (B) wished to pass to the Germans first had to have the approval of 21st Army Group. During the weeks that preceded the D-Day invasion, a dispatch rider from the Special Means subsection—usually it
was Roger Hesketh's brother Cuthbert—travelled almost daily between the SHAEF headquarters at Norfolk House and Southwick Park near Portsmouth, where General Montgomery's 21st Army Group was headquartered. In that manner the requirements of Ops (B) were cleared with G(R)—or R-Force—the deception staff at 21st Army Group under the control of Colonel David I. Strangeways.  

When the FORTITUDE directive was approved in February 1944, SHAEF already had prepared and issued a plan for OVERLORD, but soon after the Joint Commanders had taken charge, the original OVERLORD planning document was superseded by a new plan embodying certain important changes. This, in turn, led Montgomery’s Chief of Staff, Major General Francis de Guingand to advocate changes in the FORTITUDE directive. Chief among the changes was the plan to add greater weight to the post assault phase—the deception concerning the landing of the notational First United States Army Group (FUSAG), under Lieutenant General George S. Patton—with the object of holding the Wehrmacht units within the Armeekommando 15 sector in the Pas-de-Calais as long as possible after the D-Day invasion. This key change formed the basis for the post-invasion deception that the Special Means subsection was to pass to the Germans via the controlled agents.  

During the three months immediately preceding the Normandy invasion, the Special Means subsection of Ops (B) consisted of Colonel Roger Hesketh (its head), Major Christopher Harmer who was seconded from M.I.5., Major Cuthbert Hesketh who formerly was with the M.I. Liaison at the War Office, and Phillis White who was a civilian supplied by M.I.5. White acted as secretary for the staff and kept the special registry.  

Once Ops (B) Special Means had established its direct link to B.1.A. and the Special Means plan had been coordinated and with approved by 21st Army Group, the next step in the controlled leakage process was to decide which of the B.1.A. agents were best suited for each particular task within the plan. As soon as a choice was made, the agent's B.1.A. Case Officer would come across from his office at St.
James's Street to Norfolk House for a meeting to decide on the general sense of the message to be sent to the Germans. Then the Case Officer and the agent would translate the message into the particular message and idiomatic style of the agent, and at the appropriate time the message would be sent by the agent's Radio Officer via wireless transmitter or, in some instances by a secret ink letter in the agent's handwriting.45

As it turned out, practically the whole of the Special Means cover plan was passed to the Germans by two controlled agents: GARBO (the Spaniard Juan Pujol-Garcia) and BRUTUS (the Polish air force officer, Wing-Commander Roman Garby-Czerniawski).46 What this meant was that in practice one of the Special Means officers was closeted at Norfolk House almost every day with Tommy Harris and Hugh Astor, the Case Officers who ran GARBO and BRUTUS.47 It was during those long daily sessions that the details of the plot and agent story lines were finalized—it was one thing to decide on the misinformation that Ops (B) wanted to send to the Germans, and quite another to decide how it was that the controlled agent logically could obtain it. Thus, credit for the total controlled leakage effort must be given in equal measure to the staff of Ops (B) Special Means and the Case Officers of the B.1.A.48

Ops (B) did put a certain amount of information over through the agents TATE and FREAK, but for reasons which Hesketh admitted he did not understand, very few of their messages found their way into the German intelligence summaries.49 In March 1944 the agent TRICYCLE also made a useful contribution to the deception effort when he delivered to his Abwehr agent handlers in Lisbon a false Order of Battle which the OKH intelligence staff at Fremde Heere West ultimately accepted as genuine. However, beyond the misinformation put over by these double agents, the reaction of the Germans to the other lesser agents, such as BRONX, MULLETT, PUPPET and TREASURE, was minimal.50

In late June Ops (B) was enlarged so that its Table of Organization provided for two operating centers: one in France and one in London.51 While Ops (B)
continued to churn out plans and send misinformation to the Germans via the controlled leakage channels well into 1945, the days of strategic deception came to an end toward the end of July 1944. Thereafter, the deceptions were of a tactical nature and often *ad hoc.*

The story of the Special Means strategic deception effort might have ended there—fortunately it did not. After the war, Colonel Roger Hesketh and his brother Cuthbert began work on the SHAEF Ops (B) after action report that became the detailed Hesketh manuscript. Their research efforts included the interrogation of the senior German officers. In March 1946 both Hesketh brothers went to the Bridgend Prisoner of War Camp in South Wales. There they interviewed General der Infanterie Günther Blumentritt, Chief d. Gen.St., Ob. West. In April 1946 Cuthbert Hesketh went to Nuremberg and interrogated Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm Keital, Chef Ob.Kdo. d. Wehrmacht, Generaloberst Alfred Jodl, Chef d. Wehrm. Führungsstab i. Ob.Kdo. d. Wehrm., and Oberst Friedrich-Adolf Krummacher, Abwehr Verbindungs-offizier d. Wehrm. Führungs-stab. Cuthbert Hesketh came away from his interviews at Nuremberg with the firm conviction that the message from agent GARBO, transmitted at seven minutes past midnight on 9 June 1944 literally changed the course of the Battle for the Beachhead.

More will be said about the Nuremberg interviews later, but first a look at the text of the TOP SECRET letter dated 18 April which Cuthbert sent to Roger Hesketh is in order:

*I saw Keital last night. He agreed that the halting of SS Pz.Div. 1 would have been an OKW decision as they were very hesitant and nervous about moving anything from the P. de C. at that time. He could not however recollect the incident, nor could he say for certain what the "bestimmte Unterlagen" [definitive evidences] were. He suggested that it might have been air recce of shipping movements on the South Coast, or some other report from the Kriegsmarine or Luftwaffe. When he saw the RSHA message [, i.e., the GARBO report.] he as good as said, "Well, there you have your answer." He read through the comment at the end [of*
the message] and explained to me that it would have been written by [Oberst] Krummacher and that it exactly represented the frame of mind of the OKW at that moment, which was such that the RSHA report in question would have had just the effect of persuading them to countermand the move of those forces. He added, "This message proves to you that what I have been telling you about our dilemma at that time is correct." Later he said "You can accept as 99% certain that this message was the immediate cause of the counter[manding] order. . . ."

The GARBO message shown to Keital was one received at OKW over the RSHA Mil. Amt teleprinter at 2220 hours. Translated it reads:

V-man Alaric network ARABAL reports on 9th June from [his post in]
England: —

After personal consultation on 8th June in London with my agents Jonny, Dick and Dorick, whose reports were sent today, I am of the opinion, in view of the strong troop concentrations in South-East and Eastern England which are not taking part in the present operation, that these operations are a diversionary maneuver designed to draw off enemy reserves in order to make a decisive attack in another place. In view of the continued air attacks on the concentration area mentioned, which is a strategically favorable position for this, it may very probably take place in the Pas-de-Calais area, particularly since in this area the proximity of the air bases will facilitate the operation by providing continued strong air support.

When he saw the message, Oberst Krummacher underlined in red on the message form the words "diversionary maneuver designed to draw off enemy reserves in order to make a decisive attack in another place," and added this comment at the end of the page:
Confirms the view already held by us that a further attack is to be expected in another place (Belgium?).

The message then was shown to Jodl who initialed it at the top with his green ink, and underlined the words "in South-East and Eastern England." A green ink hieroglyph in the data box at the upper left hand corner of the message form signifies that Jodl considered the message to be of sufficient importance that it should be shown to the Führer. The letters "erl" (i.e., erledigt or "done") in pencil to the right of Jodl's hieroglyph shows that the message was seen personally by Adolf Hitler.\(^{58}\)

The implication of all this business about the GARBO message is explained in Chapter XXIII—"The Invasion Through Enemy Eyes"—in the Hesketh manuscript:

On 8 June, in view of the growing Allied strength in the bridgehead, the remainder of the OKW armored reserve was released, and at half-past ten on that evening an order was issued by Ob. West stating that SS Pz.Div. 1, Pz.Regmt. Großdeutschland of Pz.Div. 116 and certain other troops would with immediate effect come under command of Ob.Kdo. H.Gr. B. Further, Oberbefehlshaber H.Gr. B was to earmark two Infanteriedivisionen in the Pas-de-Calais for employment in the Normandy bridgehead. The Daily Situation Report from Oberbefehlshaber H.Gr. B stated that the SS Pz.Div. 1 was now "moving out of its present area in the district East/North East of Bruges."\(^{59}\)

and,

At half-past seven on the morning of the following day, 10th June, Ob. West issued an order which read as follows: "As a consequence of certain information, Ob. West has declared 'a state of Alarmstufe II for Armeeoberkommando 15' in Belgium and Northern France (for Netherlands Command if Ob.Kdo. H.Gr. B thinks fit). The move of SS Pz.Div. 1 will therefore be halted and it will go into the area previously
occupied by Luftfelddivision 19. The SS. Pz.Div. 1, together with Pz.Div. 116, both of which had already started for Normandy, now converged on the Pas-de-Calais, while the whole of the A.O.K. 15 area as well as Belgium and Holland were ordered to adopt the second or highest degree of alert. On the following day Rommel reported: "In the Netherlands Command and in the A.O.K. 15 area every German soldier and man is standing by night and day for defense."60

It is undeniably clear that some sort of "certain information" had a profound effect on the German decision-making on 10 June.

What had occurred between 2200 hours on 8 June and 0730 on 10 June to cause such a complete reversal of plan at the Berghof? It is clear that, from the moment the first landing took place, the Führer and his entourage were in a highly undecided frame of mind about whether the Normandy beachhead was the Schwerpunkt. Their fear of a second landing was based chiefly on their belief in the existence of the notational FUSAG under General Patton in South East England. On 8 June, under intense Ob.Kdo. H.Gr. B and from Ob. West, the OKW agreed to release armored formations from the Armeeeoberkommando 15 area. Then some report had reached them at the Berghof Führerhauptquartier which caused a change of mind.61

Three Abwehr messages compete for the honor of being the one decisive mind-changing piece of evidence. Roger Hesketh makes a convincing case that it was the GARBO message of 9 June that in fact convinced Hitler and the OKW of the imperative need to countermand the orders designed to reinforce Armeeeoberkommando 7 in the Normandy area by bringing the strong mobile reserves south out of the Armeeeoberkommando 15 area in the Pas-de-Calais sector. Continuing in Chapter XXIII, he lays out his proof:

However, before going any further a word must be said about how the Abwehr reports reached the OKW. By June 1944 all reports from the still existing field elements of Amt Ausland/Abwehr went direct to the RSHA Mil.
Amt in Berlin which, in turn, would circulate summarized versions by teleprinter to the OKW and other interested headquarters (Ob. West was usually included). At the OKW, Oberst Krummacher, was the liaison officer between RSHA and the OKW. If he thought an incoming message was of sufficient importance he would show it to Generaloberst Jodl who initialed it. In his turn, if Jodl thought the Führer also should see it, then Jodl put a different kind of mark on it and added, if Hitler has seen it, either "erl" (erledigt) or "hat K" (hat Kenntnis). As it turned out, three Abwehr messages passed through Oberst Krummacher's hands during the critical time period which might have influenced the thinking of Hitler and Jodl. With this back-ground the reader can better weigh the evidence that Roger Hesketh marshalls in favor of the GARBO message as being the Abwehr report that turned the tide of history.62

Hesketh continues his presentation of the evidence:

The first [Abwehr message] came in at 1335 hours on 9 June. It concerned an intercepted wireless message from London to an Allied organization in Brussels of which the Germans had gained control. The message contained two code phrases: "Message pour la petite Berte" and "Salomon a sauté ses grands sabots." The first code phrase was alleged by the German Intelligence to mean that a landing would take place "the day after tomorrow at the latest" and the second that the invasion fleet had already started. The Abwehrstelle forwarding the message commented that the Allies must have known that this network was under German control and that in consequence it was probably deceptive, but the senior headquarters through which the message passed expressed the view that the Allies had not had time to discover that the organization had been penetrated and that it must in consequence be taken at its face value. . . . Krummacher did not think it of sufficient importance to show to Jodl.

According, discounting this message, Hesketh continues:
The second message came in on 9th June at 1810 hours [from the uncontrolled agent JOSEPHINE in Stockholm] . . . as follows: "Very reliable V-man reports regarding invasion situation early on 9th June (time of report the night of 8th June): General opinion, according to statements of War Office spokesman to English and American journalist after-noon of 8th June (conference takes place thrice daily), is that conditions for Allied landing troops have improved. Impression shared in authoritative British military circles. According to statements by Harrison, an absolutely clear picture on the British side cannot yet be given as the critical period for the invading troops is only just beginning. Strength so far employed is also described by him as considerable, greater than was originally intended. In his opinion and according to information from other sources a second main attack across the Channel directed against the Pas-de-Calais is to be expected. . . . British public very optimistic. But views in political circles more cautious. In Conservative circles the danger of too heavy losses is continually emphasized, whereas the Labour Party and other Left-wing movements are very satisfied with the beginning of the invasion." It is marked "sofort" [i.e., "urgent"] in Krummacher's handwriting and was seen [both] by Jodl and the Führer.63

Concerning this message, Hesketh explains:

As [the second message] . . . was the work of an uncontrolled agent it will be necessary to explain very shortly a new development in their technique which was becoming evident at this time and was causing us a good deal of embarrassment [in London]. The evidence of Most Secret Sources [i.e., the ISOS deciphers of the Abwehr transmissions,] was beginning to make the conclusion almost irresistible that the uncontrolled agents, or at any rate the two most highly regarded ones—OSTRO in Lisbon and JOSEPHINE in Stockholm—had acquired some knowledge of the FORTITUDE story. It is true that a second attack on the Pas-de-Calais following after the Normandy invasion might have been guessed at by any
intelligent but uninformed person as the likely sequence of future events, but there were too many similarities of de-tail to allow us to attribute this development to chance. We now know that Dr. [Karl-Heinz] Krämer [—a German journalist living in Stockholm who ran the fictional agent JOSEPHINE—] had in fact access to Abwehr documents. This also was very probably true in the case of [Paul Fidrmuc, a German-Czech businessman in Lisbon who ran the fictional agent] OSTRO, though this point has not been proved. It was through these documents that Dr. Krämer read successive installments of the FORTITUDE story and handed them to the Germans a second time with his own embellishments. The effect, mainly unfortunate, of this practice upon our own efforts to deceive will be considered in greater detail in a later chapter [concerning Arnhem]. All that need be said here is that if this particular message of JOSEPHINE contributed in any way to the issue of the countermanding order we [at Ops (B)] may perhaps be allowed to claim a part of the credit since [Dr. Krämer] . . . was taking his cue from us and basing his appreciation on the assumed presence of FUSAG on the South East of England, a force which he himself had done nothing to establish in the German mind.54

Accordingly, and on the basis of further the proof which follows, Roger Hesketh discounts the probability of the scales being tipped by the JOSEPHINE message.

Hesketh’s convincing argument in favor of the GARBO message is stated as follows:

The third and last message arrived at [the Berghof at] 2220 hours on 9th June. . . . [Earlier,] at seven minutes past mid-night on 9th June GARBO began to send his great message, the transmission continuing without a break until nine minutes past two in the morning. Having announced that agents 7(2), 7(4) and 7(7) had arrived in London and delivered their reports, GARBO proceeded to give a full list of the major formations, real
and fictitious, in Sussex, Kent and East Anglia. This, in effect, was a summary and a re-capitulation of the reports of the previous days. He also referred for the first time to landing craft on the rivers Deben and Orwell…. [T]he message concluded thus: "From the reports mentioned it is perfectly clear that the present attack is a large-scale operation but [it is] diversionary in character for the purpose of establishing a strong bridgehead in order to draw the maximum of our reserves to the area of operation and to retain them there so as to be able to strike a blow somewhere else with ensured success. I never like to give my opinion unless I have strong reasons to justify my assurances, but the fact that these concentrations which are in the East and South East of the Island are now inactive means that they must be held in reserve to be employed in the other large-scale operations. The constant aerial bombardment which the area of the Pas-de-Calais has suffered and the strategic disposition of these forces gives reason to suspect an attack in that region of France which, at the same time, offers the shortest route for the final objective of their illusions, which is to say, Berlin. This advance could be covered by a constant hammering from the air forces since the bases would be near the field of battle and they would come in behind our forces which are fighting at the present moment with the enemy disembarked in the West of France. From [agent] J(5) I learnt yesterday that there were seventy-five divisions in this country be-fore the present assault commenced. Supposing they should use a maximum of twenty to twenty-five divisions, they would be left with some fifty divisions with which to attempt a second blow. I trust you will submit urgently all these re-ports and studies to our High Command since moments may be decisive in these times and before taking a false step, through lack of knowledge of the necessary facts, they should have in their possession all the present information which I transmit with my opinion which is based on the belief that the whole of the present attack is set as a trap for the enemy to make
us move all our reserves in a hurried strategic disposition which we would later regret."

GARBO’s message was received at his control, Abwehrstelle Madrid, and sent on to RSHA Mil. Amt in Berlin. There it was summarized and sent to Oberst Krummacher at the Berghof Führerhauptquartier at 2220 hours in the abbreviated form noted above. Included with the message was this comment by RSHA Mil. Amt:

The report is credible. The reports received in the last week from the ARABAL (GARBO) undertaking have been confirmed almost without exception and are to be described as especially valuable. The main line of investigation in future is to be the enemy group of forces in South Eastern and Eastern England.

As noted above, when confronted with the text of the GARBO message, Generalfeldmarschall Keital replied: "there you have your answer."

Hesketh’s narrative continues:

Later, when the other two messages came to light these two were put before Keital and Jodl. They both dismissed the message containing the code phrases to the sabotage organization in Brussels as being of little importance. Jodl did so largely on the ground that the hieroglyphics proved that Krummacher had not thought it of sufficient importance to show to himself. They both thought that the other two must have had a decisive influence. Jodl gave a slight preference to JOSEPHINE. Keital on the other hand held to his original view. "I am personally still of the opinion that [the] message [from GARBO] . . . played the decisive rôle, [the one from JOSEPHINE] . . . had the second place in importance. . . ." Whatever the relative importance of the three messages, they both agreed that GARBO’s message as it came in last of the three must have tipped the balance. There is, however, yet one more pointer in GARBO’s favor. It will
be remembered that his messages came through Madrid, while those of JOSEPHINE came from Stockholm. Attached to the OKW War Diary were a number of appendices, one of which contained copies of important documents relating to the Normandy invasion which were received from day to day at the OKW. On Jodl's instructions the OKW War Diary [itself] was preserved . . . , but unfortunately . . . the appendices [to it] were destroyed . . . so that we have only the bare headings. Of the four "invasion" documents included for 10th June one is entitled "News from Madrid" (Nachricht aus Madrid). There is no corresponding heading entitled "News from Stockholm." It is natural to suppose that any message which [supported a countermand order which] altered the course of a campaign should have been thought worthy of inclusion in an appendix to the War Diary.66

Thus, Hesketh concludes:

Taking the evidence as a whole, the reader probably will agree that GARBO’s report decided the issue. But what-ever view one may take it must always be remembered that no message would have spurred the Germans to action on the morning of 10th June had they not already been convinced of the presence of FUSAG beyond the Straits of Dover. And the establishment of that force on either side of the Thames Estuary had been the combined achievement of [both] GARBO and BRUTUS.67

In the view of this author, Hesketh—in the style of a trained barrister—has established his case in favor of the GARBO message beyond a reasonable doubt.

More could be written on how the false FUSAG Order of Battle was built up, and on many other aspects of the deception efforts that preceded and followed the Normandy invasion, but limitations of space prevents saying more now. The anecdote focused on here is the one which illustrates the critical payoff of the efforts of Ops (B) Special Means. The rest of Hesketh’s great history—the whole story of "FORTITUDE – A History of Strategic Deception in North Western Europe – April,
1943 to May, 1945”—necessarily must await the publication by Roger Hesketh of his manuscript as a book.  

A lot has been written in recent years to the effect that surprise is the great force multiplier, and that a little bit of deception goes a long way. That is only half the story. Roger Hesketh's manuscript brings out the fundamental truth which is: Good Intelligence—the truth, timely told—is the real force multiplier. Without good intelligence, properly used, one can never hope to plan and execute a good military operation—let alone a good deception operation. Without very good intelligence, properly analyzed, one can never defend against deception or avoid surprise. Surprise is not a free good. It has to be bought and paid for with a proper deception plan that is grounded on reliable intelligence about what one's adversary is thinking. It would be a tragic shame to see Hesketh's teaching on this point be lost to future generations as a result of the decision of the British Government to withdraw the necessary permission to publish. Hopefully, this decision will be reversed so that all the public will have a chance to read this unique historical record. Happily it finally happened, after Margaret Thatcher was no longer the Prime Minister.

--- The End ---

Endnotes begin on the following page.
Endnotes


2. Oklahoma University School of Law (L.L.B.), 1964; Notre Dame University, 1961 (B.B.A.). Defense Intelligence School 1969. At the time this paper was written, Tom Cubbage was a Senior Counsel in the Office of the General Counsel, Phillips Petroleum Company. In the period 1965-71, he served to the rank of Major in the Military Intelligence Branch of the U.S. Army. While in the Republic of Vietnam he was an intelligence collection operations officer; later he was the Army Middle East current intelligence analyst in the Pentagon. He has studied and written about the German estimates concerning the opening of a Second Front which also studies the factors which lead to the failure of estimates and the apparent inevitability of surprise.

3. Roger Fleetwood Hesketh, "FORTITUDE: A History of Strategic Deception in North Western Europe – April, 1943 to May, 1945," (MS prepared for Ops (B) SHAEF, London, February 1949, 259 pages). A copy of Hesketh's historical manuscript was previously in the custody of this author (it is now in at the" Cubbage Collection” at the Combined Arms Research Library at Fort Leavenworth. Kanas). In its official printed form the Hesketh manuscript bears all of the hallmarks of a book, but throughout this review this author shall refer to it as the "manuscript," and its shall be cited as the "Manuscript."


5. Plan BODYGUARD was approved by the Combined Chief of Staff on 20 January 1944, and sent to SHAEF for the purpose of planning on 22 January. C.C.S. 459/2, 20 January 1944, Plan "Bodyguard," with enclosures, and Memorandum for the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, 22 January 1944, subject: "Overall Deception Policy for War Against Germany.” Record Group 331, Records of SHAEF, File No. 381 Bodyguard, Modern Military Records Branch, National Archives, Washington, D.C. For the FORTITUDE plan, see SHAEF
(44) 13, 23 February 1944, PLAN 'FORTITUDE'; Record Group 319, Records of the Army Staff, Cover and Deception, File No. ETO Exhibit G, "Operations in Support of Neptune North"" (B) "Fortitude, Entry 101, Folder No. 8, Box 1, MMRB, NA, Wash., D.C.; SHAEF (44) 21, 26 February 1944, Subject: Plan 'FORTITUDE' (NEPTUNE), Record Group 319, Records of the Army Staff, Cover and Deception, File No. ETO Exhibit G, "Operations in Support of Neptune" (A) "Fortitude North", Entry 101, Folder No. 7, Box 1, MMRB, NA, Wash., D.C.; SHAEF Ref No: - N.J.C./00/261/33, n.d., Subject: Part I COVER PLAN - FORTITUDE SOUTH, with Appendix 'B' (Naval) and Appendix 'D' (Air Plan), Record Group 319, Records of the Army Staff, Cover and Deception, File No. ETO Exhibit G, "Operations in Support of Neptune" (C) "Fortitude North", Entry 101, Folder No. 9, Box 1, MMRB, NA, Wash., D.C.; SHAEF/18209/Ops (b), 3 June 1944, Record Group 381, Records of SHAEF, File No. Fortitude, MMRB, NA, Wash., D.C.

6 Letter of 29 October 1986 from R. F. Hesketh to this author. The reasons for the re-imposition of the official embargo are not at all clear. In a letter to this author dated on 21 November 1986, William J. Casey, the Director of Central Intelligence, said that he was "surprised to find that the publication had been prohibited in England. I understand that quite a few copies had gotten into circulation and was overly surprised that it was not published for public consumption." There are two possible explanations for the renewal of the embargo: (1) the British Government does not wish to exhibit an apparent double standard—allowing publication of one but not another—during the course of its effort to keep the Peter Wright's book, Spycatcher: The Candid Autobiography of a Senior Intelligence Officer (New York: Viking Penguin Inc., 1987), from being published in England; or (2) the government wished to without publication authority until after publication of Michael Howard's official history of deception operations, a document that been in the hands of the Historical Section of the Cabinet Office since about 1978. Howard’s long-awaited book finally came in 1990. See, Michael Eliot Howard, Strategic Deception in World War II: Volume 5 Strategic Intelligence (this is the last of the five book series on the British Intelligence in the Second World War, edited by F.M. Hinsley)(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

7 This author had been informed in 1986 by confidential sources that the embargo would be lifted in the near future. The publisher Frank Cass has told this author in January 1987 that he has agreed in principle to publish the manuscript. Alas, publication did not come for another twelve years. See, Roger Hesketh, Fortitude: The D-Day Deception Campaign (London: St. Ermin’s Press, 1999) 495 pages.

9 Hesketh, "Manuscript," Preface. The full text of Francis Bacon's "Of Vaine-Glory" and his other essays are to be found in, among other places, Francis Bacon, The Essays: Or Counsels Civill & Moral (Norwalk, CT: The Heritage Press, 1972), 171-72.


12 Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, 49-51, citing Memorandum, Morgan for Br. COS, Cross-Channel Operations, 21 March 1943, Annex to COS(43)148(O), 23 March 1943.

13 Roger Fleetwood Hesketh, "Introduction, Part I", n.d., 2. Several years after his 1949 manuscript was completed, Hesketh prepared two short introductory notes which contain an organizational history of the deception units in Great Britain. As these notes were not part of the original document, they are referred to hereafter under the description of "Introductory Notes, Part I" or "Part II."

14 Hesketh, "Introductory Notes, Part I," 1.

16 Montagu, Beyond Top Secret Ultra, 40, 140, 148.

17 Montagu, Beyond Top Secret Ultra, 53-54.

18 Montagu, Beyond Top Secret Ultra, 41.


20 Montagu, Beyond Top Secret Ultra, 62.


22 Montagu, Beyond Top Secret Ultra, 48, 50.


27 Haswell, The Tangled Web, 94. In addition to Bevan and Wingate, there was R.A.F. Squadron Leader Dennis Wheatley, Majors Neil Gordon Clark, Derrick Morley, Harold Peteval, and Commander James Arbuthnott, R.N. They were assisted by Sir Reginald Hoare from the Foreign Office and Professor Andrade, President of the Royal Society, the science advisor. Dennis Wheatley, “Deception in World War II (a review of


29 Montagu, Beyond Top Secret Ultra, 133-34.

30 Hesketh, "Introductory Notes, Part II," 1.


32 Hesketh, "Introductory Notes, Part I," 1-2; "Introductory Notes, Part II," 1.


36 Hesketh, "Introductory Notes, Part I," 2. The leakage of information -- both true and false -- through the covert use of diplomatic channels was another, albeit far less effective, means of controlled leakage.

37 Hesketh, "Introductory Notes, Part II," 2.
38 Hesketh, "Introductory Notes, Part I," 2.


41 Hesketh, "Introductory Notes, Part I," 3.

42 Hesketh, "Introductory Notes, Part I," 3.

43 Hesketh, "Introductory Notes, Part I," 3. Appendix V of Hesketh's "Manuscript" is the part of the Outline Plan for Special Means, SHAEF/24132/4/SM/OPS, dtd. 6 May 1944, detailing in chronological order the movement of every formation involved in the operation. The purpose of such an outline was to provide Ops (B) with a framework within which the movement of the controlled agents, real and notational, could be made to synchronize with those the real and imaginary troops which Ops (B) wishes to be brought to the attention of the Germans. The outline also served to correlate the date of the agent's messages. Ibid, 3-4.


46 Hesketh, "Introductory Notes," 4. The thirteen pages of Appendix XIII in Hesketh's "Manuscript," lists the content and the date of approximately one hundred and fifty Ops (B) messages sent by GARBO, BRUTUS, TATE, FREAK, and PANDORA, all of which found there way into either the OKH Lagebricht West or the Ueberblick des Britischen Reiches between 1 February and 18 December 1944. In that period both GARBO and BRUTUS account for about sixty-five each. See also Juan Pujol and Nigel West, Operation Garbo: The Personal Story of the Most Successful Double Agent of World War II,(New York: Random House, Inc., 1985), 5, 7, 146.


Hesketh, "Introductory Notes, Part I," 4-5. Hesketh notes that out of a total of two hundred and eight passages in the OKH Lagebricht West and the Ueberblick des Britischen Reiches whose inclusion can be attributed to the work of B.1.A. controlled agents, ninety one came from BRUTUS, eighty-six from GARBO, but only eleven came from TATE.

Hesketh, "Introductory Notes, Part I," 4-5. Masterman, The Double-Cross System, 159-61. The German were paying attention to certain other agents and this was a source of concern at SHAEF. According to J. C. Masterman:

In the autumn of 1943 . . . we became aware that certain Germans in the [Iberian] Peninsula, notably OSTRO, were in fact giving information to the Germans which, as they declared, came from their agents in England. In fact these agents were notational, and their reports were constructed from rumor aided by invention and surmise. To us, however, they seemed in the highest degree dangerous. Not only was it possible that OSTRO reports would gain more credence in Berlin than the reports of our own agents, bit it was not impossible that OSTRO might by a fluke give the exact area of the attack on the Continent, and thus destroy the deception plan. . . . [A] variety of schemes were put forward for the elimination of OSTRO. They did not succeed.

Ibid, 151. According to Roger F. Hesketh: "On the 31st May, 1944, [Paul Fidrmuc, a German-Czech businessman in Lisbon, known to the RSHA Mil. Amt as agent] OSTRO, gave a correct forecast of the invasion. There is no evidence to show that his message was based on anything more solid that his own imagination." Hesketh, "Manuscript," Conclusion, 173, fn.1. According to Albert Speer, the Führer made pointed reference to the "correct" agent report at the mid-day conference at the Berghof on 6 June:

Hitler seemed more set than ever of his preconceived idea that the enemy was trying to mislead him. "Do you recall? Among all the many reports we've received there was one that exactly predicted the landing site and the day and the hour. That only confirms my opinion that [this landing in Normandy] is not the real invasion yet."

51 According to J. C. Masterman: "The 212 Committee was formed in August 1944 by Twenty-first and Twelth Army Groups on the model of the Twenty Committee. The objects of the [212] Committee, which was afterwards taken over by SHAEF, were to approve traffic for controlled agents, to direct the deception policy governing the traffic, and to authorize the use of controlled agents for particular operations. The [212] Committee ran all double-cross agents on the Continent and continued to operate successfully until the conclusion of hostilities. Meanwhile, the old system continued in this country." Masterman, *The Double-Cross System*, 167.

52 Hesketh, "Introductory Notes, Part I," 5. In the five pages of Chapter XXXII in the manuscript Hesketh recounts the efforts made to provide a cover plan for Operation MARKET, the airborne attacks directed at the capture of the bridges between Arnhem and the Belgian frontier. He also tells of the messages from the fictional agent JOSEPHINE being sent to Berlin by Dr. Krämer, the German journalist residing in Stockholm. *Ibid*, "Manuscript," 102, 146-47. In the end the Germans wrongly concluded that JOSEPHINE was a double agent under British control for deception purposes! *Ibid*, 173, and Appendix XIV, 245-46.

53 Hesketh, "Introductory Notes, Part I," 5. The results of that interview became the basis for Chapter XXII of the manuscript entitled "German Opinion in May." *Ibid*.


55 Hesketh, "Introductory Notes, Part I," 5-6.

56 On 18 February 1944, Hitler had removed Admiral Wilhelm Canaris from his post as head of *Amt Ausland/Abwehr*. That began the long process of absorption of the *Abwehr* headquarters into the *Reichssicherheitshauptamt* where it became *RSHA Mil. Amt* under the control of Obergruppenführer SS Ernst Kaltenbrunner. Gilles Perrault, *The Secret of
Roger Hesketh: FORTITUDE — Strategic Deception in Northwest Europe 4-43 to 5-45


57 Hesketh, Manuscript, iii. The actual message from *RSHA Mil. Amt* to *OKW*, *RSHA/Paris*, and *Ob. West* reads:

> V- ALARIC UNTERNEHMEN ARABAL MELDET 9. JUNI AUS ENGLAND:..
> NACH PERSÖNLICHER RUECKSPRACHE AM 8 JUNI IN LONDON MIT MEINEN AGENTEN JONNY, DICK UND DORICK, DEREN MELDUNGEN HEUTE UEBERMITTELT, BIN ICH AUF GRUND DER STARKEN TRUPPENBEREITSTELLUNGEN IN SUEDOST UND OSTENGLAND, DIE AN AUGENBLICKLICHEN OPERATIONEN NICHT BETAILET SIND, DER ANSICHT, DAS DIE OPERATIONEN ABLenkungsmanoever SIND MIT ZWECK FEINDLICHE RESERVEN AUF SICH ZU ZIEHEN, UM DANN ENTSCHEIDENEN STOSS AN ANDERER STELLE ZU FUEHREN.
> DIESES KOENNTEN UNTER BERUECKSICHTIGUNG DER FORTGESETZTEN LUFTANGRIFFE AN DER HIER FUER STRATEGISCH GUNSTIGEN LAGE DES ERWAEHNTEN BEREITSTELLUNGSRAUMES SEHR WOHL IN DER GEGEND PAS DE CALAIS ERFOLGEN, INSBESONDERE DA BEI EINEM SOLCHEN ANGRIFF DIE NAHER GELEGENEN LUFTSTUETZPUNKTE FORTGESETZT STAERKSTE UNTERSTUETZUNG DURCH LUFTSTREITKRAEFTE EINES SOLCHEN UNTERNEHMENS ERLEICHTERN WUERDEN.=
> RSHA, MIL. AMT, BR B NR 9495/44....

The message was put on the teleprinter at *RSHA* in Berlin at 1850 hours and was received by Oberst Krummacher at the *OKW* liaison office at the *Berghof Führerhauptquartier* near Berchtesgaden at 2220 hours.

58 Hesketh, "Manuscript," iv.

59 Hesketh, "Manuscript." 100.

60 Hesketh, "Manuscript," 100. "[T]he movements of at least four divisions, and perhaps six, were affected by the counter order." *Ibid.*

62 Hesketh, "Manuscript," 101. The notation "erl" translates as "done" and "hat K" as "he is aware."

63 Hesketh, "Manuscript," 101-102. Harrison is a fictitious Air Marshal to whom JOSEPHINE attributed much of his most sensational intelligence. It is possible that he was thinking of Air Marshal Harris, but mistook the name. Ibid, 102.

64 Hesketh, "Manuscript," 101-102. According to David Irving Krämer was the Counsellor of the German Legation in Stockholm. David Irving, Hitler's War 1942-1945 (London: Papermac, 1983, 842, fn. 531. Dr. Krämer ran two agents, JOSEPHINE and HECTOR. Both were seen from the British viewpoint as "uncontrolled" and it is most probable that they were purely fictional agents—the notational product of Krämer's fertile journalistic imagination. It has been established that Dr. Krämer's motive for his game was pecuniary and he used the supposed needs of his agents for a certain compensation to get money from the Abwehr—money he pocketed for himself. Ibid, 102, fn. 19. In intelligence jargon, Dr. Krämer was a "papermill."


67 Hesketh, "Manuscript," 104.

68 As noted above, the long awaited publication only came in 1999. According to sources this editor considers reliable, in the interim there were some UK scholars who had in their possession, pre-embargo copies of the Hesketh Manuscript. If they prepared any papers relying on the document they always cited this article, and a parallel article (concerning Hesketh's Epilogue) as their sources. Doing so, I was told, was a "wink-wink" code revealing to others that they based their work on the whole original, but did not explicitly acknowledge it as a way of avoiding running afoul of the UK's Official Secrets Act. Perhaps this is true?